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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY*
 
In addition to explaining the background of the accompanying 
case study, this introduction attempts to view the experiences and 
lessons of the CBIRD project in South Korea in a broader internation­
al perspective. 
WHAT IS CBIRD? 
CBIRD (pronounced sea-bird) is the acronym for a development 
concept devised in the early 1970s by the Save the Children Federa­
tion/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF) on the basis of 
their many years of experience with helping the underprivileged in 
a variety of developing countrlea. ** CBIRD, though often referred 
to as such, is actually not a "model" in the strict sense; it is more 
in the nature of a particular strategy, based on a certain set of 
principles and goals, that can be flexibly applied in different situa­
tions in a wide variety of ways. 
The CBIRD idea was first introduced in South Korea where 
SCF/CDF had operated for many years, but it is not limited to 
South Korea. In recent years SCF/CDF has sought to introduce the 
*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs in behalf of ICED. 
**Save the Children Federation (SCF) began as a voluntary 
children's relief organization in the USA during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. After World War II, SCF extended its child relief acti­
vities overseas to several developing countries--one of the first being 
South Korea in the immediate wake of the Korean War. After the 
mid-1950s SCF expanded its program scope beyond simple relief to 
individual children and began supporting self-help development 
efforts by poor families and communities that could bring about more 
lasting improvements. To promote and implement these broader self­
help projects in the field, SCF created the Community Development 
Foundation (CDF) in 1957 and established the first CDF field office 
in South Korea--which later became the sponsor and manager of the 
CBIRD Project. The two names have since been merged--the official 
name of the parent organization now being Save the Children Feder­
ation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF). But since 
most Koreans still associate the separate CDF name with CBIRD, the 
authors of the case study have used this shorthand identification
except when referring to the parent organization (as SCF/CDF). 
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a moresame strategy--though in very different specific forms and on 
modest scale--in 17 other less developed countries in Asia and the 
Pacific, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The South Korean 
version, however, represents the most comprehensive, sophisticated 
and ambitious application of the general approach thus far. 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS 
CBIRD in South Korea held special interest for ICED because 
it is a living embodiment of the naw international consensus on rural 
development that has evolved since the early 1970s and is receiving 
wide attention today. This new international consensus advocates 
a more "integrated" and "community-based" approach to rural develop­
ment and in particular a concerted effort to improve the condition of 
the poorest of the rural poor, the status and role of women, and the 
welfare of young children. This appealing rhetoric has now been 
adopted and is being actively promoted by virtually all United Nations 
and bilateral development agencies, by various voluntary organiza­
tions, and by top policy-makers in a growing number of developing 
countries. 
The big problem everyone faces at this juncture, however, is 
how to translate this popular rhetoric into effective actions. This 
is proving to be much more difficult than the rhetoric itself suggests, 
and than many people had supposed. The difficulties arise in part 
from the inherent complexities of traditional rural societies and the 
stubborn obstacles that stand in the way of transforming them--even 
in such an economically prosperous and rapidly modernizing society 
as South Korea. Equally serious difficulties also arise, however, from 
the fact that the unconventional strategy and goals espoused by the 
new consensus run directly counter to the conventional doctrines and 
approaches to rural development that have prevailed almost univer­
sally over the past 25 years, and to the way national and international 
development agencies are structured and accustomed to thinking and 
operating. 
Most govornment rural programs--ranging from agricultural 
extension and rural credit to health, nutrition, family planning and 
educational services--have been and still are operated independently 
by various specialized agencies, each with its own "delivery system" 
and cadre of field agents. As a result, rural programs are highly 
fragmentod--the very antithesis of integration--and the bureaucra­
cies that. run them are disinclined to yield any of their autonomy in 
the Interest of better integration. Further, these rural programs are 
structured and operated in a hierarchical, top-down fashion, leaving 
little room or incentive for participation by the rural people and 
communities they are meant to serve. Unfortunately, also, these 
programs--less by design than by force of circumstances--have 
generally by-passed the poorest segments of the rural population. 
Such benefits as they may provide accrue mainly to the better-off, 
thus widening the already large socioeconomic gaps that exist within 
many villages and often zctually worsening the plight of the most 
disadvantaged. In like manner, what are euphemistically labeled 
"women's programs" and "children's programs" often turn out on 
close inspection to be little more than token gestures. 
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The architects of CBIRD believed that these serious deficiencies. 
could be substantially remedied, if not entirely overcome, by creating 
an integrated, bottom-up development system, managed by local com­
munity committees, that could be linked, close to the grass roots 
level, with the top-down government services. 
In the context of South Korea, the new CBIRD Initiative happily 
coincided with a strong commitment by the central government to 
promote and invest substantial amounts in rural development under 
the aegis of the Saemaul Undong tNew Community Movement). This 
strongly top-down campaign put great pressure on all the lower 
echelon administrators of various bureaucracies to coordinate their 
rural activities. It also, paradoxically, put great pressure on the 
villages to engage in bottom-up community planning and extensive 
self-help efforts. The new CBIRD initiative also coincided with an 
extraordinarily dynamic national economy that provided an unusually 
favorable climate for rural development. 
The promoters of CBIRD took skillful advantage of these circum­
stances and tailored their strategy to harmonize with the Government's 
efforts, but going substantially beyond them by establishing much 
stronger and more sophisticated mechanisms for local planning and 
development management. 
The evidence in the case study portrays an impressive record 
of accomplishment. The CBIRD community-based system, all things 
considered, is working remarkably well in the six selected rural 
"impact areas." It has clearly contributed significantly to increased 
productivity and income and to improved living standards In these 
areas. Its largest and most visible achievements have been on the 
economic side. The main weakness in the performance record, 
according to the case study's evaluation, are in the area of social 
welfare services and help to the poorest 20 percent or so of the 
population. But this, according to the analysis, was not for any 
lack of trying on the part of CBIRD's sponsors and field personnel. 
The main causes of the imbalance between income-increasing projects 
that would benefit mostly the middle and higher level farmers, and 
social welfare and other efforts designed to benefit the poor, the 
women and the young children, were rooted in the traditions and 
social structure of the communities themselves and reflected the felt 
needs and ordering of priorities as seen by the local decision-makers. 
This phenomenon is not unique, of course, to the Korean 
context; it can be found in a great many rural societies. But it 
happens to be unusually well analyzed and brought into focus by 
this particular case study. 
SOME WIDELY APPLICABLE LESSONS 
The findings of this case study, though confined to South 
Korea, lend support to the following general propositions that have 
relevance for rural development planners in many developing 
countries. 
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(1) 	 If any externally designed rural development model is to 
its original basic assumptions,have a reasonable chance of success, 
and strategy must come to terms with the traditional valuegoals, 
system, human relationships and felt needs of the rural society into 
which it is being introduced. This requires a process of sensitive 
and skillful compromise and adaptation; otherwise the alien scheme 
will be rejected like an incompatible heart or liver transplant from 
the human body. The CBIRD experience in South Korea offers use­
ful lessons on how such a process can be successfully conducted, and 
on why the necessary compromises are likely to result in a significant 
gap between the originally proclaimr :1 goals of the imported model and 
the realities of its actual accomplishments. 
would be unrealistic to expect an intervention of this(2) It 
to br.ig about, all by itself, a 	fundamentalsort in a few pilot areas 
structure, traditionaltransformation of the existing socioeconomic 
values, and pattern of human relationships in these areas. If proper­
ly adapted to locally felt needs, preferences and mores, as well as 
such an intervention-­to prevailing government policies and programs, 
as the CBIRD experience demonstrates--can result in impressive 
improvements. But a fundamental transformation of existing village 
structures and behavior patterns can only be brought about by 
broader and deeper nationwide economic, political and social changes. 
South Korea in the 1970s was a textbook example of such broad 
dynamic changes and provided a highly favorable climate for the 
CBIRD projects. 
(3) The rate and extent of local improvements that can be 
brought about by an innovative rural intervention--such as CBIRD-­
also depende heavily on the development potential of the particular 
rural areas to which it is applied. This potential is determined by 
a combination of factors such as topography and natural resources, 
social cohesiveness or divisiveness, physical access to markets, the 
nature and strength of local institutions and traditions of coopera­
tion, and the availability of dynamic local leadership. The importance 
of these factors, as well as their geographic variations, are well 
illustrated by the different CBIRD impact areas. 
(4) Achieving a sizeable and permanent improvement in the 
position of the poorest families in virtually any rural area--as 
distinct from temporary infusions of charitable relief--is a far more 
difficult task thani the currently popular rhetoric suggests. This 
proved to be the case even in the unusually prosperous circumstances 
of rural South Korea in the 1970s, despite the best efforts of CBIRD's 
sponsors. This in no way diminishes the importance of the goal of 
helping the rural poor, buL IL does caution against creating unrealistic 
hopes and expectations that in the end can only lead to disappoint­
ment and disillusionment and to making the task even more difficult 
the next time around. 
(5) The pressures from many quarters on the managers of
 
rural development projects to produce quick, visible and quanti­
tatively measurable results tend to create program distortions and
 
to become a major obstacle to achieving equally important qualitative
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changes and improvements. There is a crucial message here for 
decisionmakers and quantitatively-minded program analysts and 
evaluators of major funding aLencies. 
The above observations are in no way intended as criticisms of 
the CBIRD program in South Korea. On the contrary, the fact that 
CIBRD's managers were able to cope with the realities of the situa­
tion, to take such good advantage of the favorable :actors in the 
South Korean context, and to navigate so skillfully around the 
obstacles, is a tribute to their sensitivity, ability and devotion. 
HOW THE REPORT WAS PRODUCED 
This report is the result of a collaborative effort by two social 
scientists--art American social anthropologist and a Korean rural 
sociologist--who were exceptionally well-qualified for the assignment. 
Professor Vincent S. R. Brandt had studied Korean society for many 
years and just prior to the present case study had engaged in an 
extensive case study of the Saemaul Undong (New Community Move­
ment) mentioned earlier, which forms an important part of the 
context of the CBIRD program. Dr. 3i Woong Ch~ong, Professor of 
Community Development at the College of Agriculture of Seoul 
National University, had done numerous previous field studies of 
rural development h.both Korea and the Plilippines and already had 
a first-hand acquaintance with the CBIRD program. 
These researchers were encouraged by ICED to give special 
attention to qualitative evaluation of the CBIRD projects in terms of 
organizational and interpersonal relationships and environmental 
adaptations. At the same time they have Included extensive 
quantitative 'vidence of improvements in productivity, income and 
social welfare in the impact areas. Of the six CBIRD rural Impact 
areas in Korea, fonr are described here in some detail. Each of the 
authors, while responsible for writing about two areas, visited all 
four in order to obtain a general, comparative perspective. 
The data on which the report is based comprise extensive 
personal observations at the village lev,92, numerous interviews with 
local leaders and ordinary farmers and fishermen, and long discus­
sions with CDF Coordinators in the field and with the Director and 
Staff of the SCF/CDF office in Seoul. In addition the authors 
have consulted and drawn upon the large body of descriptive and 
statistical documentation compiled by SCF/CDF. 
Tho field rasearuh was carried out over several weeks between 
August and October 1978, during which time the researchers worked 
closely together exchanging data and observations and discussing 
conclusions. For logistical reasons, however, the report itself was 
drafted mainly by Professor Brandt, working on his own, after 
returning to the United States. Thus, while Dr. Cheong contributed 
importantly to the substance of the report, Professor Brandt has 
asked that it be made clear that he personally accepts final 
responsibility for the views end interpretations expressed in it. 
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CHAPTER I
 
THE CBIRD CONCEPT AND GOALS
 
The Save the Children Federation/Community Development 
Foundation (SCF/CDF) of Westport, Connecticut, U.S.A. has been 
engaged since 1973 in an innovative, systematic, and highly organized 
effort to increase rural income and upgrade the quality of village life 
in South Korea. SCF/CDF, a nonprofit, sectarian, voluntary organ­
ization, has appropriately named its Korean program, "Community-
Based Inte grated Rural Dovelopment" (CBIRD). 
Funds to support the CBIRD program are obtained from several 
sources: 1) SCF/CDF funds raised privately in the United States; 
2) an Operational Program Grant from the United States Agency for 
International Development; 3) Republic of Korea Government funds; 
and 4) contributions and investments by the villagers themselves. 
BACKGROUND
 
Save the Children Federation began its work in Korea in 1953 
by providing aid to war orphnns, widows and refugees. Money con­
tributed by individual American "sponsors" and relief supplies were 
distributed to the families of needy Korean children during the period 
of extreme deprivation that followed the Korean War. In particular 
SCF focused its efforts on uprooted refugee groups in an attempt to 
preserve family cohesion and stability. 
A transition took place after 1957 when SC'F established an 
office of its newly created Community Developme-nt Foundation (CDF) 
in Seoul as its representative in Korea. * Thereafter aid in the form 
of cash and relief goods was increasingly converted to self-help 
support, with CDF providing assistance to poor families in both 
urban and rural communities. Support 3pread to encompass children's 
educational scbolarships, family self-help plans, and community 
improvement projects. In order to increase family productivity, CDF 
encouraged and assisted farmers in the raising of livestock and 
the cultivation of cash crop vegetables. For the community as a 
whole there was support for such public works projects as land 
reclamation, bridge and reservoir construction, and improved sources 
of drinking water. From the start SCF/CDF encouraged the maximum 
*Although the organizational name has since become SCF /CDF, 
the earlier CDF name is used in this report in the context of CBIRD 
because this is how it is still popularly known in Korea. 
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amount of local participation and management in its development 
projects. P 1972 various kinds of assistance--to Individuals, to 
families, and to communities--had been furnished to about 7,000 
people in some 400 commtmities. 
In 1972 SCF/CDF decided, as the result of a thoroughgoing 
self-evaluation of its activities, to consolidate the various programs, 
focusing its main effort on promoting integrated development in 
clusters of cooperating villages that were called "impact areas." 
This integrated, "high impact" approach to community improvement 
was launched in the following three carefully chosen groups of 
villages: 1) Tong Myon (township or sub-county), Chunsong Gun 
(county), Kangwon Province; 2) Tong Myon, Yanggu Gun, Kangwon 
Province; 3) Sanbuk, Yoju Gun, Kyonggi Province.* 
In June 1976 SCF/CDF received from the United States Agency 
for International Development (US AID) a sizeable Operational Pro­
gram Grant in partial support of the Korea program. Under provisions 
of the grant CDF was expected "to establish pilot communith-based 
integrated rural development projects as mini-regional (or small area) 
development management models, with an ultimate goal, over a five 
year period, of institutionalizing a process that will improve income, 
health, education, and commanity institutions and services for low 
income rural people." The US AID grant enabled CDF to select three 
additional Island communities off Korea's southwest coast, so that in 
all there are now six "mini-regional" projects (three island areas and 
three in the mountainous north central region). ** 
The CBIRD Concept 
In very general terms there are three main aspects of the CBIRD 
concept that, when taken together, distinguish it from most other 
development efforts: 
1) The term, Community Based Integrated Rural Development, 
represents an attempt to combine the strengths of tradi­
tional community development theory and methodology with 
the advantages of a larger scale, systems oriented, care­
fully planned and integrated development strategy. 
2) The unit of development or impact area comprises several 
villages, roughly corresponding to the lowest level of 
local bureaucratic administration. 
*A fourth impact area, not considered in this study, is an 
urban, low income neighborhood on the outskirts of Seoul; it is 
inhabited by rural migrants to the city who were formerly squatters. 
**US AID /Seoul's funding contribution for the island impact 
areas during the period June, 1976 through the end of 1978 equalled 
16 percent of total investment& (including villagers' contributions). 
9 CBIRD Concept ai d Goals 
3) 	 The CBIRD program is designed to supplement and be 
integrated with the Saemaul Undong (New Community 
Movement), an intensive program of rural development 
that is being promoted by the Korean Government 
throughout the cuuntry. 
CDF has been prolific and articulate in documenting the aims, 
methodology, and results of its Community Based Integrated Rural 
Development (CBIRD) projets. 1 A typical statement follows: 
Small area community-based development involves 
building upon the experience of individual village 
development with wider concern for Inter-village 
cooperation and systematic planning to create and 
expand market and employment possibilities, for 
improvement and utilization of hoalth and educational 
systems accessible to the villagers, and expansion of 
credit systems to recycle rural income back into the 
rural economy. The area size is determined by the 
linkages, administrative, economicall3', and socially 
that are important to the people for a broader 
development outlook on their needs and resources. 
Generally, the size of the area encompasses a whole 
'myon' (township) including eight to twenty villages 
and populations from 3,000 to 8,000. CDF has 
established the project in three island myons off 
the south-west coast of Korea and in three mountain­
ous areas of the north-east and north-central region 
of Korea.
 
In implementing a community based integrated area 
development program, CDF is introducing and demon­
strating skills for improved planning, management and 
evaluation of economic and social development projects 
to link macro level development objectives with speci­
fically targetted community goals. The project is 
designed to involve bottom-up planning and grass­
roots representation in the planning process and the 
implementatibn of projects with long-range and short­
term objectives that reinforce national development 
plans for increased productivity, income, and 
improvement of the quality of life for Korean people.2 
1 SCF /CDF, Korea Field Office, Semi-annual and Annual 
Reports, Seoul, Korea, Jan.,1977; July, 1977; Jan., 1978; August, 
1978. SCF/CDF Korea Field Office', Application to AID for 
Operational Program Grant in Korea, Seoul, Korea, 1975. 
2SCF/CDF, Korea Field Office, Third Semi-annual Report, 
Jan., 1978, pp. 1-2. 
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The general scheme tries to profit from the insights and tech­
niques of the hard-headed economist or systems analyst, while 
remaining true to basic community development principles. The 
community development approach has traditionally been people­
with an emphasis on changing values and relationshipsoriented, 
order to get things moving.within a small face-to-face community in 
CD practitioners insist that development efforts should be directed 
and that this can only be achievedat the "felt needs" of a community, 

by maximizing local participation in decision-making--in the planning
 
and direction of projects. Self help through cooperative effort and
 
the investment of local resources is stressed. And finally there is 
usually an emphasis on egalitarianism and improving the quality of 
community ilfe, particularly with regard to the situation of the 
poor and other deprived groups. 
The economist's planned approach to rural development, on
 
the other hand, usually involves both capital inputs and direction
 
from outside the local community, in accordance with a large scale
 
plan that is more concerned with increasing quantifiable measures
 
of production than with such intangibles as human motivation and
 
satisfaction. The plan, which usually covers a relatively large
 
on the basis of more or less rigorousgeographic area, is formulated 

surveys and sophisticated economic and technological analyses of
 
problems to be overcome.
 
The CBIRD concept combines what are regarded as the
 
strengths of both methodologies. At the same time it re,:ogntzes
 
that the actual program operation mast take place withi the
 
political context of a highly centralized,. authoritarian bureaucratic
 
administration. The term, "integrated", in the CBIRD title, then,
 
can be taken to mean that a variety of problems at the village level
 
should be attacked simultaneously, and that local development
 
projects should be mutually reinforcing; but also it encompasses
 
the adoption of a holistic view of village problems within the regional
 
and national economic, sociological, environmental, and administra­
tive setting.
 
onIn its theoretical formulations SCF/CDF places great emphasis 

local decision-making, and self help. The creation of permanent
 
local organizations capable of planning and implementing various
 
kinds of development pr'jects is regarded just as important
as as
 
the actual end results achieved by such projects. This process
 
of "bottom-up" decision-making and management is believed to be
 
superior to centrally planned and directed "top-down" systems
 
imposed on farmers by bureaucrats from outside the villages for
 
two principal reasons: 1) it is alleged that only grass roots
 
participation in the entire process can ensure enthusiastic wide­
spread involvement, a correspondence of project goals with locally
 
felt needs, and an equitable distribution of benefits; 2) in the
 
longer term after CDF capital and advisors are no longer available,
 
local initiative and control are necessary in order to ensure that
 
developmental momentum is maintained.
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In CBIRD terminology, the "development management model" 
requires that villagers receive various kinds of training in order to 
be able to survey local needs themselves, assess capabilities, reach 
reasonable decisions and carry them out effectively. Accordingly 
the. CBIRD projects all involve extensive programs of nonformal 
education. In addition to courses in leadership, planning, evaluation 
and agricultural (or fishing) technology, CDF also trains villagers to 
manage local credit unions and to operate a system of development 
loans through a revclving fund, by which increased farm income is 
recycled into the local village economy. While it is recognized that 
increases in productivity and income should probably have priority 
at the initial stages of a rural development program, CDF tries to 
attack all the major constraints on improving village life, rather 
than concentrating on any single sector or set of problems. 
Thus health care, nutrition, child care, family planning,
 
sanitation, and social/cultural/recreational activities are as much
 
a part of the overall design as projects designed to increase
 
productivity and incomes. In particdar, CDF has stressed, both
 
in its general announcements and in formulating specific planning
 
goals, that the CBIRD projects are designed primarily to assist the
 
rural poor, with women and children singled out as the principal
 
beneficiary groups.
 
These are all conventional community development goals. What 
is innovative about the CBIRD program is that it is organized to 
provide an integrated development approach for larger areas, com­
prising from six to twenty-one villages with populations of from 2,000 
to 9,000 persons. There seem to be two main, interrelated advantages 
to increasing the size of the impact area: 1) it becomes feasible to 
undertake more ambitious projects in such sectors as public works, 
education (both formal and nonformal), and health care where large 
initial investments in trained personnel and facilities are usually 
required. Also, there is a much larger local resource base to sup­
port such projects, both in terms of labor and material contributions; 
2) the "-'ini-regional" area corresponds roughly to the sub-county 
or myon, which Is the lowest Korean administrative unit staffed by 
full-time government employees. The fact that the local cooperatives
and extension service also have offices at the myon level is of great 
importance. Once a measure of consensus and a willingness to 
participate in achieving joint goals has been established beyond 
village boundaries within the impact area, then local leaders can 
work together with officials in formulating development plans and 
obtaining additional funding or other kinds of governmental 
assistance. 
Close collaboration with governmental administrative agencies
 
and other outside institutions, both public and private, is an
 
integral part of CDF's method in Korea. The integration of village
 
economies with national markets, the introduction of the latest
 
agricultural and fisheries technology, and the inculcation of effi­
cient methods of local planning and financial management, all require
 
close and constant ties with the more modernized sectors of Korean
 
society.
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CBIRD goals in Korea can be summarized then as follows: 
a) To expand the boundaries of the cohesive, cooperating, 
-md developing community from the village to the subcounty 
)rtownship. 
b) 	 To focus assistance efforts on the rural poor, both by 
raising incomes and by improving the quality of lifr; 
through social welfare programs. 
c) 	 To maximize local participation in development planning 
and management initlat"ves by mobilizing local energies 
and resources through effective organization and training. 
d) 	 To integrate rural development efforts with on-going 
of help outsidegovernmental programs and other sources 
the village. 
e) 	 To develop techniques that can be applied elsewhere. 
The last goal listed above, (e), represents itsomewhat 
different kind of objective as implied by the phrase, 'establish... 
development management models," that was used as part of the 
rationale for obtaining an Operational Program Grant from AID. 
Here the emphasis has shifted somewhat from concrete efforts to 
improve the economic and social situation in particular communities 
to a more general and abstract goal, that of formulating an 
organizational structure and method that can be used or built on 
by those responsible for improving the condition of the rural poor 
elsewhere. 
In analyzing the successes and shortcomings of the CBIRD 
program in South Korea, we have kept these goals in mind as the 
principal basis for our evaluation. 
CHAPTER 2
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING
 
AND IMPACT AREAS
 
South Korea (the Republic of Korea) has a total land area of 
about 38,000 square miles (98,500 square kilometers) and a popula­
tion of about 37, 000, 000, making it one of the most densely populated
countries in the world (374 persons per square kMometer). Less 
than 25 percent of the land area is arable, however, so that the
actual concentration of people, even in rural areas, is much greater.
Because winters are fairly cold and dry, double cropping is only
possible in the southernmost provinces. However, winter vegetable
growing in vinyl greenhouses has been widely adopted in recent 
years.
 
Since the Korean War, South Korea has undergone an extra­
ordinarily rapid rate of industrialization, urbanization and economic 
growth.* Starting from a predominantly agrarian society, its urban 
population rose from 28 percent of the total population in 1960 to 
nearly 55 percent at present, with a corresponding decline in the 
rural population. The Gross Domestic Product (measured in constant 
prices) grew at an average annual rate of 8.11i percent between 1960
and 1970, and 10. 3 percent from 1970 to 1978. Per capita real income 
rose at an average annual rate of 7.3 percent from 1960 to 1976,
reaching an average of US$670 per person in 1976. Despite an 
absolute decline in the agrariam population (due to rapid urban 
migration and an increasingly effective birth control program),
agricultural output grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent
from 1960 to 1970, and 4.8 percent from 1970 to 1976. However, its 
share of the tot; GDP fell from 40 percent In 1900 to 27 percent in 
1970 because in the same period industrial production was growing
at more than 17 percent a year, bossting its share of the GDP from 
19 percent in 1960 to 34 percent in 1976. At present there Is on 
actual shortage of agricultural labor in South Korea--an unusual 
phenomenon in the developing world. 
*The statistics in this parigraph are from the World Bank's 
World Development Report, 1978. 
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In contrast to most other Asian developing countries, the 
distribution of wealth in South Korea is fairly equitable (comparable 
to that in the United States). 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
A thoroughgoing land reform program was carried out in 
1949/50. As a result, while over 83 percent of farm families 
depended to a greater or lesser extent on landlords in 1947, in 
1964 (after the reform) the figure had dropped to about 30 percent. 
During this same period the percentage of completely landless 
households in the farm population fell from more than 45 percent 
to about 7 percent. 
Although agricultural production rose in the 1960s' its pace 
picked up in the early 1970s. Grain production since 1973 has 
increased at a rate of about 7 percent annually, mainly due to 
the successful adcptation of new varieties of rice and barley tc 
Korean soils and climate. Urban and export demand for agricul­
tural products, particularly cash crops such as fresh vegetables, 
fruit, and meat, stimulated even greater increases in productivity 
in some of these crops. While demand is, of course, an essential 
stimulus, the rise in farm production has only been possible 
because more fertilizer and pesticides, improved irrigation systems, 
greatly increased amounts of rural credit, and improved technical 
knowledge have been made available in recent years. 
Increased productivity and rising prices for agricultural 
products have improved farm income and the farmers' terms of 
trade. Better transportation, rural electrification and a rapid 
expansion in educational facilities have also contributed to the 
rising quality of rural life. In summary, there has been since 
1971 a real transformation in rural living standards with average 
farm household income approaching that of urban workers. 
Development is the main preoccupation of most Koreans today. 
In rural areas new crops, new agricultural methods, and dramatic 
improvements in social infrastructure are characteristic of most 
villages. 
THE SAEMAUL UNDONG 
While the economist tends to see the causes of this rural 
economic growth and social transformation in such factors as market 
incentives, improved seed varieties, and the greater availability of 
agricultural raw materials and services to the farmer, the Korean 
Government attributes most of the recent progress to the success­
ful implementation, starting in 1971, of its Soemoul Undong (New 
Community Movement). Although the main focus of the New Com­
munity Movement has been rural development, it also has another 
dimension--the fostering of a new ideology. 
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In recent years social commentators as well as political scien­
tists have deplored the lack of a genuine national Ideology in South 
Korea, maintaining that anti-Communism and the pursuit of material 
progress were not enough to provide inspiration as national goals 
and symbols. By 1972 it was apparent that the New Community Move­
ment in its broadest context constituted part of a determined attempt 
by the Government to fill this ideological gap. The attempt is still 
being pursued, and strenuous efforts are made to infuse every aspect 
of life--from garbage collection to poetry writing--with the Saemaul 
spirit. The Movement adopted "self help, cooperation, and diligence" 
as its motto, and the President's frequently repeated words, "Let's 
live better," became a kind of slogan. Building on both the hier­
archical and collective traditions, the Movement stressed obedience 
to expert, paternalistic administrative leadership and an extension 
of the idea of community to encompass the entire nation. The ideo­
logical component was, of course, closely rolated to the Park 
Government's objective of expanding and consolidating grassroots 
political support. 
By the winter of 1971-1972 a major effort had been launched 
to get the majority of farmers in all 35,00 South Korean villages 
involved in cooperative village improvement projects. Supplies of 
cement and steel reinforcing rods were made available by the 
authorities, and villages were encouraged to use them to improve 
roads, bridges, wells and sanitation facilities. A major program 
was also launched simultaneoualy to persuade farmers to replace 
their thatched roofs with tile, metal or composition. The expacta­
tion was that through participation in projects having an imm3diate 
impact on the village environment, farmers would realize the 
benefits of working together during the off season, and a spirit 
of progressive community activism would be fostered. 
Because of unrelenting pressure from the top, bureaucratic 
efforts to achieve the movement's goals were intense. Saemaul 
became the main focus of activity for all local administrative agencies, 
and thousands of other officials from the capital descended on the 
provinces to inspect, exhort, direct operations, and, to some 
extent, compete with local officials. The result Initially was often 
confusion and bureaucratic overldll, while the astonished villagers 
struggled to comply with mounting and sometimes conflicting 
demands for compliance with various aspects of the overall plan. 
In the beginning most farmers distrusted the motives of 
officials and resented their constant interference in village affairs. 
After all, nothing good had ever happened to rural society before 
as a result of closer contacts with the bureaucracy. Where villagers 
were slow cr reluctant to organize for carrying out suggested 
projects, official pressures were applied that often amounted to 
direct coercion. For example, if several farmers in a village were 
reluctant to replace the traditional brush fences around their 
houses with cement walls, jeep loads of men from the county seat 
might arrive and simply tear them down. Similarly, there were 
occasions when house owners who were unwilling to make the 
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substantial investment necessary to replace their thatched roofs with 
composition or tile might return home from a market trip to find the 
thatch gone and their homes open to the sky. Such excesses, which 
reflected the concern of local officials with producing quick results 
to please superiors, generated a lot of resentment and cynicism 
during the first two or three years of the movement. 
But since 1973 attitudes in most places have gradually shifted, 
as farmers discovered that all the excitement and effort did, in 
fact, result in substantial benefits. Each village is given a rating 
by the county chief in accordance with its accomplishments, and 
local pride has in many cases been stimulated to a high competitive 
pitch among neighboring communities. Where village leadership is 
in the hands of determined activists, who are also skillful in main­
taining good relations with other members of the commnity, a 
considerable degree of constructive enthusiasm has usually been 
generated and sustained. Once the most influential men in a village 
are committed to pursuing the Movement's goals, others will nearly 
always follow, and non-conformists are subjected to subtle but 
extremely effective sociai censure. As a result, although distrust 
and reluctance prevailed a few years ago, now most village councils 
are eagerly drawing up ambitious development plans and begging for 
official support to help carry them out. 
There is a good deal of variation from one village to another, 
and while some degree of participatlon exists everywhere, such 
factors as the quality of leadership, geographic accessibility, the 
degree of village cohesion (or conversely, of internal division, 
usually along kinship boundaries), the distribution of wealth, and 
commercial opportunities for individual profit, all vary from place to 
place, and all affect the extent and intensity of involvement in 
collective community efforts. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the uneven performance it is unde­
niable that the Saemaul movement has transformed the appearance of 
Korean villages, fostered the successful completion of a large variety 
of cooperative, seli-help projects, and promoted more effective 
working relationships, both among farmers and between farmers and 
local officials. It has also given villagers a sense of participation in 
a momentous national effort, with strongly patriotic overtones. Any 
visitor to rural Korea today can observe the pride in recent achieve­
ments and a confidence in the future that were almost entirely absent 
tan years ago. 
The government's claim that it is the New Community Movemert 
that is responsible for bringing about the new rural prosperity, is 
not entirely convincing. Actually, it has become increasingly diffi­
cult to analyze cause and effect in rural development, because the 
dimensions of the movement as a "nation building" ideology have 
been expanded to include everything positive that happens in rural 
society. It seems clear, however, that it is not so much that Saemaul 
has sparked rural prosperity, as that it has been pushed in a 
context of relative rural prosperity that is the result mainly of other 
factors: 1) the widespread successful adoption of new, high-yielding 
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varieties of rice and to a lesser extent barley; 2) the maintenance offavorable su-bsidized grain prices by the government; 3) the in­creased availability of more effective agricultural extension services;4) the greatly expanded urban market for a wide variety of new cash
crops; and 5) improvements in transportation and storage facilitiesthat have made it possible for farmers to engage profitably in
commercialized agriculture. 
It is in the upgrading of administrative performance by localgovernmental and semigovernmental agencies and the improvement
of institutlonal linkages and communications between village and citythat the Saemaul Movement has probably made its greatest contribu­tion. Pressures from the top to achieve rapid, concrete and drama­tically visible results have been so great that in six years the mass
of provincial, county and sub-county officials has been forced to
change their outlook and working style from that of conservative.

self-seeking, formalistic control and status quo oriented bureaucratsto that of relatively enthusiastic activists dedicated to a transforma­
tion of the countryside. Their careers have been at stake. 
 Thehighly centralized, authoritarian political system of South Korea hasproved to be well adapted for accomplishing this transformation, eventhough it has never been specifically enunciated as a goal of the 
Movement.
 
The Ministry of Home Affairs and its local agencies, the pro­
vincial, county and sub-county administrative offices, have generally

exercised effective supervision, making sure that the efforts of

various other concerned government agencies were integrated in the
3verall Saemaul Movement. 
 After many years of "fragmented hierar­
chical programs" Sruth Korea has finally achieved a coordinated

administration of rural development policies. The implications for
future rural development of such increased local administrative

sffectiveness aro great. In addition there is now a recognition byvillagers that technological advice, capital and improved marketing
facilities can 
best be acquired through official channels and tha
expansion of ties with the national economy. Officials are no longerfeared and avoided as in the past, and the social gulf between farmers
and bureaucrats has noticeably narrowed. 
Some persistent problems remain, however. The poorestfarmers and laborers, who have no land or very little land, and whomake up about 15 percent to 25 percent of the rural population, arenot particularly enthusiastic about the Naw Community Movament.They complain that while obliged to participate in village public worksprojects, usually without pay, they receive no benefits comparableto those of landowners whose property is being improved. They mustlive by their labor, and they insist that "voluntary" collective work isan unfair burden. Also, higher grain prices are of little help to the40 percent of all farm households whose land holdings are so smallthat they have little or no marketable surplus. 
The long run future of the Movement is somewhat problematic,because of a potential contradiction in values and organizationalbsructure that is inherent in contemporary Korean society. The
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Movement's success (but not necessarily further rural development) 
depends on continuing community solidarity and cooperative effort 
at a time when individualism and materialism, both as personal 
ideologies and a3 patterns of economic behavior, are challenging 
tradition in every social sector. So far, although exceptions exist 
in most villages (particularly those near urban areas), traditional 
patterns of interaction reinforced by outside official support for 
collective organizations and cooperative effort seems to have resisted 
or contained the divisive effects of commercial individualism. 
The CBIRD program began some two years after the start of 
the Saemaul Undong, and it would not be an exaggeration to state 
that it has managed to embed itself within the Saemaul Movement, 
both at the village level and in terms of the local administrative 
environment. In any case it is not possible to understand the 
CBIRD method of operation or evaluate its achievements without 
considering the general context of contemporary rural development 
in Korea as outlined above. 
THE CBIRD IMPACT AREAS 
Two inland and two island groups of villages are considered 
in this report. The unit of "community" in the CDF community-based 
integrated rural development (CBIRD) program ranges from about 
one-half of a myon (township or sub-county) * with six villages 
to a full myon, with twenty-one villages. The two inland or moun­
tainous pilot areas examined here are both parts of a myon, while 
the two island areas comprise entire myons. 
CDF had two criteria for the selection of its impact areas: 
1) that they be isolated and "deprived", i.e., relatively impoverished 
by Korean standards; and 2)that they possess a good potential 
for development with regard to such factors as cooperation, 
leadership, and resources. 
CDF has been working in the three inland or "mountainous" 
areas, Yanggu, Chunsong and Sanbuk, since 1973. Of these, all 
of which are in north central Korea, the latter two are described 
below. All three of the island projects, Jeungdo, Yaksan, and 
Wido, were first implemented by CDF in 1977. An account of the 
programs in Yaksan and Wido is included here. 
Sanbuk Area 
This area comprises eight administrative villages (ri), each
 
of which is made up of several hamlets or small natural communities.
 
*The myon office with 15 or 20 full time employees is the
 
lowest level of bureaucratic local administration.
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The mainThere are 562 households with a total population of 3,134. 
occupation is agriculture on some 539 hectares of land, of which only 
about one-third is irrigated. In addition an important cash crop-­
fragrant mus'ooms--is harvested on the wooded mountain slopes, 
which make up 83.5 percent of the total land area. The average 
holding per farm household of arable land is 1.17 ha., which is above 
both the national average of .94 ha. and the provincial average of 
Yields per hectare for rice are below the national average,1.14 ha. 
however. Average farm household income (some 95 percent of Sanbuk 
households are agricultural) was about 1.3 million won or $520 per 
was also below the national average. Landcapita in 1977, which 

distribution is relatively equitable with the largest land holding
 
amounting to only 4 hectares. 
The Sanbuk area is unusual in that the eight villages are sur­
rounded by high mountains, and therefore, although there is easy
 
access from one village to another, Ehe entire district is somewhat
 
In fact, because ofisolated from the rest of the myon and county. 
the mountains and bad bus connections it takes nearly an entire day 
to reach the myon office (including a ferry ride across the Han 
river). The county seat, Yoju, is approximately 30 km. to the south, 
while Seoul is 60 km. to the northwest. Actually, it is easier for 
Sanbuk residents to travel to two other county seats, Ichon and 
Yangpyon, than to their own. Because of this geographic isolation
 
and as a result of CDF initiatives, a branch of the Kumsa myon
 
office has recently been established in Sanbuk.
 
as most of the local residents them-Several observers as well 
selves attribute their readiness to cooperate and the widespread 
sense of community encompassing all eight villages to the common 
heritage of deprivation in a context of geographical isolation. There 
was no regular bus service until 1963, and residents had to walk 
12 kilometers to reach the market in the nearest town. Today, 
however, busses pass through Sanbuk six times daily, so that 
transportation with the outside world is no longer a significant 
problem. 
Kinship ties among members of a single predominant lineage
 
that includes nearly forty percent of the area's population provide
 
another source of cohesion among the various villages. A dispro­
portionate number of leaders and wealthy farmers belong to this
 
lineage.
 
In a mountainous country like Korea the grouping of villages
 
in relation to land, as well as the clustering of houses within a
 
village, have an important influence on patterns of interaction and
 
cooperation. In the case of Sanbuk, kinship ties, both through 
membership in a common lineage and as a result of marriage, provide 
a structural channel for frequent interaction among the villages. 
What was previously a sense of solidarity in terms of shared poverty 
and isolation has been transformed during the past several years 
into an extraordinarily dynamic cooperative spirit for self 
improvement. The special topographical situation of Sanbuk as 
well as the cohesive spirit of its inhabitants were important factors 
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in its choice as an impact area. While admirably fulfilling the require­
ments for development potential, it is somewhat difficult to duplicate 
this situation in other parts of the country. 
Chunsong 
This impact area includes six administrative ri (twelve natural 
village communities) located in interconnecting mountain valleys 
(see map). Jinaeri 1, which is the administrative center of the 
myon as well as of the CBIRD impact area, is only about 8 kilometers 
from the provincial capitJ, Chunchon, a city of more than 250,000 
people. 
There are 393 households in the area with a total population 
of 2,080. More than 100 residents work outside the Chunsong area; 
most of these commute to the nearby capital city. 
Of the 394 hectares of arable land, about one-third are 
irrigated rice fields. The average land holding per farm household 
is 1.06 hectares, which is a little more favorable than the national 
average but less than the average for the province. Yields are 
still rather low, however, because of the relatively severe climate, 
poor soils, and lack of advanced agricultural technology. Thu most 
important crops raised are rice, tobacco, corn, beans, peanuts, 
and green onions. 
Farm household income averaged 1,590,000 won or US$515 per
 
capita in 1977, which is almost exactly the same as that of Sanbuk.
 
Although this amount is still less than the national average, the
 
gains for both areas in recent years have been slightly better than
 
the average increase for the country as a whole.
 
The county seat is in the nearby capital city of Chunchon, 
and transportation is excellent, with buses running every hour 
from Jinaeri. The other villages are all fairly close and are 
connected by reasonably good roads. In addition to the myon 
administrative office, there are offices of the agricultural cooperative, 
the extension service, and the health service nearby. A primary 
school is also located in the same village. 
The distribution of wealth is fairly equitable except for one 
village, where it is concentrated in the hands of a single dominant 
lineage. This village has generally demonstrated less enthusiasm 
for participation in CBIRD activities than the other five communities. 
Two of the villages, Jinae 2 and Jinae 3, have cooperated closely 
with each other and been particularly active in planning and imple­
menting a wide variety of self-help projects under CDF auspices. 
While they have not displayed the same sense of community 
and cooperative spirit at the "mini-regional" level as in Sanbuk, 
most of the people in the Chunsong area have been taking advantage
of available opportunities, particularly in the economic and 
educational fields. If the most isolated and least progressive 
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village--the one with a single dominant lineage and particularly 
unequal land distribution--is omitted from the averages, then the 
pace of development for Chunsong is well above the national average, 
despite disadvantages of the environment. 
Ninety-five percent of all houses in the area have electricity. 
Only 12 percent of farm house roofs are still made of straw thatch; 
more significantly, compositior roofs are rapidly being replaced with 
the more expensive and prestigious tile. And there are 71 telephones 
for 376 households, which is a much higher rate than is usual in 
the Korean countryside. A significant statistic that tustifies to the 
energy, ambition, and solid economic base of the area is the number 
of primary school students (free, obligatory educmtion) that goes on 
to middle school, a substantial expense for farmers. In Chunsong 
87 percent of children in the appropriate age group attend middle 
school, compared to a national averaee of 79 Dercent. 
Wido Island Area 
The Wido impact area comprises all of Wido myon (sub-county) 
in Buan Gun (county), North Cholla Province. In addition to the 
main island of Wido there are four other inhabited islands in the 
group. T'he total population is about 4,500, 80 percent of which 
lives on the main island. The total land area of the inhabited islands 
is 1, 414 hectaros, of which 76 percent is mountainous, 1.3 percent
irrigated rice fields, 13 percent dry fields, and 10 percent is used 
for houses, roads, or other purposes. Average land holdings are 
very small (only about one-third the national average), and the 
great majority of households have less than half a hectare. Table 
t shows the distribution of land ownership. The islanders all know 
that the crops produced in any given year on Wido are only suffi­
cient for about three months local consumption. Farm technology 
and productivity is low, both because of the lack of an extension 
service (until 1977), and because most of the population is not 
primarily interested in farming as an occupation: nearly every
houshold also engaged in fishing, either in their own small boats 
or as employees on larger fishing boats. Table 2 shows the number 
of fishing boats by kind and village. 
Average household income in 1976 was, according to CDF's 1977 
survey, only 748,000 won, or $275 per capita, about half that of 
Sanbuk. Fishermen have many different sources of income, however, 
and it is extremely difficult for the outsider to obtain accurate data. 
Also, the averages for Wido as a whole are pulled down becaune of 
the much greater poverty of the inhabitants on the other, smaller 
islands. In any case the situation has improved greatly during the 
last two years (1977 and 1978) because of larger fish catches and 
higher prices paid for fish. 
On Wido island itself there is a much more inequitable distri­
bution of wealth than in most agricultural communities on the main­
land.
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Environmental setting/ImpacrArea ,9. 
Land Size 
less than 0.1 
0.1 - 0.3 
0.3 - 0.5 
0.5 - 1.0 
1.0- 1.5 
1.5 - 2.0 
TOTAL 
Village 
Jin-ri 
Beol-geum 
Chi-do 
Pajang-geum 
Dae-ri 
Jeong-geum 
Sikdo 
Georyun-do 
Sang-wang-do 
Hawang-do 
TOTAL 
Table 1
 
Number of Farm Households on Wido by 
Size of Cultivated Land 
(hectare) Farming Households 
Number of Percent 
66 10.6 
266 42.6 
203 32.5 
83 13.3 
6 1.0 
1 0.2 
625 100.2 
Table 2
 
Number of Fishing Boats on Wido,
 
by Type and Village
 
Engine Powered Without 
Large Medium Small Power 
0 10 5 18
 
4 7 0 26
 
0 0 20 0
 
0 3 0 9
 
0 17 43 0
 
0 0 0 7
 
1 11 10 0
 
0 2 0 2
 
0 0 1 9
 
0 0 0 2
 
5 50 79 73
 
Source: Wido Myon Office Report, 1978
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The ten ri (administrative villagebl, five of which are on the 
main island, are quite distinct from each other in terms of their 
topographical situation, amounts of arable land, access to marine 
resources, community cohesiveness, and other aspects of local 
tradition. For example, Jinri is the myon's administrative center 
where public agencies are located. Nearby Polgum has a deep water 
harbor and a good beach with considerable potential for tourism. 
Pajangum is two kilometers to the northeast and has a large sheltered 
harbor used by hundreds of mainland boats as a base during the 
fishing seasons. As a result there is a large and prosperous enter­
tainment industry located there. Daeri, six kilometers southwest of 
Jinri has the best anchovy resources cf the island and a somewhat 
closed solidarity that is expressed in strong folklore traditions and 
a reluctance to cooperate with other communities. Jonggum, a 
presque isle connnected to Wido by a narrow strip of land at low 
tide, and Sikdo have demonstrated strong co]loctive efforts in 
accomplishing self help projects. The small communities on the 
other islands are also distinctive, but they are insignificant both in 
size and in terms of the CBIRD program. (See map.) 
There is a regular daily ferry service between Wido and the 
mainland that takes two to three hours depending on the weather. 
The mainland port is also rather isolated, however, and another 
seven hours of travel is necessary to reach Seoul. Transportation 
on Wido is poor, as there are only narrow steep rozcky paths and 
roads. There are no motorized vehicles and ':dly a few bicycles. 
It takes about 1-1/2 hours on foot to go from Daeri to the boat land­
ing at Beolgeum. Except for the three villages that surround 
the main harbor, regular ferry transportation among the villages 
by small boat is impracticable, because of the lack of landing piers. 
Although there are widespread kinship ties among the villages 
as a result of intermarriage, there are no strong cohesive lineage 
organizations on Wido. 
Yaksan 
Yaksan myon is a single island about 9 kilometers long and 
5 kilometers wide off the South Coast of Korea in Wando county, 
South Cholla Province. It comprises 21 villages with a total popula­
tion of about 9,000 persons. Even though the island is extremely 
mountainous, the population density of 376 persons per square 
kilometer is higher than for the county or for the nation as a whole. 
The average arable land holding is less than half a hectare, of which 
about 40 percent is rice land. Most households (1,299 out of 1,478) 
are engaged in both farming and fishing. 
Because of the shortage of land and a consequent concentration 
on fishing, agriculture is not particularly well developed. The major 
crops are rice, barley, soy beans, potatoes, and vegetables, but 
production is insufficient for the island's needs. In addition, pigs 
and goats are raised. The average income per farming household 
from agriculture is about 500, 700 won (US$1,000). 
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Income from ocean products--the cultivation and gathering of
 
seaweed is more important than fishing--is much greater than from
 
agriculture. The average per household income from this source is
 
over 1,300,000 won (US$2,700). This average figure is misleading,
 
however, because much of the income from seaweed production goes
 
to large, wealthy operators.
 
With only 15 households owning more than 1-1/2 hectares, the 
land distribution is relatively equitable for the island as a whole. 
As a result of the varied topographical situation, however, some 
villages, particularly the eight prosperous communities on the nor­
thern side of the island, have much more land than the others. So 
here again average figures are misleading. The same situation exists 
with regard to fishing and seaweed cultivaotion. Some areas have 
access to much better ocean resources than others. As a result 
there is, with a couple of exceptions, a relatively sharp division 
on the island between the poor villages along the west and south 
coasts and the prosperous villages (which have average household 
incomes much higher than the national average) to the north and 
northeast (see map where the names of the prosperous villages 
have been underlined). 
There are also differences among the villages with regard to the 
distribution of Income gained from the sea. While there are many 
small cultivators of seaweed, its processing is mostly in the hands of 
a relatively few wealthy men. On the other hand, the ownership of 
small motor boats for fishing Is widely distributed. 
Over 90 percent of the houses have electricity, and in 1978 
there were 637 television sets or one for every 2-1/2 households. 
Although the island has 75 telephones, they are unevenly distributed, 
so that some villages are still without telephone communication. 
In addition to the myon office, there is a farm cooperative and
 
a fishery cooperative on the Island. A public health office building
 
exists, but at present (1978) it is not staffed.
 
There are 3 primary schools, 3 small branch primary schools, 
and one middle school on Yaksan. Just under 80 percent of eligible 
students attend middle school, which is close to the national average. 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE IMPACT AREAS 
If we are to evaluate CDF's contribution to development through 
Its CBIRD program, some allowance must be made for various aspects 
of the natural setting. Or to put it somewhat differently, the process 
of change in each area must be examined in relation to environmental 
factors. 
In addition to their later sturt in the CDF program (only two 
years ago) the island communities present some special problems that 
make rigorous comparisons with the mainland areas difficult. 
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Koreans have traditionally regarded fishermen with contempt, 
and most small island villages have with few exceptions been rela­
tively poor. In recent years, however, the higher demand and 
better prices for sea products have brought relative economic 
prosperity wLerever ocean resources are abundant. But the distri­
bution of wealth is generally somewhat more uneven in Korean fishing 
communities than in inland agricultural areas; and this tendency has 
been reinforced as owners of boats, nets, and seaweed producing
facilities have taken advantage of the improved opportunities.
Accordingly, the gap between rich and poor has widened. It is 
axiomatic, in Korea at least, that such concentration of wealth within 
small communities makes the organization of cooperative self help 
activities more difficult. 
Another set of more general and intangible contrasts can be 
hazarded to distinguish the inland and island areas. Farmers tend 
to be less geographically and occupationally mobile, conforming more 
to tradition in a variety of economic and social matters. Accordingly
the pace of change in agricultural villages is relatively slow and 
consistent, if not predictable. Fishermen, whose livelihood is 
closely tied to mainland markets, are less committed to any particular
activity or place. Jn addition to small scale subsistence farming they 
are engaged in seaweed cultivation, the gathering of oysters and 
various kinds of fishing, depending on available resources and 
current market opportunities. 
The potential economic rewards for inter-village planning and 
cooperative effort in building, for example, a reservoir, irrigation 
or flood control facilities, or roads and bridges are immediately 
apparent to the farmer. In the two CBIRD island areas, however,
the current prosperity of the fishing sector is absorbing much of 
the available energy; the fishing economy tends to focus villagers'
attention on their own harbors, boats, nets, fishing grounds, and 
markets rather than on the need for cooperation with neighboring
communities. At the same time the fisherman's lack of strong ties 
to the land, his dependence on manufactured goods (engines/fuel/
nets) and his involvement in national and export markets, make him 
particularly sensitive both to the need to acquire the latest techno­
logical skills and the requirement that he engage in capitalistic
entrepreneurship. Thus, there is a real sense in which fishermen,
despite their physical isolation, are being swept along by the 
processes of social change accompanying economic development even 
faster than farmers. There seems to be a paradox, however. On 
the one hand fishermen are more mobile physically in the sense that 
they are usually more willing than the farmer to change their 
residence and occupational activity according to economic exigency,
while on the other hand fishing villages tend to retain a more closed 
and ingrown type of isolated solidarity. 
The importance of mass communications and transportation for 
development, particularly in relatively iL-accessible areas, is undoubt­
edly great. The fact that Yaksan is almost completely electrified, 
which permits the operation of large numbers of television sets, 
means that island residents are being rapidly indoctrinated in 
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on Wido the isolation is far fromnational popular culture. Even 
since almost every household possesses a transistor radio.complete, 
Transportation to and from the island areas is a good deal more 
because passengerdifficult, of course, than in mainland rural areas, 

boat service is limited. Yaksan, however, is fairly close to the main­
so that ferry service toland and to other well populated islands, 
several different villages is quite frequent. Also, the fact that so 
many households have boats, while the surrounding waters are mostly 
sheltered, means that transportation is not a serious problem. Wido, 
however, is much more inaccessible. 
The Yaksan and Wido islands are both mountainous, so that 
land travel among most of the villages is difficult. Whl].e roads 
as a result of Saemaul ni CDF initiativeshave been improved recently 

(using local cooperative labor), there has not yet been time to
 
much this has helped to broaden traditional villageobserve how 
feelings of solidarity so as to include a larger geographical area. 
South Korea is a small country with a racially homogeneous 
population. Throughout the peninsula people speak the same 
same clothes,language, share a common belief system, wear the 
eat the same kinds of food, and observe most of the same customs.
 
There is a general pattern of rural social organization that is, with
 
few exceptions (e.g., Cheju Do), repeated everywhere. Yet the
 
environmental, social/psychological, andvariations--economic, 
as well as communitiesstructural--that distinguish different regions 

within the same region have a significant relation to the pace and
 
kinds of developmental processes that are going on. 
CHAPTER 3
 
ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE,
 
LINKAGES AND ROLES
 
Local Administration 
As noted earlier, CDF decided in 1973 that its development
effort should be organized on a larger scale than the single agri­
cultural village. One important reason was the need to establish
and maintain close ties with local administrative agencies in planning
and implementing projects, since integration with the SaemaulMoviment was a necessary condition for success on both political
and economic grounds. The myon (township or sub-county), whichis the lowest level of local administration, was a logical and, in terms
of size, manageable unit on which to base the CBIRD structure.The myon usually comprises anywhere from eight to twenty-one
administrative villages with a total population of from 3, 000 to10, 000 persons. In each myon thero is an administrative office(Home Ministry), an agricultural extension office (Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries), an agriculture and/or fisheries cooper­
ative (National Cooperatives Federation), and a health office(Ministry of Health and Social Welfare). In addition there are theprimary schools and a middle school (Ministry of Education), the post office, and a unit of the national police. Each of these agenciesis the bottom link of a large national bureaucracy with its own chain
of command, system of communications, and operating procedures
that extend from Seoul down through the provincial and county
administrative levels. There are also local political party heads-­
wealthy and influential residents--who have their own formal andinformal links to the sources of authority in Seoul. 
All of these representatives of the central power structure(except for the outlying primary schools) are grouped fairly closelytogethrr near the myon administrative office (myon samuso). Thehead of this office, the myon chang, has the highest formal, bureau­
cratic prestige and authority in the area. It is his responsibility
to coordinate the efforts of all the agencies within his jurisdiction
in order to promote the development and economic well being of the 
myon. Since the beginning of the New Community Movement (SaemaulUndong)in 1971, he has been under intense pressure from his
superiors at the county administrative office (gun chlong) to producefast results in readily observable, quantitative terms. To the extent 
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that outside voluntary agencies such as CDF assisted him in this 
task, he welcomes their support. He also usually is glad to have 
a separate source of public relations outside of official channels that 
can call attention on a national s-alo to special accomplishments in 
his myon. 
In choosing the mainland CBIRD sites, CDF has established its 
base of operations near the official administrative agencies, but 
has included only a portion of the myon (6 villages at Chunsong 
and 8 villages at Sanbuk) in the impact areas. Both sociological 
and environmental factors were taken into consideration in defining 
these limits so that there would be a good potential for development. 
In the case of the Yaksan and Wido islands, however, each myon was 
a single clearly demarcated unit set off from the rest of the country, 
and accordingly, CDF decided, in order to avoid obvious discrimina­
tion and at the suggestion of the Korean authorities, to include the 
entire myon in its project area. However, the inclusion in the island 
impact areas of villages that are quite diverse economically, and that 
do not have easy physical access to each other, has made the 
achievement of cooperation on a multi-village basis difficult. CDF 
has discovered that insularity is not necessarily congruent with 
unity or a sense of community. Also, the much larger size of the 
island areas has inevitably diluted the "high impact" of CDF 
programs.
 
CBIRD Institutions 
CDF has approached the problem of promoting and instution­
alizing balanced integrated development on the basis of local needs 
and goals, by establishing a CBIRD organizational system in each 
impact area, which comprises three main elements: 1) Lhe Community 
Committee, 2) a Field Coordinator, and 3) the Community Center. 
1) The Community Committee (see chart) is the decision­
making body. It is elected and is supposed to represent a cross 
section of the population from each village. In practice it is made up 
of village leaders and other men of influence, energy and good 
reputation. In addition, at the insistence of CDF it includes a 
number of women representatives. Tis group, with the encourage­
ment and advice of the Coordinator, 
formulates long range development goals, as well as an 
annual development plan, and it also assists in the 
implementation and evaluation of projects and activities. 
The Committee Is thus responsible for oversesing all 
programs in the area including specific projects, 
finances, management, coordination, etc., in 
cooperation with the Field Coordinator sent from CDF 
office. (All quotes from CDF documents.) 
The Committee usually consists of from 20 to 25 members under 
the direction of a Chairman, a vice chairman (sometimes there is 
another, female vice chairman), a full time, paid secretary­
treasurer, two auditors, and a paid clerk. As a rule members serve 
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for two years, and the Committee meets once a month, but such
 
procedural matters are determined by the Committee itself.
 
Annual meetings, at which project planning and budgeting for 
the subsequent year is determined, may go on fnr two days or even 
longer, while the monthly meetings to cope with the various problems 
and changes that occur in the course of the year may take only a 
half day. "The committee formulates regulations for organization 
and operation which are submitted to the people along with finan­
cial statements in annual general meetings." 
The actual composition of the Community Committee is deter­
mined locally in accordance with what appears to be the most equitable 
representation of village opinion and interests. At Yaksan the 
Committee is made up of the village heads of all 21 vilages on the 
island plus the Chairman and Vice Chairman. In Wido there is a 
kind of proportional representation with three committee members 
from each of the three largest villages, two from each of the other 
villages on Wido itself, and one each from the four szjall communities 
on outlying islands. On the mainland Chunsong and Sanbuk both 
have the same system. .ach village has two committee members 
(three for Chunsong), and in addition there are the two officers 
and several women representatives. For each village with more 
than one member the village head is invariably included, and the 
other representatives are "elected", which usually means appoint­
ment by consensus decision rather than formal vote. 
The four permanent sub-committees of the Community Committee 
are, Children, Youth, Women, and Income Increase (or productivity). 
The sub-committee on children supervises the operation of day care 
centers for pre-school children, and the. youth committee assists 
the various 4H clubs of member villages, also organizing sports 
events between villages or local associations. The women's sub­
committee encourages such programs as "rice saving" (building up
small family savings by decreasing daily rice consumption), the 
operation of a women's credit union, the provision of meals for day 
care centers, and in some areas women's joint, cash crop farming. 
In implementing projects that deal with health care, nutrition, and 
family planning, the women's sub-committee either organizes its own 
meetings and training sessions or tries to revitalize such existing 
organizations as the Mothers' Club and the Women's Club. The 
income increase sub-committee provides organizational and material 
support as well as advice to a number of individuals and local 
groups, e.g., associations for cattle and pig raising, dairy farming, 
seaweed cultivation, mushroom growing, apple cultivation, green 
house construction, credit unions, and other financial organizations. 
Special temporary sub-committees are established to deal with 
currently urgent projects such as electrification, flood control, 
irrigation, bridge construction, and telephone installation. These 
sub-committees must approach the appropriate government author­
ities for approval and financial support; in addition they seek 
advice and assistance from non-governmental experts. 
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2) The Field Coordinator is "a qualified and trained field
 
worker of CDF" who is chosen in consultation with the local admini­
stration.
 
He organizes the Committee initially and works in 
close cooperation with it subsequently, providing
continuing advice on the planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of projects, as well as on finances. 
He gives continued support and guidance to facili­
tate the effective operation of the program and tries 
to better acquaint the community with available 
itis essential tmat ne provide an effective link between the 
Committee and local official agencies, so as to obtain their support
and make sure that the Committee's efforts are integrated with 
other developmental goals. He also has responsibility for organizing
training programs, and he supervises the keeping of descriptive
and financial records, making periodic reports to the CDF field 
office in Seoul. 
New recruits for the job are ordinarily given three months 
intensive training by CDF followed by a period during which they work 
under an experfenced Coordinator in an established impact area. 
The coordinator lives in the impact area during the first few years
of operation of the CBIRD program, until the Community Committee 
and its chairman are able to function without constant supervision
and guidance. Thereafter, he visits the area frequently, consulting
with local officials and committee officers as well as participating
in important meetings and social events. Successful implementation
of the CBIRD program probably depends more on the Coordinator's 
skill than on any other single factor. Ideally, he should be a 
diplomat, a charismatic mobilizer of men and women, and a practical
trouble shooter. Further discussion of the Coordinator's role fcllows 
below under Roles and Relationships. 
3) The Community Center is a building or group of buildings
that is owned by and registered In the name of the Committee. It is 
located near the myon office and other administrative agencies so as ti 
be as accessible as possible to all people in the CBIRD area. Thedesign and construction is carried out with the Idea that future addi­
tions will be made to the building as the Committee expands its 
activities and the number of community organizations under its aegis
increases. In addition to the office of the Coordinator and full time 
Committee officials, the center is used for committee meetings, train­
ing sessions, workshops, ceremonies, and recreational events. It 
may also house a day care center, a credit union, a club for the 
elderly, a sm '-..- _ Ltcial agency such as the extension 
service branch. It is up to the Committee to determine how best to 
use the Center so as to make it the focus for developmental activism 
in the wider community. 
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The Korea Office of SCF/CDF has strongly urged the Com­
munity Committees to build their Community Centers in traditional 
style with heavy curving tiled roofs, even though this type of con­
struction is more expensive. The general idea seems to have been 
that such a uniquely Korean building with all its associations of upp 
class authority and aesthetic beauty would inspire a great pride in 
whichlocal citizens. And in fact the Community Center at Sanbuk, 
built in this style, is the most intensively and constructively utilizei 
of all the Centers. Its functions have been incorporated into the 
daily lives of local residents, who for the most part do appear to 
have a sense of proprietorship--a feeling that they share in its 
ownership and operation. Furthermore there is little doubt that 
Sanbuk Center is built solidly wit) local materials and will stand as 
symbol to people of the village for generationseither a monument or 
to come. 
athe other hand, pragmatic modernists (and there areun 
great many such people in the Korean countryside today) favor 
maximum accommodation for thewesternized efficiency--in this case 
least cost. At Chunsong, for example, there is also, at least among 
the lite, local pride in the fact that the Community Center, a modern 
is able to house so many different organizations with sobuilding, 
many different functions under one roof. Nevertheless, the mood 
of the center is somewhat more bureaucratic and formal than at 
Sanbuk, with fewer visits by ordinary farmers and women. While it 
is manifestly impossible to reach any solid conclusions with regard 
to the importance of an intangible factor such as building design in 
the mix of variables that contribute to community spi+ , there is a 
hint here that greater attention should be paid to the subtler, 
instead of concentratingpsychological ingredients of local morale, 
of social and material progress.entirely on concrete measures 
The following principles are stressed by CDF for the Center's 
1) The Center is to be used to promote the economic andoperation: 
social benefit of all the villagers in an integrated manner, without 
giving undue emphasis to any one area, group, or type of project. 
2) There should be more emphasis on fostering self help efforts 
by the villagers than in providing services or aid from outside. 
3) The Center should be used to encourage systematic cooperation 
and joint activities with other agencies in the area, rather than 
focussing on independent CDF projects. 
As an example there are listed below the events taking place 
in a typical summer month at the Chunsong Community Center: 
Date 
uly 9 
12 
Name 
4-H Club 
Day Care Center 
Committee 
Sponsoring Agency 
Rural Guidance Office 
(extension)
Community Committee 
No. of Participants 
15 
10 
14 Governing Board of 
WomE k's Bank 
Women's Bank 12 
14 Women's Bank Women's Bank 80 
Context 
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Date Name Sponsoring Agency No. of 
Participants 
July 14 	 Welcome Party for Community Committee 30
 
University Medical
 
Service Team
 
17 	 Tong Myon Integrated Tong Myon (Chunsong) 13 
Development Con- Committee 
ference 
21 Civil Defense Drill Tong Myon (Chunsong) 70 
Office 
23 Evaluation of Community Committee 8 
Training Programs 
24 	 Evaluation and Tong Myon Office 70 
Planning Meeting 
for Saemaul Activities 
27 Tong Myon 'lders Tong Myon Elders Committee 50 
28 Mothers' Meeting for Kasan Day Care Center 35 
Day Care Center 
29 Monthly Meeting Community Committee 16 
One of the best indications of how effective the CBIRD program
has been in any given area is the amount of activity that goes on in
 
the Community Center. Where, in addition to regularly scheduled
 
meetings, the Center becomes a place in which there is frequent
 
informal personal interaction and an on-going exchange of ideas
 
on a variety of matters affecting development in the entire area,
 
then the Center's purpose as the focus of cooperative efforts is
 
probably being realized. Both the sonse of popular involvement
 
and of common proprietorship are expressed through continuing,

frequent use of the building.
 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 
One kind of formal linkage between the CBIRD structure and 
other 	organizations and agencies in the myon is provided through 
a local Advisory Committee, which is organized by the Coordinator
 
and the Community Committee. (See Fig. 5.) It comprises the
 
myon chief (myon branch chief in Sanbuk), the head of the
 
agricultural c3operatlve and/or fisheries cooperative, the head of
 
the Rural Guidance Office (extension service), the police chief,

the post office head, the school principals, ex-charmen of the
 
Community Committee, and other influential men. The Coordinator
 
.,is naturally anxious to obtain the administrative, material, and 
social support of such local dignitaries for the work of the Community
Committee, and whenever a person is newly appointed to one of 
these offices, he is asked to serve on the advisory committee and
 
then briefed at some length regarding the CBIRD operation.
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The most crucial link for everyday implementation of the 
program is between the CBIRD structure and the myon office. 
sure that both the county (gun.)The Coordinator tries to make 
and myon officials are involved with him in joint planning and 
funding for development, i.e., that CBIRD is incorporated in Sae­
maul plans. In this way local officials can participate in and 
take some credit for CDF accomplishments, while Korean Govern­
ment funding is made available to the Community Committee for 
multi-village projects. In 1978 the Korean Government contributed 
a larger share of outside funding support to CBIRD projects than 
did CDF. CDF comments, "this is an achievement of the joint 
planning efforts by local government and the people with motiva­
tional and technical support from the CDF field coordinator." 
In addition to the Coordinator's diplomatic skill and persuasive­
ness in dealing with myon officials, constructive relations with the 
bureaucracy also depend on high level contacts with the national 
centers of power. The director and staff of the SCF/CDF Korea Field 
Office in Seoul maintain contacts with the President's office, the 
Economic Planning Board, and the Ministries of Home Affairs, 
Health and Social Welfare, and Education.Agriculture and Fisheries, 

As a result of these initiatives at the top, provincial, county, and
 
myon officials have been instructed by the Home Minister to cooper­
ate with CDF in local development projects, and petitions from
 
CBIRD areas, particularly Wido, for larger scale government invest­
ments have been favorably acted upon. Officials at the provincial,
 
county and myon levels have participated in CDF training courses 
and visited the impact areas to observe actual accomplishments. In 
this way, as well its through various kinds of mass media publicity, 
CDF has been able to focus attention on the special problems that 
exist in remote areas, particularly the Islands. The institutional­
ization of local planning, decision making, and the direction.of 
projects through the Community Committee has given provincial 
and county officials confidence that their investments will be 
effectively utilized. 
The Korean Government is also interested in the CBIRD program 
as a source of new ideas and practices that might be incorporated in 
national development policies. CDF training methods, the mechanisms 
for establishing revolving funds and providing credit, as well as the 
overall concept of a small area or multi-village planning and funding 
unit, are under consideration as possible models for the modification 
of national programs. 
ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS 
The new institutional structure created by CBIRD to achieve 
its goal of organizing integrated. development on a multi-village 
or small regional basis, requires that villagers modify certain attitudes 
and roles, entering into different kinds of relationships. Previous 
patterns of authority, loyalty, and association had been closely 
,integrated with the traditional, closed, cohesive village structure, 
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and Coordinators encountered considerable initial resistance to 
change. In the beginning there was a tendency for relations between 
the Community Committee and the village power structures to reflect 
a certain amount of rivalry and jealousy, both over positions on the 
Committee and regarding the division of available funds. The idea 
that the total pie war limited, and that one village could only profit 
at the expense of another, was firmly rooted in rural thinking.
Village elites, whose economic and social base had usually been 
narrowly confined to one small community, were reluctant at first 
to commit themselves to the new institutions. In addition to their 
farming tasks there were the incessant demands of the Saemaul 
Movement, so that established leaders were unwilling to take on new 
responsibilities. Where this occurred, the Coordinator usually had 
to go ahead with younger, less prestigious men who were more 
receptive to change. 
Only very gradually as the Coordinator continued to preach his
 
message, and as a 
few initial projects brought good results, was there 
increasing acceptance of the idea of several villages joining together
in development efforts. Without substantial outside capital inputs
from CDF it would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, 
to get things started. Some Coordinators found it expedient to 
direct the initial benefits from such projects as cow raising or house
repair to village leaders, in order to ensure their enthusiastic 
participation in the program. 
The construction of the Community Center as a tangible symbol
of the CBIRD ideal appears to have been something of a turning 
point in overcoming village parochialism. The fact that the new 
centers involved joint planning, the mobilization of labor from every
village, and the subsequent diversified use for the benefit of the 
entire impact area has helped to consolidate the idea of inter-village
cooperation. 
The role of the Coordiiiator is, of course, especially important
during the early phase. He has great influence--amounting almost 
to control--over the Committee's decisions regarding the expenditure
of CDF funds, and he must use this influence wisely, e.g., by
urging the Committee to give the best cow to the chairman If necessary, 
or by opposing extravagant plans that have little prospect of 
immedate success. 
On the other hand, as an outsider it would be counterproductive
for him to take too strong a stance in dealing with local leaders. He 
should exercise guidance as indirectly and subtly as possible, so as 
to foster the Committee's ability to discuss projects intelligently,
resolve conflicting claims, and take effective action on its own. The 
Committee should not only have responsibility for decision making;
it should accept responsibility for failures. Too much dependence on 
the Coordinator is bound to inhibit the development of a self 
sustaining Committee that commands support and respect throughout
the area. 
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a 
number of aggressive individuals 	will invariably try to get him to 
which are likely to be mutually 
If people think the Coordinator can do anytching he wants, 
support their own private goals, 
the key man incontradictory. Or if local officials find that he is 
he will be under intensesuccessfully carrying out Saemaul projects, 
pressure to achieve their targets for them at the earliest possible 
as a neutral,date. He must therefore maintain a certain distance 
guiding people to do things for themselves whileobjective advisor, 

avoiding direct responsibility.
 
entirely objective and neutral in 	 hisThe Coordinator cannot remain 
personal relationships, however. The kind of influence over people 
that is described above is only possible if there is a considerable 
degree of genuine warmth and respect, and this takes time to 
establish. He must be able to get along with people of all types 
and social levels. His character and behavior are under constant, 
intense scrutiny, particularly when he first arrives in the area. 
Any moral lapse (one Coordinator was replaced because of a 
scandalous romance with the Committee clerk) or violation of 
etiquette will seriously impair his influence and effectiveness. 
All of these personality characteristics, including even the 
His role is toCoordinator's style of speaking, are important. 
preach a somewhat radically new ideology to the effect that everyone 
in the larger multi-village community can ben~iit only if all work 
together for common goals rather than just for the advantage of 
their own households or village. 	 For this kind of missionary 
activity a certain charisma is necessary; once the Coordinator has 
succeeded in gaining the respect 	and affection of local resido3nts, 
then all aspects of the program seem to be easier to accomplish. 
Another key role in the CBIRD system is that of the Community 
Committee Chairman. He is a prominent local citizen elected by the 
Committee to lead the village representatives in their effort to plan 
and carry out development projects on i regional basis. He is the 
main link between the Coordinator and the local population, and he 
also formally represents the CBIRD area in dealing with the bureau­
cracy or other outside agencies. 
Each village chief in Korea has direct relations with the myon 
office on Saemaul and other administrative affairs, so that there is 
a built-in potential for rivalry between village heads and the 
Committee Chairman, who deals with the local authorities as the 
representative of several villages on CBIRD matters. If there is 
widespread confidence in the ability and fairness of the Chairman, 
however, the several village heads are usually glad to delegate as 
much of their time-consuming and onerous duties to him as possible, 
so that a respected Chairman becomes in fact a kind of de facto 
representative of the entire area on most development matters. 
On the basis of CDF experience in Korea and by making very 
broad (and crude) distinctions, one can define four different 
general types of Chairman: 1) the authoritarian activist; 2) the 
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respected and energetic leader; 3) the ordinary tarmer ot good 
reputation; 4) the honorary officeholder. At various times Commun­
ity Committees have chosen chairmen who represent variations on all 
four types, but the job of the Coordinator is made much easier if he is 
lucky enough to work with type number two, "the rerpected and 
energetic leader." 
Of course prestige is always an important incentive, since 
Chairmen receive no salary. It is appropriate in the East Asian 
tradition that a man of means, ambition, and ability should, as he 
gets older, devote himself to the general welfare without thought of 
remuneration. He and his entire family then receive added status 
from this role. But today the effective Chairman (or village chief 
in most other Korean villages) must also be a determined activist, 
deriving satisfaction from the achievement of practical development 
goals. 
Either of the first two types listed above can be effective as 
chairman, although the authoritarian approach may provoke opposi­
tion and exacerbate existing divisions. The third type, the 
ordinary respectable farmer, may be too busy with his own farming 
or fishing activities to devote the necessary time to CBIRD matters. 
And such a person, if he lacks a high school education or special 
strength of character, may depend too much on the Coordinator, 
acting more as figurehead than as leader. 
Unfortunately, candidates of the fourth type, the honorary
officeholder, are not lacking in Korea. Such obvious and widely 
recognized qualifications as wealth, higher education, and important 
connections aro hard to ignore when people are being chosen for 
important or prestigious posts, even though the primary interest 
or talent of such a person may have little or nothing to do with 
rural development. 
Once a progressive style of chairmanship has been firmly
established in an impact area, it seems to be easier to maintain 
the momentum, even though the position itself is rotated every two 
years or so. It then becomes possible for the Coordinator to play 
a less conspicuous role, as Chairman and Committee members learn 
to plan and implement projects within the broader, multi-village 
environment. The start-up period, i.e., the first six months 
or so during which CBIRD institutions are established, appears to 
be crucial in determining local attitudes, procedures, and precedents. 
It is an obvious condition for effective performance in planning 
and implementing development projects that the three key figures 
on the local scene--the Coordinator, the Committee Chairman, and 
the sub-county chief (myon chang)--should get along well 
together. Unfortunately, interpersonal tensions do sometimes arise, 
and the program invariably suffers as a result. 
In contemporary Korea the government has promoted youthful,
dynamic village leadership as an integral part of the Saemaul 
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Movement. When innovations are introduced, there has been some 
tendency for older, well-established, more conservative farmers to 
hold back, waiting to assess the results. These informal leaders 
tend to set more involved in community development efforts, only 
as the success of the new methods becomes apparent. This same 
linkage between the adoption of successful innovations and the 
increased community involvement or public spiritedness of older 
village elites is also evident in the CBIRD program. When it occurs 
there is a significant strengthening of the institutional base for 
development. 
VILLAGE ORGANIZATIONS 
In each village there are several organizations established by 
governmental order to accomplish development goals. The situation 
varies, of course, from one place to another, but there is a strong 
tendency for many of these, such as the Mothers Club, the Farm 
Improvement Club, the Forestry Association, the 4-H Club, or the 
Women's Club to exist only on paper, or when prodded into temporary 
activity by local officials. CDF usually tries to encoui age such 
activities, both at the village level and in a regional context, by 
providing a meeting place, technical advice, and sometimes material 
support. 
As a result of the Saemaul Movement two organizations, the 
Village Development Committee and the Village Bank or credit union 
now function more or less continuously, depending on local leader­
ship and the extent of activism in the community. Village Develop­
ment Committees comprising both formal and informal local leaders, 
have the main responsibility for planning and implementing Saemaul 
projects in accordance with the general wishes of the community. 
The village representatives to the Community Committee are likely 
to be also members of the Village Development Committee (the village 
chief invariably is), and this overlap in membership linking the 
village to the impact area helps ensure that decisions and commitments 
made under CBIRD auspices will in fact be carried out. It also 
helps ensure that Community Committee decisions are based as much 
as possible on responsible n rass roots opinion. 
The village banks usually suffer from lack of managerial skills 
and a shortage of funds, forcing farmers and fishermen to continue 
to rely on usurious loans for a portion of their credit needs. CDF 
is encouraging the amalgamation of several such small banks into 
stronger multi-village financial organizations. Training is provided 
for the bank staff, while the Community Committee makes a portion 
of its revolving fund available as bank capital. 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN KOREA 
CDF has been extremely active in developing contacts with, 
and utilizing the services of, many other semi-public, and inter­
national organizations in the development field. There have been 
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numerous inspection trips, joint workshops and study groups with 
such agencies of the United Nations as the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the UNDP Asia Center for 
Training, UNICEF, and UNESCO. 
Discussions of particular problems have been held with experts 
from such national Korean Organizations as the Korea Development 
Institute, the National Social Workers Training Center, the Korea 
Institute of Family Planning, the National Agricultural Technical 
Association, and the Korean Society for the Study of Education. 
CDF has hired a number of university professors and their research 
assistants to carry out surveys and provide assistance in refining 
the CBIRD long term programs., Coordinators obtain help from 
expert consultants on the technical aspects of particular projects 
in their impact areas. 
University medical teams have carried out surveys in the CBIRD 
areas on nutrition, public health and medical care. They have also 
operated temporary dental and medical clinics in the impact areas 
with a view to developing a comprehensive rural medical service 
program in the future. 
There has been frequent discussion and collaboration with other 
voluntary agencies operating in the field of Korean rural development. 
Private business and trading (import-export) firms are consulted 
on a continuing basis with regard to the technical and economic 
feasibility of such varied matters as the introduction of new agri­
cultural products, cattle breeding, and the installation of boat 
engines. 
CDF has also established an advisory committee of prominent 
Koreans and Westerners in Seoul, which has been able to raise over 
$15,000 for CDF projects in 1978. Because of tha interest that 
has baen generated in the CBIRD development projects, CDF staff 
are "blged to spend a good deal of their time briefing foreign and 
Korean visitors and taking them on tours of inspection to the impact 
areas. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE PLANNING PROCESS 
The CBIRD areas have from the outset been engaged in a rela­
tively sophisticated planning process under the guidance of the CDF 
Coordinator. In this respect, CBIRD is a sizeable step ahead of the 
Saemaul Movement, which also encourages local planning but within 
the framework of a standard, nationwide bureaucratic model that 
often cannot be easily adapted to the varying needs, conditions and 
capabilities of different villages. Moreover, the Saemaul approach 
applies only to making separate plans for each individual village, 
whereas the CBIRD approach applies to a consortium of neighboring 
villages. 
In principle, the CBIRD planning system provides all villagers 
in the area, whatever their status, an opportunity to express their 
views not only on their own priority needs and aspirations but on 
what the priority development objectives of the whole area should be. 
Since such views are bound to differ from family to family and village 
to village, the system also provides for mediating these differences 
through a give-and-take process until a generally acceptable consen­
sus emerged. 
This consensus gets expressed in the form, first, of a "long 
term" development plan (3-year) and later in a series of short term 
(1-year) development plans for each CBIRD impact area, Itemized in 
terms of specific "productivity" and "social infrastructure" projects 
with corresponding investment requirements and sour-:es. The 
process imposes a strong discipline because the overall plan must be 
cut to fit a clearly defined timetable and the set of resources 
expected to be available from both local and outside sources. In 
other words, it cannot be simply a list of dreams and compromises 
that cannot possibly be implemented. Nor can the process end 
simply with an overall plan; each individual project must also be 
planned and properly prepared if it is to be effectively implemented. 
Making such plans Is inherently a very complex undertaking, 
especially in a rural society unaccustomed to such sophisticatq' self­
diagnostic and decision-making methods. Not only must the 
community's own needs, resources and potentialities be accurately 
assessed and a meeting of minds achieved among conflicting interests, 
but the local plan must also be compatible with the policies and 
capabilities of outside supporting agencies- -particularly Saemaul 
and CDF. This requires skillful negotiation. Moreover the plan must 
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be sufficiently flexible and adaptable so that it can be altered on 
short notice in response to unforeseen events such as droughts or 
a serious delay in the delivery of expected outside assistance. 
Types of Projects 
To interpret a typical CBIRD plan it is necessary first to under­
stand the various categories and terminology used in CDF plans and 
financial reports. 
Following Saemaul practice, all CBIRD projects are classified 
under two headings: 1) "Productivity /Income-Raising" projects 
and 2) "Social Infrastructure Projects" (sometimes also referred to 
as "Environmental Improvement"). The productivity projects include 
mainly agricultural (or fishery) improvements carried out by 
individuals, largely with their own efforts and investments, though 
often with temporary loans and technical assistance from CBIRD or 
others. Typical projects in this category include: raising new live­
stock, building a vinyl greenhouse for cash crops, or improving 
boat and fishing equipment. This category may also include, however, 
certain economic infrastructure items of utility to the whole community, 
such as a warehouse, local bank or cooperative store. 
The Social Infrastructure category can be quite confusing to the 
outsider because it combines several quite dissimilar sub-categories, 
some of which are more closely linked in conventional parlance to 
economic developnent than to social development. These sub-categories 
include: (a) household improvements by individual families (largely 
at their own expense, using loans where necessary) such as replacing 
a thatched roof with tile, making kitchen improvements, building a 
latrine or installing electricity, running water or a telephone; (b) 
community health and sanitation activities such as nutrition, family 
planning, medical insui'ance, water systems and parasite control 
programs; (c) education and culture projects, such as day care 
centers, school improvements, athletic and cultural programs, and 
scholarships; (d) public works projects (with important economic 
implications) such as road, bridge or dike construction, harbor 
improvements, truck purchases and the like; and (e) program manage­
ment including local administration of the CBIRD program, operating 
the community center, technical and leadership training, and emer­
gency assistance, The important point to bear in mind is that this 
Social Infrastructure category includes a melange of projects, only 
a few of which could properly be classified as social welfare under 
customary usage. 
CDF's F;nancial Strategy 
The financial aspects of CBIRD plans and CDF summary reports 
can also be confusing to the outsider who is unaware of CDF's basic 
financial strategy. This rather unusual strategy has four main ob­
jectives: (1) to maximize self-help by individual farmers, fishermen 
and households by providing easy access to loars at moderate 
interest rates; (2) to recycle a substantial portion of CDF grant 
funds back into the local economy in the form of loanable assets 
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under the control of the Community Committees; (3) to combine CDF 
project support wherever possible with substantial local and govern­
ment support; and (4) to use a portion of available CDF funds--if 
need be without matching funds from other sources--to spearhead 
certain social welfare activities considered important by CDF but not 
or the government.yet considered high priority by the local community 
Evidence presented in the next chapter sheds light on how 
Before presenting thiseffective this finarcial strategy has been. 
areevidence, however, it is important to explain how CBIRD plans 
made. 
Making a Plan 
Getting t? 9 CBIRD type of planning process implanted is not
 
an easy matter and requires great skill and ingenuity on the part of
 
the Coordinator. It works somewhat differently in each area, but in
 
principle the planning process starts with a survey of the Impact
 
area to obtain "baseline data." In addition to a general description 
of the area, the survey contains demographic data, lists of local 
organizations and institutions, and detailed quantitative information 
on land quality, ownership and use, crop yields, agricultural imple­
ments, household income, housing conditions, and facilities for health 
care and cultural activities. A parallel and somewhat more informal 
survey collects the views of people in the different villages on the 
most pressing needs and priority goals to which the plan should be 
addressed. 
On the basis of all this information--and after extensive informal 
and formal discussions--the Community Committee with the help of the 
Coordinator draws up a three-year plan based on selected priority 
development goals and targets, with corresponding cost 
estimates end projections of anticipated "Investment" resources 
from CDF, the local people, the Government (mainly under the 
Saemaul program), and any other outside sources. A sample of 
such a 3-year plan, from Chunsong for the period July 1976-June 
1979, is shown in Table 3. This plan envisages 45 different 
projects and activities over three years at a total investment of 
nearly $270,000, equally divided between productivity and social 
infrastructure projects. Of this total, 52 percent would come from 
"self-help" (cash plus contributed labor), 17 percent from CDF, 
and 31 percent from Government. 
The process of developing an annual plan, according to Coord­
inators, has proved to be a heavy and difficult task for the Chairmen
 
and members of Community Committees, requiring continuous and
 
extensive assistance by the Coordinators. A summary of the FY
 
1977/78 annual plan of the Chunsong Area is shown in Table 4.
 
The gestation period for an annual plan is usually about five 
months, starting in February and ending in late June with a new plan 
ready for implementation. At the formal level the Coordinator usually 
initiates the process by presenting the overall scope of the annual 
CDF grant to the Community Committee. He then suggests that the 
Committee draw up its development program, taking account of the 
villagers' most pressing needs and the extent of local resources 
Table 3
 
Example of a Three Year CBIRD Plan
 
(Chunsong Impact Area)
 
Planning Period: July 1976 - June 1979
 
Relative Investment (U.S. dollars) 
Type Name of Project Contents Self-Help SCF /CDF Others Total 
Productivity (Agriculture) 
Water way 5 places 
Water Lift System 1 place 
Land Improvement 20 ha 
Seed Improvement (rice) 100 bag 
Seed Improvement (other) 100 bag 
Vinylhouse Culture 100 houses 
Fruit Tree Plantation 20,000 trees 
Warehouse Construction 6 places 
Cow Raising 278 head 
Milk Cow Raising 30 
Bee Hives 50 boxes 
Deer Raising 10 head 
Fish Raising 1 place 
Sub-total 
2,000 
1,000 
2,000 
1,200 
600 
6,000 
5,000 
5,000 
13,900 
4,500 
1,000 
3,000 
5,000 
50,200 
2,000 
1,000 
2,000 
1,000 
1,000 
5,000 
1,000 
1,500 
14,500 
3,000 (Govt.) 
3,000 (Govt.) 
2,000 (Govt.) 
6,000 (Govt.) 
7,500 (Agr.Coop) 
6,500 (Govt.) 
2,000 (Agr.Coop) 
30,000 
7,000 
5,000 
4,000 
1,200 
600 
9,000 
12,000 
17,500 
13,900 
12,000 
1,000 
3,000 
8,500 
94,700 
Productivity (Commerce 6 Industry) 
Cooperative Stores 
Village Bank 
Mine Development 
Village Industry 
Sub-total 
10 places 
3 places 
5 places 
2 places 
2,000 
3,000 
30,000 
1,000 
36,000 
1,500 
1,000 
2,500 
2,000 (Agr.Coop) 
2,000 (Govt.) 
4,000 
4,000 
4,500 
30,000 
4,000 
42,500 
Social 
Infrastructure (Environment Improvements) 
Roof Improvement 110 houses 
Kitchen Improvement 143 " 
Latrine Improvement 151 " 
6,100 
2,860 
3,020 
1,100 
1,430 
1,510 
3,300 (Govt.) 10,500 
4,290 
4,530 
Table 3 (contInued) 
Relative Investment (US dollars) 
Type Name of Project Contents Self-Help SCF/CDF Others Total 
Social 
Infrastructure Compost Places Constr. 
House Improvement 
Barrier Improvement 
Community Beautification 
Sub-total 
147 places 
13 houses 
43 " 
6 villages 
882 
2,600 
1,270 
5,000 
21,732 
1,300 
5,340 
2.600 
5,900 
(Govt.) 
882 
6,500 
1,270 
5,000 
32,972 
Social 
Infrastructure (Health Q Sanitation) 
Running Water System 
Nutrition Program 
Medical 7nsurance 
Parasite Control 
Family Planning 
Sub-total 
6 places 
450 children 
6,000 people 
2, times /yr. 
80 people 
3,600 
1,600 
1,500 
300 
200 
7,200 
1,200 
.1,600 
1,500 
300 
200 
4,800 
2,400 (Govt.) 
2,400 
7,200 
3,200 
3,000 
600 
400 
14,400 
Social 
Infrastructure (Education U Culture) 
Daycare Centers 
Athletic F Culture 
Scholarship Program 
Amplifier System 
Playground 
Sub-total 
4 centers 
3 years 
10 students 
(10 y.) 
6 places 
6 places 
3,000 
1,500 
3,000 
600 
600 
8,700 
3,000 
1,500 
1,000 
600 
600 
6,700 
6,000 
3,000 
4,000 
1,200 
1,200 
15,400 
Social Infra-
structure 
(Program Management) 
Community Center Operation 
Village Centers 
Training Programs (Leaders.) 
Technical Training 
Emergency Assistance 
Administration 
1 center 
7 centers 
21 courses 
30 courses 
21 cases 
3 years 
1,000 
700 
1,000 
2,500 
500 
1,500 
3,000 
700 
2,000 
1,000 
420 
1,500 
4,000 
1,400 
3,000 
3,500 
920 
3,000 o 
Sub-total 
GRAND TOTAL 
7,200 
140,332 
8,620 
45,960 83,300 
15,820 
269,592 
Table 4 
Example of an Annual CBIRD Plan 
(Chunsong Impact Area) 
Period: July 1, 1977 - June 30, 1978 
Date: Month Relative Investments (U.S. Dollars) TOTAL 
CDF Govt. 6 Other SourcesStarting Ending Community
.Type 
A. Priority CBIRD Projects 	 Cash Inkind Cash Cash Inkind 
P* 	 Tobacco Drying Houses Feb. 78 June 78 3,742 2,079 4,158. 9,979 
10,915P Cow Raising 	 Sep. 77 Nov. 77 4,158 2,599 4,158 
10,395P Animal Pen Construction Sep. 77 Nov. 77 4,158 2,079 4,158 9,771P Vinyl Houses Jan. 78 Apr. 78 2,079 4,158 3,534 
P Project Bank July 77, June 78 2,079 1,040 3,119 
S* Community Center Ongoing 1,040 2,798 3,838 
S Leadership Training Ongoing 416 2,911 1,663 4,990 
1,247 3,119 2,079 1,559 2,275 10,279S Daycare Centers Ongoing 3,884S Education 1 Culture Ongoing 	 208 1,462 2,214 
June 78 1,87 1,558 1,736 	 5,165Health 1 Sanitation July 77S 	
1,341 1,341Administration Ongoing 
Sub-total 14,137 24,747 26,800 5,717 2,275 73,676 
4,158 62,370 66,528B. Supplementary Projects 
8,316 	 22,661C. Locally Supported** 	 12,682 1,663 
26,410 30,958 76,403 2,275 162,865
GRAND TOTALS 	 26,819 

*P=Productivity S = Social Infrastructure 
**Projects not utilizing SCF/CDF Funding but which resulted directly or indirectly from SCF/CDF's assistance 
or involvement. 
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available for investment to supplement or match outside help. There 
is continuing reference to the general guidelines and objectives 
established as part of the aroals three-year plan, although consider­
newable flexibility in adjusting to changing conditions or in adopting 
and innovative ideas is encouraged. 
The village chiefs, who are also members of the committee, then 
convene a series of meetings at their own villages, where there is 
discussion of which projects are particularly desirable and feasible 
in the light of local capabilities. The projects may be either on behalf 
of individuals, such as raising cows or installation of a fishing boat 
engine, or a cooperative project such as the construction of a bridge 
or piped water system. 
A 6reat deal of what eventually takes place is as much determined 
by informal conversations among the Coordinator, local officials, 
the Committee Chairman, the village heads, and farmers or fishermen as 
by the deliberations in regularly scheduled meetings. Often the latter 
merely ratifies what has been already worked out informally in 
advance. Accordingly, the social skills, intelligence and good will 
of the major figures involved are crucial factors in achieving results. 
COORDINATION WITH GOVERNMENT 
Once the Community Committee has settled on a draft of the
 
new annual plan, its members meet with representatives of government
 
agencies at the sub-county (myon) office to coordinate with the
 
Saemaul program and to request and negotiate for specific government
 
inputs. This is a time-consuming process and is considerably compli­
cated by the lack of fit b'tween CDF's fiscal year and that of the
 
Government of Korea.
 
There is considerable variation in the way this process is 
carried out, depending on the method of operation of the myon 
office chief. Saemaul projects are generally planned and implemented 
as separate village efforts, and many are not included in the Commun­
ity Committee's program. Conversely, some CBIRD projects, 
particularly those dealing with education, day care centers and 
health, but also some projects designed to increase income, are 
excluded from the official Saemaul program. 
The actual integration or linkage of CBIRD and Saemaul programs 
usually takes place in one of two ways. First, the myon office 
may decide to incorporate the CBIRD plan in its overall development 
program for the area and retain responsibility for coordinating and 
directing all the various projects within its jurisdiction--in which 
case the Community Committee is subject to a greater degree of myon 
office control and loses some of its autonomy. The second way, 
practiced at Sanbuk, is for the Community Committee to review not 
only the CBIRD projects but also the Saemaul projects of its member 
villages, revising and eliminating some of them on the basis of its 
own estimate of local needs and capacities, then submitting the 
whole package for review. The advantage of this method for the 
myon office is that instead of dealing with representatives from each 
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separate village on several different plans, it can discuss a single 
unified CBIRD/Saemaul program with the Community Committee that 
encompasses all the villages. The Committee benefits by retaining 
more independence and gaining greater bargaining power with the 
myon office concerning the amount and direction of governmental
 
inputs.
 
REVIEW BY CDF 
When negotiations with local government agencies have been 
completed, the projects are then divided by the Committee into those 
that can be funded and carried out by the community alone and 
those requiring outside assistance from CDF, the Korean Government, 
or other agencies such as CARE. As the final step, the Committee 
not only submits the plan as a whole to the CDF Seoul office for 
review and approval but also a statement describing and justifying
 
each Individual project. An example of such a Development Project
 
Descr,ptlon Form relating to the creation of a community bank in
 
Yaksan, is shown in Appendix I. The plans for each impact area 
are reviewed by the director of the CDF Korea program, a procedure 
that requires a series of meetings in Seoul of the Coordinators and 
other members of the CDF staff. There is heavy pressure to 
complete this final clearance process before the end of June so that 
implementation can begin in July. 
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SPECIFIC PROJECTS 
Specific project proposals usually originate from four different 
sources. 1) Local leaders and Committee members representing the 
population of their villages are likely to bring up economic (i.e., 
income raising) projects. 2) The Field Coordinator tends to propose 
proiacts dealing with training, welfare, and the development and 
ma _ge-aent of CBIRD institutions. 3) Local agencies such as the 
schools, the extension seivice, or the myon of.ce also make project 
proposals from time to time. 4) Many project ideas arise from 
discussions that take place in the course of various meetings. Most 
project ideas are discussed informally with the persons or organiza­
tions most immediately concerned before being put to a formal meeting 
of the Community Committee. 
Once a project is adopted, its effective implication requires 
further careful planning and preparation. For example, for 
innovative projects on which local knowledge is inadequate, expert 
advice is sought from a number of sources, either through such 
governmental agencies as the extension service or the cooperative, 
or through CDF. The Coordinator may dirt;tly seek out experts 
in nearby towns or cities, or he may ask the CDF office in Seoul 
to obtain the services of a specialist consultant. Coordinators find 
that obtaining timely, expert, technical advice is often a difficult 
problem. In Chunsong the fact that the local agricultural extension 
office is located in the Community Center has made it easier to obtain 
such help in introdrucing new kinds of agricultural practices. 
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THE PLANNING ROLE OF THE COORDINATOR
 
The CBIRD concept and methodology envisages an initial strong 
as the local popula­role for the Coordinator that gradually diminishes 
tion--particularly tho local leaders--gain experience and competence 
and develop self-confidence in running their own program. Though ir 
principle the Community Committee is responsible for the planning, 
scheduling, implementation and evaluation of projects, the ideas of 
the Coordinator and the main concerns of CDF inevitably tend to 
predominate in the formulation of plans during the first couple of 
years. In addition to promoting the proclaimed CDF goals of 
responding to local needs and helping the poor, the Coordinator 
endeavors to mobilize interest and involvement on the part of the 
local population that will produce sufficiently dramatic results to 
inspire confidence in the effectiveness of the CBIRD approach. 
A comparison of the impact areas in Korea indicates that it is 
important right from the start for local leaders to be given as 
much responsibility as possible so as to acquire from the outset the 
conviction that they are operating their own program rather than one 
on the Coord­controlled by CDF. Once an initial habit of dependence 
inator is established, it becomes more difficult later to promote local 
leadership and institutions on an independent, self-sustaining basis. 
There is a tendency for Koreans to adapt naturally and easily to 
hierarchical, paternalistic relationships, particularly where the 
patron possesses knowledge, relatively high status, and material 
aresources. This kind of problem can arise not only where there is 
particularly strong and competent Coordinator, but also if the 
Chairman of the Community Committee has a great deal of power 
and authority in the area. 
If all goes well, the Coordinator gradually recedes into the 
background of the planning process and the Committee members take 
over increasingly. Nevertheless he continues to exert considerable 
influence in determining the actual mix of projects in the annual plans 
He must occasionally discourage what he regards as excessive local 
enthusiasm for an impractical or risky undertaking, and he must also 
counter the local preference for income-producing or public works 
schemes by pushing social welfare projects that are considered 
by CDF an essential part of village development. Such projects, 
which include atlletic and cultural events, film showings, day care 
centers, health clinics, meetings for the aged, and help for local 
education, are also designed to develop cooperation and community 
spirit among residents of the several villages that comprise the 
impact area. So far the greatest local enthusiasm for this kind of 
project has been demonstrated in Sanbuk. 
The acid test of any planning process, of course, Is the extent
 
to which it ultimately gets translated into action and positive
 
achievements. The next chapter examines the record from this
 
point of view.
 
53The 	Planning Process 
APPENDIX I 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESCRIPTION FORM 
1. 	 Name of Project Village Bank 
2. Project Number 
3. Name of Country Korea Name of Field Office KFO 
4. Impact area nuraber and name 07 Yaksan 
5. Village Name Jangyong area and Oedu-rl 
6. Number of Beneficiaries - Direct 530 ; Indirect 890 
7. Date of preparation May 20, 1978 
8. 	 When Will When Will 
Project Begin July 1, 1978 Project be completed June 30, 1979 
9. Problem - Why is the project needed? 
There are 2 financial organizations and a few village banks 
in Yaksan area. But since they i3il to meet the islander's
 
financial requirements, usurious debts are prevailing in this
 
community. The said village banks have a little funds and are
 
operated inefficiently. It is, therefore, necessary that there
 
should be some measures to improve this discouraging situation.
 
LO. Purpose - How will these conditions in your community be
 
measurably improved during the next year by carrying out
 
the project?
 
This project is designed to help the islanders reduce their 
usurious debts and meet their fund needs by merging four
 
village banks into one for its efficient operation--through
 
reduction of operational expenses.
 
11. 	 Activities - What will you do in order to make these changes? 
The 4 village banks will be merged by June 1979 with 
supporting fund of $4,158 to be made available from the revolving 
fund of the community committee. The staff members of the 
newly-established bank will be provided with training in
 
management and they will observe the community which is
 
operating the village banks efficiently and successfully. The
 
training and observation will be carried out in cooperation with
 
the village bank federation. Also, this project will place
 
emphasis on Bank members' Investments in order to increase
 
its fund.
 
12. 	 Inputs - What will you need in order to do these activities? 
RELATIVE INVESTMENT 
Communit CDP ... Others Total' 
Cash "Inkind Cash Cash Inkind Source 
1.9,355 $9,355 
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APPENDIX I (continued) 
BREAKDOWNS
 
CalculationsContents Fund 
Bank Merger $9,355 	 Supporting fund: $4,158 
Jangyong Bank: $2,079 
Oedu ": $2,079 
Kuseong/Yeodong
Banks: $1,039 
Total: 	 $9,355 
13. 	 Assumptions - For what reason could your project fail or have
 
only partial success?
 
Discouraging factors in operating this project could be 
failure to merge village banks, inefficient operation, slump in 
investments and failure to conduct training in management for 
the accountants and other staff of the village bank. 
14. 	 Goal - What long range social or economic problem in your
 
community does this project help to change?
 
Improved management of the bank resultant from a merger 
would be able to help the population reduce or exterminate 
usurious debts by meeting partial or entier requirements of the 
islanders' funds. As a result people here would benefit by this 
project. 
15. 	 Benefits for Children - What benefits will this project provide
 
for the target group of children and youth?
 
Children will benefit directly or indirectly by this bank. 
Because their parents are able to borrow some money from this 
village bank when they are in dire need of funds for their living 
earning business or for their children's schooling or clothes, etc. 
16. Community Development -	 How will the community be able to 
continue this project after funding coming from SCF/CDF is no 
longer available to the community? 
The Community Committee would continue this project with 
its own fund in cooperation with bank's members by expanding 
its fund. 
17. 	 The field coordinator should sign the copy of the Development 
Project Description From (plan) sent to the National Office to 
indicate approval. (In addition, copies of project descriptions 
retained by the community committee and/or field office must 
also be signed by the representative of the community. During 
field visits National Office staff will verify that the community 
representative has signed the project plans. 
Oh Byung Sup 
Chairman on behalf of SCF/CDF Field Coordinator 
The Community People 
CHAPTER 5
 
THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD
 
In examining the implementation record of CBIRD plans it is 
important to bear in mind the following environmental factors, dis­
cussed in Chapter 2, that strongly influence the development 
capabilities, incentives and behavior of CBIRD and other Korean 
rural communities. 
Rural development in Korea today--in contrast to earlier years-­
is very much an active concern of both the farm population and local 
administration. The booming prosperity and industrialization of the 
urban areas and the rapid growth of the economy have created un­
usually favorable conditions for development in both agriculture and 
fishing. Villages have been carrying on extensive self-help projects 
since 1972 within this favorable economic climate and there have been 
significant increases in living standards and agricultural productivity. 
Expectations for further progress are high, and there Is a general 
acceptance of the need for innovative change. In contrast to the 
suspicion and hostility with which officials were regarded in the 
past, villagers now tend to look to local administrative agencies for 
advice and material assistance. Although progress has been uneven, 
government planners are making efforts to provide more assistance 
to lagging areas. 
Environmental factors, however, vary a great deal in Korea and 
play an important role in determining the developmental opportunities 
and constraints that any particular village or group of villages 
confronts. While the CBIRD areas all have considerable potential 
for development in terms of topography and arable land--or access 
to marine resources--the mainland farming communities have certain 
advantages over the island areas, at least at this stage. They are 
more homogeneous, both with regard to kinds of productive activity 
and the distribution of wealth. They are also more compact, compri­
sing fewer villages, among which transportation is easier. Moreover, 
CBIRD programs were initiated in the mainland communities in 1973 and 
.1974 whereas the island programs have only been in operation since 
1976. 
These and other aIfferentiating factors must therefcre be taken 
into account in comparing CBIRD accomplishments in such disparate 
areas. Some--probably most--of the difficulties encountered in the 
island projects are attributable to aspects of the physical environment, 
55 
56 . CBIRD/South Korea 
the amounts of investment, and the relatively short period since CDF 
launched its project. In addition, the unfortunate tradition in Korea 
of contempt by educated city dwellers for fishermen, whose character­
istics are contrasted unfavorably with the sturdy virtues of the farmer, 
still persists to some extent. Accordingly, there is some tendency on 
the part of officials and other outsiders (sometimes even CDF coordin­
ators) to attribute certain problems to the particular social organization 
of island communities or the peculiar personality and customs of island 
people. 
THE EVIDENCE 
CDF has developed an extensive statistical repoiting system 
designed to monitor and assess progress in project impl.ementation i1a 
each CBIRD area and to keep close track of financial flows. Although 
the reports from different areas differ in clarity and comprehensive­
ness, and one encounters occasional puzzling discrepancies between 
different reports from the same area as well as among the numerous 
summary accounts of the Korea program, they nevertheless provide a 
onuseful quantitative picture of the physical progress being made 
various types of projects and of their financial dimensions. 
These quantitative statistics do not, however, shed much light 
on significant qualitative changes taking place (which sometimes are 
even more important than the quantitative ones). Nor do they reveal 
what sorts of impact the successfully implemented projects are actually 
having on the lives of various subgroups in the local population. It 
is especially difficult to ascertain from these quantitative data whether 
and to what extent the poorer families are sharing in the overall bene­
fits of the CBIRD program--a question we will return to later. 
The present chapter draws upon a number of different CBIRD 
statistical reports for quantitative purposes but relies upon the 
authors' discussions and direct observations in the four selected 
project areas with regard to qualitative and distributive aspects. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINANCIAL STRATEGY 
The CBXRD program hais clearly made substantial progr3ss in 
implementing the financial strategy de'cribed in the previous chapter. 
Cumulative CDF grants to the six rur.A CBIRD areas through June, 
1978, totaled $683,000 (excluding expenditures of the SCF/CDF field 
office in Seoul).* Investments in CBIRD projects by the Government of 
Korea over the same period somewhat exceeded this amount. Community 
self-help investments and contributions of materials and labor totaled 
an estimated $1,500,000. (This figure, particularly the portion rela­
ting to contributed labor, is only a rough approximation and could be 
somewhat inflated. ) Thus it appears that, overall, each CDF dollar 
has been matched by four to five dollars of local effort and government 
funds. These figures do not mean, of course, that in the absence of 
CDF grants and the CBIRD program none of the other investments 
would have been made. There is good reason to believe, however, 
that the CDF funds primed the pump for considerably larger 
efforts by others--especially the communities themselves--than 
would otherwise have occurred. 
*See note on Table 8 for SCF /CDF Field Office expenditures. 
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The impressive local effort shown above is partly explained by 
the fact that 40 percent of the CDF grant funds were recycled back 
into the local economy as loan assets (controlled by the Community 
Committees), against which local people can borrow for thir owi. 
private productive and household improvement projects. An additional 
34 percent went into physical property and facdlities (e.g., the Com­
munity Centers) vested in the Community Committees. These growing 
assets, summarized in Table 5, have given the Committees an 
increasingly stronger base of authority and viability. 
We can reasonably conclude from the above evidence that CDF's 
financing strategy, calculated to produce a multiplier effect on total 
investment funds for the CBIRD programs and to build financial 
foundations for continuing the CBIRD approach after CDF's with­
drawal--has been quite successful. 
A OMPARISON OF TWO CBIRD AREAS 
It is instructive to compare the FY 1978 record of one of the
 
early mainland CBIRD areas, Chunsong, and one of the later island
 
areas, Yaksan, in terms of their mix of planned projects and the
 
extent to which they were implemented.
 
Chunsong 
The projects planned for the Chunsong area for FY 1978 and 
the extent to which they were actually implemented are shown in the 
first two columns of Table 6. The next three columns show the rela­
tive investment of CDF, Community, and Government funds in each 
project. Out of a total investment of $94,800, CDF grants accounted 
for $29,400; community effort, $53,400; and Government contribution, 
$12, 000. * 
The annual plan as depicted in Table 6 originally provided for 
six productivity/income-raising projects and five social infrastructure 
projects. Two important modifications were later made, however. The 
project for building 20 tobacco drying houses was dropped because, 
even though local farmers had been heavily and profitably engaged in 
tobacco growing, increased problems with plant disease and falling 
prices convinced them that other crops would be more profitable in 
the long run. Hence, some of the funds earmarked for the tobacco 
houses were redeployed to irrigation pumps to counter the adverse 
impact of the 1978 drought on cash crops. 
The striking fact is that, according to tL, year-end report to
 
CDF, all the remaining 10 projects (except for Health and Sanitation)
 
achieved or exceeded their planned targets during the year--an
 
impressive record.
 
*These totals are taken from Table 8. The totals for community 
and government contributions shown on Table 6 are provisional and 
hence do not quite jibe with the corrected totals on Table 8. 
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Table 6 
Community Assets Created by CDF Grants 
as of 1978 (in U.S. dollars) 
CDF Grants 
Community 
Committee 
Property 
Revolving 
Loan 
Assets 
d 
Sanbuk 
Yanggu 
Chunsong 
Wido 
Yaksan 
Jeungdo 
165,135 
167,131 
125,042 
74,552 
76,639 
74,224 
78,703 
66,112 
63,027 
--
6,570 
17,671 
70,157 
56,694 
48,422 
29,923 
36,417 
42,931 
Totals 683,323 232,083 284,544 
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Table 6 
Implementation Record of Chunsong
 
CBIRD Projects FY 1977-78
 
Projects No. of Projects Actual Investments4(US$) 
Planned Actual CDF Community ROK Govt. 
20 01Tobacco drying houses 
Cows 10 10 4,158. 6,757.
 
Cow pen construction 10 15 6,237. 9,356.
 
Vinyl greenhouses 10 10 3,534. 6,362. 94.
 
Community center ongoing 1 2,798. 1,040.
 
centerLeadership training 
courses 16 16 595. 666.
 
Day care centers ongoing 4 2,524. 4,366. 6,220.

centers
 
Education 6 culture 8 10 2,144. 1,331.
 
Health 6 sanitation 4 1 1,247. 7,445.
 
Irrigation pumps 192 2,219. 3,169. 561.
 
Administration 1,341.
 
Totals 27,072. 40,492. 6,875.
 
Locally Supported Projects 3
 
Garlic planting 2 ha 4.2 ha 10,395.
 
Truck purchase (co-op) 1 truck 1 truck 2,079. 8,316.
 
Women's Welfare Bank 1 bank 1 bank 1,206
 
Totals 27,072. 54,172. 15,191.
 
1Cancelled; see explanation in text. 
2Added; see text for explanation. 
3 Defined as "projects not utilizing SCF/CDF funding but which resulted 
directly or indirectly from SCF/CDF's assistance or involvement." 
4The figures on this table for community and government contributions 
are provisional. The correct totals are shown on Table 8 below. 
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The emphasis of the Chunsong program is revealed by the 
Two-thirds of the total expenditures wentallocation of expenditures. 

into economic projects (principally cattle raising, vinyl greenhouses
 
for cash crops, garlic planting and purchase of a truck), reflecting
 
a strong local preference for income-producing projects. Within the
 
were for
social infrastructure category the largest expenditures 
operating the four existing day care centers for children, a health
 
and the operation of the Community Center,
and sanitation project, 

all of these reflecting CDF priorities. Smaller amounts went to leader­
ship training, education and culture, and administration.
 
Yaksan 
This island area presents a quite different pattern than Chun-
Table 7, the plan provided for 10 song in FY 1978. As shown in 
basically economic projects representing a wide assortment of activities 
growing medical herbs, kelp(e.g., animal raising, vinyl greenhouses, 

an abalone nursery, and an Irri­and seaweed, planting fruit trees, 

gation channel). The 12 planned social infrastructure projects were
 
equally varied. They included, for example, building a community
 
center, a public bathhouse, a consumer cooperative store, a road and
 
kitchen and roof improvements on private homes,
ferryboat landing, 
athletic and cultural events, healthschool supplies and equipment, 

(parasite extermination), and leadership training.
 
poorer thanThe actual implementation record was considerably 
Chunsong's. Of the 21 planned projects only ten met their target, 
five fell short, and six were delayed or cancelled, but four small 
unplanned projects were added. In the circumstances, however, this 
was actually not so bad a record. The CBIRD program in this area, 
was quite new and the management inexperienced; expectedafter all, 
government funds for some important projects failed to materialize; 
the drought upset certain other projects; competing Saemaul projects 
diverted funds and energies; market conditions for some agricultural 
certain projects evaporated.products declined, and popular interest in 
Despite all these problems a total of $240,000 in cash and in kind 
was invested during the year, including $39,900 of CDF funds, $75,900 
in local resources, and $108,100 in government funds and materials.* 
The largest single expenditure was on re-roofing houses ($24,000); 
the main agricultural projects together took $35,000, and public 
works over $11,000. Less than $5,000 was devoted to social welfare. 
A puzzling contrast emerges when CDF grant funds to Yaksan 
on a per capita basis are compared to other CBIRD areas. As shown 
only $5.85 per capitain Table 8, the FY 1978 figure for Yaksan is 

Chunsong and
compared to a range of nearly $12 to $14 for Wido, 
are taken from Table 8. The investment figures*These totals 

on Table 7 for the community and government are incomplete. CDF
 
1978 but
actually granted $53, 000 to the Yaksan Project for FY 
not used due to delays in the community center.$13,500 of this was 
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Table 7 
Implementation Record of Yaksan 
CBIRD Projects FY 1977-78 
No. of Projects 1 Actual Investments 2(US$) 
ROK Govi 
120 
2,079 
1,040 
624 
Project Plannedl 
Animal Raising 
Cows 
Goats 
Pigs 
Medical Herbs (stavia) 
Consumers Co-op Store 
Vinyl Greenhouse 
Kelp Cultivation 
Women's Sub-committee 
Community Center 
Kitchen, Improvement 
Abalone Nursery 
Irrigation Well 
Leaders Training 
Athletic 6 Cultural 
Events 
Roof Improvement 
Seaweed (laver) 
Cultivation 
Public Health 
Housing 
School Supplies 
Telephone Line 
Public Facilities 
Road Construction 
Water Tank 
School Drinking 
Fountain 
Administration 
35 
100 
.02 ha. 
1 store 
0. 3 ha. 
3.0 ha. 
Actual CDF 
5,925. 
3
 
50
 
60
 
.02 ha. 1,663 
1 store 1,040 
0.2 ha 624 
delayed 4,158 
(various projects) 1,040 
construc-
tion 
planned 
30 
2 ha. 
not planned 
originally 
delayed 5,489 
30 624 
cancelled 
* acre 
irrigated 
624 
2,079 

cancelled because of drought 
41 houses 41 houses 6,819 
1 nursery 1 nursery 2,079 
Parasite Extermination 1,040 
30 houses cancelled 
Books 8 drawing 
materials 624 
1 1 520 
bath house cancelled 
village hall 
100 m. 100 m. 418 
not originally 1 tank 624 
planned 
not originally 1 system 2,017 
planned 
2 495 
Community 
6,998. 
3,746 
946 
249 
2,721 
936 
959 
1,372 
17,364 
6,237 
21 
499 
895 
1,490 
TOTALS ................................. 900 44,433
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Table 7 (continued) 
No. of Projects Actual Investments (US$) 
Project PlannedL Actuali CDF Community ROK Govt. 
Balance from previous page 39,900. 44,433. 3,823. 
Locally Supported Projects 
Fruit Tree Planting 
Irrigation Channel 
Ferry Boat Landing 
3,000 
persimmons 
400 m. 
1500 
3,000 
persimmons 
300 m. 
150 m. 
5,884. 
1,238. 
labor 
624. 
10,400. 
TOTALS 39,900. 51,555. 14,847. 
1Additions and cancellations of projects explained in text. 
2 The figures on this table for Community and Government investments 
are incomplete. The correct totals are shown on Table 8. 
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Table 8
 
Funding Sources and SCF/CDF Grants
 
Per Capita, FY 1977-78
 
Impact Area 
(population) 
dollars)Funding Sources (U.S. 
SCF/CDF ROK Govt. Community CDF Grants 
Yaksan (9058). 5 153,000. 108,100. 75,900. 
(per capita)
5.85 
Wido (4500) 50,000. 78,100. 69,600. 11.84 
Chunsong (2108) 29,400. 12,000. 53,400. 13.94 
Sanbuk (3134) 43,000. 107,500. 196,300. 13.72 
Sources: CDF Semi-annual Reports and Project Evaluation Summary 
Sheets, FY 1978. 
1 Includes $13,500 not yet spent because of delays in planning the 
Communitv Center. 
Note: Overall SCF/CDF expenditures In Korea for FY 1977-78 
1) SCF/CDF Field Office Budget 
Salaries (including CDF Coordinators) 
Transportation 8 Administration $231,777. 
Training 11,992. 
Consultants 4,318. 
Sub-total $248,087 
2) Grants to (7) Impact Areas 295,769 
3) Grand Total $543,856. 
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Sanbuk. The explanation may lie in the fact that Yaksan's population 
is two to four times larger than the other areas whereas an equal 
arbitrarily earmarked$50,000 of the US AID 	grant to SCFICDF was 
for each of the three new island areas regardless of their differing
 
population size. Or alternatively, perhaps the SCF/CDF office in
 
Seoul felt, that Yaksan 	simply was not yet ready to absorb larger
 
this marked discrepancy poses an interesting
funds. In any event, 

question as to whether there may not be some "minimum critical mass"
 
in terms of the per capita grant below which a new CBIRD impact area
 
will have great difficulty "taking off." It also raises the question of
 
how the limited funds available to CDF in Korea can most effectively
 
be divided among relatively well established CBIRD areas, such as
 
Sanbuk and Chunsong, and new areas such as Yaksan and Wido
 
that are still in the early stages. A related question is, when should
 
CDF start phasing down its annual grants to the older project areas,
 
and when will it be prudent to pull out altogether? 
Another point of laterest is the great variation in the amount of 
areas ingovernment funds made available to the different CBIRD 
any year, the large annual fluctuation in these funds from year to 
year, and th3 disruptive impact on local plan implementation when such 
funds fail to come through. The instability of Government funds--and 
the incompatibility between the Government's fiscal year and CDF's 
fiscal year--clearly creates some difficult problems for making CBIRD 
plans and implementing them. 
EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL AND
 
UNSUCCESSFUL PROJECTS
 
It is helpful to get behind the cold staistics and discover why
 
some projects work out bettei than others. The following sample
 
cases illustrate some of the reasons.
 
Credit Union in Sanbuk 
In April 1976 the Sanbuk Coordinator, W,,, ,,q
 
extensive experience with rural cooperative credit organizations,
 
introduced the credit union idea to the Community Committee. After
 
extended discussion the Committee adopted the idea and decided that 
its permanent employee, the secretary-treasurer, should rec3ive 
On May 21 the unionintensive training as the credit union manager. 
was established with 87 initial members who invested a total of 44,510 
won. With the strong backing of the Committee the credit union 
prospered. By January, 1977 there were 119 members and by the
 
end of June, 1977 the membership had reached 200.
 
During the first year of operation the credit union provided
 
low interest loans averaging $186 to each member household from
 
a total fund of about $18,000, of which CDF had contributed $7,732.
 
Earlier, under the Saemaul program, each village in the impact 
area had established an officially sponsored micro-bank. Since these 
organizations had the same function and rationale as the credit union, 
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there was considerable competition--in which the village micro-banks 
were losing out. In order to solve the problem, a joint meeting was 
arranged in June, 1977, attended by the village micro-bank chairmen, 
the Sanbuk credit union chairman, Community Committee members, 
the Coordinator, and Inyon officials. It was decided to integrate the 
village micro-banks with the crbdit union on the condition that the new 
organizztion would retain the Seemaul name of Maul Kumgo (micro­
bank), and that its operations would be reported hrough official 
channels, following the previous practice of the several smaller 
micro-banks. On August 23, 1977 the credit union in effect absorbed 
the mcro-banks, while retaining its original organizational structure 
and method of operation. By Jume, 19/8 when the former Chairman of 
the Sanbuk micro-bank was elected Community Committee Chairman, 
the credit union had 491 members and investments of about $33,000. 
During FY 1978 each member received dividends equal to 31.2 percent 
on his deposit, an impressive yield. 
The new Sanbuk credit union has practically eliminated the 
dependence of farmers on usurious loans from private moneylenders. 
Members have utUized credit union loans for both home improvement 
and productive investments. Since the credit union is an integral 
part of the Community Committee, its success has helped to streng­
then the Committee as a local institution. The Committee's secretary­
treasurer is busy every day with credit union matters, and the 
Community Center has become the focal noint of the area's financial 
affairs. 
Electrification on Wido 
Bec-use if the strong desire for electricity on the part of all 
Wido Island villages, a sub-committee for island electrification was 
organized as soon as ths CBIRD Community Committee was established 
in 1976. Soon theroaftur an electrification project proposal was 
submitted, both to the local administration and to CDF. After a 
Coordinator was assigned to Wido In the spring of 1977 several 
meetings of the Committee were held to discuss basic strategy. The 
Committee selected eight members for an observation trip to study a, 
model electrification pojout on another island. Other Committee 
members together with the Coordinator were able to obtain promises 
of technial and financial support for the project under Saemaul 
auspices irom the local fisheries cooperative and the myon office. 
The CommtItee with the help of the Coordinator then submitted a 
detailed plan for electrification to the national government through 
the local administration. 
As finally approved, seven out of ten villages on the island 
are included in the project. The plan provides for the construction 
and transportation to the island of concrete electric power poles, 
to be installed by contributed local labor. As part of the myon 
Saemoul effort, the Government is providing about $35, 000 of support. 
The fishery cooperative is furnishing $10,000 more, and CDF's 
investment is $14,000. Each electrified household must pay $60. 
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As of late 1978 the project was being implemented under the
 
supervision of an advisory team composed of the myon chief, the gun
 
chief and the Coordinator. CDF employed an electrical technician and
 
was
three assistants to direct the actual work, and village labor 

mobilized as needed.
 
It was hoped that the completion of this project would not only 
raise the living standards and morale of the islanders but would also 
increase their respect for, and involvement with, the Community 
Committee as the key local development agency. 
The project was originally scheduled for completion by June, 
1979 but a number of problems have arisen and work has gone more 
slowly than expected. Some of the villagers have only been wiilng to 
work on the sections that directly lead to their own communities. 
Villages on the outlying islands and those individuals who are too 
poor to pay the 30,000 won are excluded from the project, and this 
has resulted in widespread dissatisfaction. 
In retrospect, perhaps the initial planning should have taken 
these problems more into account. Possibly low cost, long term loans 
to the poor might have been arranged. Also, there inight have been 
more discussion of the situation of the remote villageG on outlying 
islands together with a stronger bid for aid from the authorities on 
their behalf. Even if unsuccessful, such actions might at least have 
given the disadvantaged persons and villages more of a sense of 
participation in CBIRD development efforts. 
Livestock and a New Cash Crop on Yaksan 
The original Yaksan plan was to buy black goats and Korean cowi 
for distribution to selected farmers, since they were well adapte I to 
local conditions, and the villagers were already familiar with their 
care and feeding. Just as this CBIRD project was getting underway, 
however, the market price of cows more than quadrupled. At the 
same time, the government together with the local fisheries coopeT­
ative decided to distribute 80 cows on the island. With such a large 
government cattle project under way it seemed unnecessary for the 
Community Committee to spend the limited amount of available CDF 
funds for the same purpose. 
Accordingly the Coordinator looked into the possibility of
 
raising pigs. About 80 percent of the farmers on the island were
 
already raising the Korean variety of pig, but compared to western
 
varieties the east Asian pig has a slower rate of growth and produces
 
much less meat when mature.
 
The Coordinator consulted experts from the Office of Rural 
Development with regard to a,)propriate pig varieties, techniques 
for raising them, prevention cf disease, and market conditions. He 
then presented all the informadon to the Community Committee, recom­
mending that the project be adopted. The Committee decided to buy 
B0 pigs and selected 30 skilled, conscientious farmers from two villages 
who, it was hoped, would be able to raise the new varieties of pigs 
carefully according to instructions. The farmers were sent to the 
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county experimental livestock farm for two days of intensive instruc­
tion in pig raising, and the pigs were purchased through the good 
offices of the county administration and the experimental farm. Since 
the new pigs required more sanitary conditions than the Korean variety,
the selected farmers had to build concrete-floored pens at their own 
expense. 
The Yaksan extension office was able to arrange cooperative
purchasing of pig feed and immunization materials for the new owners. 
Most other farmers had shown little interest in the project initially, 
but after seeing the astonishing growth rate of the new pigs, every­
one wanted to raise them. Those persons involved in the project thus 
found themselves in a position to make substantial profits, both from 
the sale of pork when the mature pigs were slaughtered and by selling 
the piglets, now in great demand locally. 
It is expected that eventually every household on the island will 
be able to raise the new breed of pigs. There is a large national 
demand for pork, and the Yaksan agricultural cooperative has agreed 
to market the pigs so as to maximize profits for the farmers. Regular 
courses of instruction in pig raising are to be held twice a year for 
prospective new owners. A local pig raising association has been 
formed, and there will be strict regulation to ensure that immuniza­
tion and breeding are carried out properly. 
An ill-fated New Cash Crop on Yaksan 
In contrast to Yaksan's highly successful pig project, an 
attempt to introduce an innovative cash crop there in 1978 ran into 
difficulties. Stevia, a plant of the chrysanthemum family originating
in Paraguay, has been developed in Japan as a sugar substitute with 
a wide variety of uses. The Coordinator had heard a radio report
that the plant was successfully grown over a two year period on 
Cheju Do (a Korean island province), and there was widespread 
interest when he mentioned it at a Community Committee meeting. 
The Coordinator then made inquiries at the provincial branch 
of the Office of Rural Devel.9pment, at large city nurseries, at the 
Fishing Village Development Institute in Seoul, and at pharmaceutical 
companies. He discovered that good profits could be made if size­
able amounts were grown for export to Japan. People with experience
in growing Stevia were asked to visit Yaksan where they explained to 
the Community Committee that income from the plant, which is har­
vested three times a year, would be about double that from beans or 
sesame on the same field. 
The Community Committee selected 20 farmers as Stevia growers,
loaning them a total of $1,529, or about one-third the cost of the 
seedlings. The other two-thirds of the cost was born by the individup' 
growers. Unfortunately, because of the severe drought in 1978, only 
one harvest instead of three was possible, and the expected income 
did not materialize. Even so, the return was better than for beans 
under similar drought conditions, and most of the farmers want 
to try again.. 
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Vinyl Greenhouses in Chunsong 
Some of the problems involved in introducing new agricultural 
under the most advantageous circumstances, aretechnology, even 
illustrated by the vinyl (polyethylene) greenhouse cash cro:? project 
because of lack of confidence, resourcesin Chunsong. Until 1974, 

and know-how, there were almost no vinyl greenhouses in Chunsong,
 
although they were widespread and a source of good profits among 
the neighboringthe more progressive and prosperous farm villages in 
The Community Committee, havingmyon just across the Soyang river. 
finally decided to organize adiscussed the problem several times, 
January, 1975. A specialisttraining program, which took place in 
instructor from the provincial Office of Rural Development emphasized 
corn in greenhouses,the profit-making potential of planating sweet 
because this crop would reach markets early and command high prices. 
He also described the necessary techniques to the 80 farmers who had 
indicated a desire to participate. 
to go ahead withThose attending the training program decided 
addition to arranging the instruction, was tothe project. CDF, in 
provide loans covering one-third the cost of building the greenhouses. 
After returning home and discussing the project further, however, 
tech­most of the farmers backed out, because they felt that the new 
niques were too complicated. 
This timeThe Committee then set up an-ither training session. 
they invited two experts with more practical experience. Those 
attending listened closely and exchanged ideas and opinions. Once 
again thny seemed to be confident at the meeting of their ability to 
engage in this kind of farming, but after more reflection at home they 
again felt they could not apply what they had learned. 
In early March of 1975 the Committee organized a chartered bus 
study tour for direct observation of vinyl greenhouse cultivation 
techniques. The 40 people who took part were much impressed, and 
on their return more training sessions were held locally in cooperation 
with the extension service. Still there were objections that the cost 
of building the greenhouses was too high. So a revised construction 
method was devised by the Committee in cooperation with the extension 
service, using bamboo instead of steel ribs. Two demonstration 
greenhouses were built and more detailed instruction on setting out 
the plants and transplanting was provided. Finally, only twelve 
farmers actually undertook the greenhouse cultivation, and most of 
them failed, even though the Committee worked closely with them to 
make sure that everything was done properly. According to the 
Coordinator, the trouble was that farmers would not follow instruc­
tions exactly. 
During the past three years the Committee has continued to 
encourage greenhouse cultivation, and the number of farmers success­
fully using this method has slowly increased, though with many ups 
and downs. In FY 1978 CDF supplied $3,534 in loans for vinyl house 
operations. In contrast to the original 1975 plans, however, the CDF 
loans covered about two-thirds of the cost, with farmers putting up 
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It is expected that from now on the expansion o,only one-third. 

thls form of cultivation will be rapid.
 
AN IMPROVED MONITORING SYSTEM 
A clearer picture of the progress being achieved in the impact 
areas is provided by the new Project Design Summaries recently 
adopted by CDF, based on the "Logical Framework" method of 
The Sanbuk version isproject evaluation devised by U.S. AID. 
shown in Table 9. 
Under this system a list of "objectively verifiable indicators" 
training,is established under various program headings such as 
agricultural improvement, health services and so forth. Quanti­
tative measures of these indicators are provided for three different 
dates: (1) the base year (1975), (2) the date of the most recent 
and (3) the target year (1980). A survey (in this case May 1977), 
comparison of the quantitative indicators for these three dates 
reveals how far various parts of the overall program have 
progressed since the base year toward the objectives set for the 
target year 
one of the Sanbuk objectives under AgriculturalTo illustrate: 
from 400 in 1975Improvement is to increase the number of milk cows 
(the base year) to 800 in 1980 (the target yearl. By May, 1977 the 
number of cows had actually increased to 467. Thus it was evident 
that, although some progress haJ been achieved in two years, much 
would have to be made in the next three in order to reach themore 
target.
 
on Table 9 reveals wideAn examination of all thE indicators 
variation In the rate of progress up to mid-1977 toward various 1980 
CBIRD targets in Sanbuk. Projects under the Training Program 
(except for youth training) scored consistently high. The Agricul­
tural Improvement Program had made measurable progress but would 
have to speed up to meet the 1980 targets. The Home Industry and 
Off-Farm Employment Program was clearly in trouble. The record for 
Health Services presents some puzzling paradoxes. On the positive 
side dramatic reductions are reported in infant mortality, TB cases, 
and the rate of population growth. By contrast, as of mid-1977 
nearly one-third of the children had not yet received government 
required immunizations; the proportion of preschool age children 
receiving supplementary food had Increased only six percentage 
points; and less than one-quarter of the population was utilizing 
public health services or was supplied with sanitary water. However, 
household Improvements (on roofs, kitchens, etc.) were making 
as weresubstantial progress toward some very ambitious goals, 
Public Services (new and improved roads, telephones, electrification, 
etc.). 
Overall, the Sanbuk implementation record between 1975 and 
areas--was quite1977--notwithstanding the shortfalls in some program 
impressive, considering that the momentum of the CBIRD program was 
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Table 9 
Project Design Summary 
Logical Framework 
The Sanbuk Project 
1975 May 1980 
Narrative Objectively Base 1977 Target 
Summary Verifiable Indicators Year Latest Year 
Survey 
Outputs for Sanbuk 
Miniregional 
Development Area 
The expected a. 1 community committee 
functional output established and 
1 	 1included the functioning 
following b. 20 committee members 
components 	 trained in develop. 
5 20 20components 
1. 	Training c. 25 women trained in 
8 24 25spec. dev. comp. 
d. 	 20 youth trained in 
0 	 5 20spec. dev. comp. 
e. 	 8 trainees particip. in 
spec. dev. courses 
(e.g. credit, agr. 
tech.) 0 6 
f. 	 7 agriculture improve. 
club functioning 1 6 8 
g. 	 8 mothers clubs 
functioning 8 8 9 
h. 	7 youth clubs functioning 7 7 8 
1. 	24 community leaders 
trained in spec. comp. 10 17 24 
J. 	3 local officials involved 
in dev. train, sessions 0 3 3 
k. 	 1 joint plan. session 
with local officials 0 1 1 
1. 	1 field coordination placed 1 1 1 
2. 	 Agriculture a. 200% inc. in food crop 1,480 ton 1,533 ton 1,753 ton 
Improvement b. 200% inc. in cash " 8.5 ha 10 ha 25 ha 
Program 
cowsc. 	 100% inc in livestock 400 cows 467 cows 800 
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Table 9...continued 
Narrative 
Summary 
3. 	 Credit 8 
Finance 
Program 
4. 	 Home Industuy 
and Off-Farm 
Employment 
5. 	 Health Services 
Nutrition 8 
Family Planning 
6. 	 Education 
Objectively 1975 May 1977 1980 
Verifiable Indicators Base Yr. Latest Target 
Survey Yr. 
a. 	 75%inc. in farm $40,000. $53,600 $70,000 
bank savings 
b. 	150%inc. in low $40 per $186 per $300 per 
interest loans household household household 
c. 	 200%inc. in aver. $900 $2,000 $3,700 
household income 
a. 	 50%inc. in home 10 0 15 
industries 
b. 	 36% inc. in off-farm 100 105 136 
employment 	 persons persons persons 
a. 	 100%people utilizing 0 20% 100% 
public health services 
b. 	 1.5%population growth 2.0% 1.2% 1.5% 
c. 	 70% children achieving 50% n.o. 70% 
normal growth standard 
d. 	 60%pre-school child, 30% 36% 60% 
receiving supplementary 
food 
e. 	 95% people sanitary 0% 23% 95% 
water supplied 
f. 	 70%non-parasite 30% n.a. 70% 
infected 
g. 	 3.0%infant mortality 4.0% 1.4% 3.0% 
h. 	 100%child. receiving 60% 70% 100% 
immunizations required 
by govt. standard 
I. 	 2.0%active cases of TB 4.0% 1% 2.0% 
a. 	 95%eligible child, en- 75% 84% 95% 
rolled ir middle school 
b. 	 50% Jnc. in nonformal 2 n.a. 3 
education activities 
c. 	 100%inc. in daycare 1 1 2 
kindergarten programs (program) 
d. 	 50%inc. in no. of 2 1 3 
child. attending voc. (programs)
 
training
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Table 9...continued 
Narrative 
Summary 
7. 	 Environr 
Improver 
8. 	 Public 

Services 

9. 	 Cultural 

Enrichment 

CBIRD/South Korea 
Objectively 1975 	 May 1977 1980 
Base Yr. Latest 	 TargetVerifiable Indicators 
Survey Yr.
 
a. 	 90%of roofs improved 53% 81% 90% 
b. 	 90%of kitchens 138 200 539
 
houses houses
improved 	 houses 

c. 90%of toilets 	 92 152 543
 
houses houses
improved 	 houses 

d. 90%of chimneys 92 126 543
 
improved houses houses houses 
sanitary drainages 
90%e. 	 90%Inc. in no. of 40% 50% 
f. 	 10 community beauti- 0 3 10
 
ficatlon projects
 
a. 	 10 km of new farm 11 km 18 ICn 21 km 
roads constructed
 
or Improved
 
b. 	 7 community cntrs 7 8 9
 
in operation
 
c. 	 8 projects of telephone 0 4 8
 
villages villages villages
 
8 public speaker 7 8 8
 
villages villages villages
 
d. 	 5 projects of 0 0 5.
 
embankments
 
e. 	 1 community owned 0 4 8
 
bath house per village
 
98% 100%
f. 	100%houses electri. 10% 
a. 	 4 film showings annually 1 2 4
 
b. 	 10 community libraries 5 7 10
 
established 
c. 3 community playgrounds 0 5 3
 
established
 
d. 	 2 facilities for elders 0 0 2
 
established
 
e. 	 3 cultural events org. 1 2 3
 
annually
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just building up in this period and was likely to accelerate from 
1977 to 1980. 
As helpful as these quantitative indicators are for monitoring 
the progress of implementation, some important qualifications about 
them must be noted. First, they do not reveal important qualitative 
nor do they shed any light on why somedimensions or changes, 

projects are doing well and others poorly. Second, they provide
 
little if any evidence of actual impact that successfully implemented 
clues whatever onprojects are having on the lives of people, and no 
how the benefits are being distributed among different sub-groups 
in the population--especially the poor. Finally, some of the recorded 
improvements may be the result of separate Saemaul projects, 
individual initiatives or any other cause; hence it is not possible 
to determine how much is attributable specifically to CBIRD actions. 
However, every indicator listed corresponds to a CBIRD objective, 
and in many cases--such as, for example, women's training, day care 
centers, and technical training--CBIRD Is probably the only organiza­
tion sponsoring that particular kind of activity. 
Despite these qualifications, the conclusion we draw from the 
evidence cited in this chapter is that the CBXRD program, viewed 
in the large and judged by any realistic standard, has achieved a 
remarkably good record of Implementing its project plans. One can 
reasonably expect that as more experience is gained the record will 
become even better. 
CHAPTER 6
 
THE .SOCIAL WELFARE RECORD
 
The evidence examined in the previous chapter reveals a generally 
impressive record of achievement in terms of the physical implementation 
of local CBIRD project plans and the practical application of CDF's basic 
financial strategy. The evidence also suggests--even though direct 
measurements are not available--that the CBIRD program in combination 
with the Saemaul Movement is making a significant contribution to 
increased productivity and income and to better living standards in 
the rural Impact areas, and that this contribution is likely to increase 
over time. 
It is important, however, to ask a further question: How well 
are all these activities serving CBIRD's basic social welfare goals? 
In examining this question it is important to bear in mind that 
the CBIRD approach and objectives are founded on a broad eclectic 
view of rural development which holds that economic and social develop­
ment must go hand-in-hand. Economic growth, the argument runs, is 
essential to provide increasing support for meeting basic human needs 
and improving living conditions; but a strategy that focuses largely or 
exclusively on economic growth results in a lopsided and morally and 
politically unacceptable form of development that enriches the better 
off and may actually worsen the plight of the poor and disadvantaged. 
Moreover, widespread chronic ill-health, malnutrition and ignorance 
can be serious deterrents to increased rural productivity, and unre­
strained population growth can offset the gains of economic development. 
Taking this view, the CBIRD approach therefore calls for an 
integrated combination of economic and social improvement measures, 
with special emphasis on improving the welfare and status of the most 
disadvantaged families--particularly the women, the young children 
and the helpless who comprise the most vulnerable group. These 
humanitarian goals and principles are constantly stated and restated 
In CDF reports, evaluations and brochures prepared for outside 
visitors and supporters; they are also stressed in CBIRD training 
programs and by Coordinators in Community Committee meetings; and 
they get reflected in various social welfare projects within local 
CBIRD plans involving, for example, health, nutrition, child care, 
education and culture, family planning, and women's activities. 
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THE EXTENT OF CBIRD EFFORTS 
TO HELP THE POOR 
The previous chapter showed that large expenditures have been 
made under the rubric of "social infrastructure." But, as noted 
earlier, only a fraction of the projects within this category can be 
properly classified as authentic social welfare projects calculated to 
help the poor. For example, the investments going into home improve­
ments--particularly new roofs, running water, latrines, tiled kitchens, 
electrification and telephones--have been quite sizeable, but such 
improvements are largely restricted to better off families with sufficieni 
assets to afford the cost and are generally out of reach of the poorer 
families. Even the day care centers, which charge fees, are very 
difficult for the poor to patronize, except in special cases where 
scholarships for indigent children are provided by the Community 
Committee. 
An analysis of the projects undertaken in the CBIRD areas showE 
that only relatively small investments are being made in direct social 
welfare services such as health, child care and nutrition, to which the 
poorest families are likely to have effective access. Precise calculationt 
are difficult to come by, but our estimates indicate that in the three 
year plans for Chunsong and Sanbuk for FY 1976-79 no more than 15 
percent of the overall projected investment appears to be earmarked 
for such social welfare programs. * Or, if we consider the annual planr 
for FY 1979 of Chunsong and Yaksan, the equivalent percentages are 
only 14 percent and 12.5 percent respectivTely. As a further check, th 
CDF project evaluation sheets for projects actually implemented in FY 
1978 give the following even lower estimates for social welfare projects: 
Chunsong 12 percent 
Sanbuk 10 percent 
Wido 5.5 percent 
Yaksan 5.5 percent 
The above expenditures, it should be noted, are not specially designed 
to benefit only the rural poor; rather they are for social welfare projects 
from which the poor as well as all others may have a real opportunity to 
benefit. 
These facts are generally obscured by the way in which projects 
are categorized on the forms used for planning, reporting and evalua­
tion; genuine social welfare programs are shown under the "social 
VFor purposes of this calculation, the running water systems under 
the category "health and sanitation," which require substantial invest­
ment by the home owners, are excluded. Similarly, under "education and 
culture" the day-care centers, which charge a fee, 'and the athletic and 
cultural events that are enjoyed by the whole community, are excluded. 
Some small portion of the funds spent on home improvement may be of 
benefit to the poor, but there is no record of how much. 
also includes suchinfrastructure" category which, as explained earlier, 

items as public works, housing improvements, technical and leadership
 
and CBIRD programtraining, the operation of community centers, 
In order to permit analysis for review and evaluationadministration. 

of projects in terms of their contribution to meeting basic CBIRD
 
objectives--particularly the objectives of improving the welfare of 
children, women and the poor--there is pressing need for more 
or graphs that would give a clearer picturerefined summary tables 
of which particular subgroups in the population are most likely to 
benefit--or are actually benefitting--from particular projects. 
There is no suggestion here whatsoever that any of this con-
Onfusion represents a deliberate effort by CDF to mislead anyone. 
the contrary, it appears to be the result of determined, dedicated 
efforts by everyone concerned to get on with the business of rural 
development within the particular context and constraints of the 
Korean milieu, without abandoning cherished humanitarian goals. 
CONFLICTING VALUE SYSTEMS 
It may be that South Korea is a special case, but it seems otvioui 
now in the light of both the Saemaul and CBIRD experience that rapid 
rural development is possible without first or simultaneously attacking 
the problem of primary health care, for example, or doing much about 
the situation of the very poor. What has emerged from the Korean 
experience is the fact that effective local planning and the mobilization 
of local self-help efforts in conjunction with coordinated bureaucratic 
help and a favorable economic climate has provided the formula for 
progress. Increased purchasing power on the one hand and the greater 
availability of goods and services on the other is contributing to higher 
living standards and improved life chances pretty much in accordance 
with the desires and aspirations of the rural population. Except for 
the poorest 20 to 30 percent, farmers and fishermen are eating well, 
dressing well, traveling a great deal, buying all sorts of personal 
accessories and household appliances, sending their children to 
higher schools, and investing in their own productivity. Their 
behavior reflects Korean priorities and should not be. thought of as 
a distortion of some ideal conception of rural development. The focus 
of government development policy has also been economic rather than 
social, and integration has been achieved mainly in economic terms: 
rural credit, technical advice, agricultural inputs, transportation, 
storage facilities and, above all, increasing demand for the farmers' 
crops at profitable prices, have all been made available more or less 
simultaneously. 
Slowly improving health care, more social services and a steady 
but very gradual rise in the position of women--subject to the con­
straints of an evolving national cultural tradition--are following along 
behind. With higher incomes farmers have been able to purchase more 
and better services, both as individuals and cooperatively through 
village organizations. The more able-bodied of the landless poor have 
benefitted from the much higher wages paid for rural labor, thanks to 
a labor shortage and the relatively high profits to be made from 
commercialized agriculture. In other words, most of the social and 
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economic benefits for the poor are the trickle down effects of general 
economic progress. In the mainland CBIRD communities, as a result 
of several years of effort, it is now beginning to be possible to under­
take more significant social programs on behalf of the entire local 
population, using the revolving funds established through successful 
economic projects. But it will evidently take a long time for the island 
impact areas to reach this position. 
From this perspective the CBIRD approach does not really appear 
to differ so radically from the Saemaul model, except In the size of the 
development unit and the sophistication of the planning and managemeni 
structure. Rather, it is a refinement of what appears to be a standard 
pattern of Korean rural development with some supplementary emphasis 
on cultural affairs, health, education, and family planning. The social 
welfare side of the CBIRD effort, rather than being an essential aspect 
of the integrated approach to development, appears more as an extra 
benefit derived from increased economic productivity. 
This is certainly the way the Korean farmer or fisherman views 
the matter. Their strong preference--notwithstanding CDF's social 
welfare objectives--is for productivity projects that will raise their 
own income. The CBIRD impact area Coordinators are thus caught In 
a dilemma between two value systems. In order to promote local 
decision-making, to work towards the fulfillment of genuine locally 
felt needs, and to win the enthusiastic support and participation of 
those who count most in the community, most of the program's emphasis 
must be on productivity and income-increase projects. But in order 
to promote CDF's humanitarian principles and objectives and to satisfy 
the sponsors, the Coordinators must also do their best to persuade the 
Community Committee to devote a reasonable proportion of available 
funds to genuine social welfare programs, aimed especially at the poor. 
The result is usually a compromise strongly tilted toward economic 
projects, which in the circumstances is undoubtedly the best that can 
be hoped for. 
Such projects as the construction of bath houses, toilet and 
kitchen improvements, day care centers, improved nutrition, village 
libraries, and cultural events do not really correspond to strongly 
felt popular needs. Farmers and fishermen have to be taught to 
value these projects, and even then they are likely to be more impor­
tant as competitive status symbols--sources of individual and regional 
pride--than for their inherent usefulness in improving the quality of 
local life. This kind of project reflects the outside change agent's 
view of the direction progress should take more than it does local 
aspirations. 
In spite of the intentions of planners, some social projects such 
as day care centers, more sanitary kitchens and toilets, or the 
installation of telephones actually increase the distance between poor 
and well-to-do farmers rather than improving the position of low 
income groups. In each case some contribution is required in order 
to participate, and the poor either cannot afford to spend anything, 
or they have different priorities for using whatever meager surplus 
may be available. On the other hand, a shiny tiled kitchen or 
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affluent houseprivate telephone gives added prestige to the more 
owner. 
THE EXAMPLE OF RURAL HEALTH 
Although lack of adequate health services is a major problem in 
most Korean villages, the perspective of outside observers and 
a mind-­development agents, who usually have particular solution in 
the organization ofwhether it be a proliferation of small rural clinics, 
or education for disease prevention--is likelypara-medical services, 
diffeient from that of the local population. Traditionalto be somewhat 
the lack of nearby medical personnel, and popular concep­attitudes, 
all make it extremelytions of what constitutes adequate health care, 
this field.difficult for CDF to achieve major results in 
Until quite recently most Korean farm families have been reluc­
tant to seek medical help outside the village, partly because they were 
not entirely convinced of the efficacy of scientific medicine, partly 
town were exhorbitant inbecause the fees charged by 	doctors in 
and partly because of the poor quality ofproportion to rural incomes, 

whatever health care was available closer by.
 
with most people's energies focussed primarily onIn the past, 
towns and cities was ansurvival, scientific medicine 	as practiced in 
except for the richest farmers. Still today localunattainable luxury, 

remedies are tried first, and there is usually resort to a doctor only
 
very sick or badly injured. 	 Forin desperation when the patient is 
these reasons health care still has a relatively low priority for much 
terms of how people actually allocate scarceof the rural population, in 
care of the sick at home resources. The traditional practice of taking 

without seeking expert treatment outside the village remains wide­
or less random
spread, although it is often modified today by the more 

purchase of antibiotics or other medicines on the advice of the drug­
on the store owner's advice,
store owner in a nearby town. Or again, 

injections may be administered by the village head or other reputable
 
doctor's fees and hospitalization costs are
local figure. In any case, 

still regarded as outrageously high by most ordinary farmers,
 
The farmer's relatively low priority attached to professional health 
care is mirrored in the meagerness of the Government's rural health 
programs. Part of the problem lies in the "Seoul-centered" attitude of 
most members of the central bureaucracy who, although they them­
access to the most modern medical facilities in the city,selves have 
see no pressing need to tamper with the existing situation in the
 
provinces. A perhaps even more difficult problem to overcome is the
 
to live andunwillingness of reputable doctors (and even many nurses) 

work in small towns, let alone large villages such as the subcounty
 
seat (myon). Everyone--even the farmer--is likely to think there is
 
something wrong with a person who acquires so much education and
 
a rural town. In any case, countyexpertise and then buries himself in 

and sub-cointy health clinics have a poor reputation among the rural
 
population.
 
are1 Peace Corps volunteers who have worked in these clinics 

invariably appalled at the conditions and the poor level of treatment.
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Rapid rural economic development is bringing many changes in 
this area as in most othera. Farmers watch TV programs that show 
modern operating ronms in city hospitals; and increasingly they have 
money to spend. Nearly everyone has at least one close relative living 
in the city who consults professional medical practitioners as a matter
 
seems to be that while most people may continue
of coure3. The result 
to put off going to the doctor as long as possible, when they finally
 
ey to a nearby city and consult
do go they prefer to make the jou 
someone who inspires in them some degree of confidence. 
Until very recently Korean doctors and nurses who did not work 
in large cities have usually gone abroad. Financial and social­
psychological rewards are still not adequate to attract them in signi­
ficant numbers to rural areas. 	 The situation will probably improve
 
medical and nursing school graduates
in the future, however, Lis new 
find the Seoul job market completely saturated and opportunities
 
overseas more reditricted. Also, a gradual change in high level
 
bureaucratic attitudes is taking place in the direction of providing
 
more welfare services to ordinary people. This, combined with the
 
greater avaflab~ity of public tmds, should evontually result in some
 
But since Korea is asort if government subsidized health scheme. 
small country vith increaj'ngly frequent and ubiquitous rural bus
 
transportation, it seem more likely that adequate and ralatively cheap
 
medical care will be irade available at the county seat level (usually
 
towns with a population of 30,000 to 0,000), rather than that rural
 
clinics will be established on any extensive scale.
 
Given the pprticular situation described above, the goal of 
establishing genuine rural health facilities must be regarded as out
 
of reach for the foreseeable future. On this basis the fact that CDF
 
has not made a major effort in the field of rural health must be seen
 
as a wise acceptance of the realties of the situation.
 
projects have-made significantNevertheless, some of the CBIRD 
The medical and dental schoolscontributions to health improvement. 

of major Korean universities commonly send teams of doctors and
 
students to the countryoide during the summer to provide low cast
 
health care, and CDF has arranged for such temporary clinics t) be
 
held in most of the impact areas. But farmers and their wives, aven
 
while la.dng advantage of the medical and dental services, invariably
 
grumble because they believe that the treatment given by stud q is
 
second rate.
 
CDF attemotod In 1975 to set up modest health insurance schemes 
in Sanbuk and Chunsong, utilizing such intermittent clinics as well as
 
government services. By the faUll of 1977, 70 percent of the house­
holds in Chunsong were enrolled, but a year later the plan was no
 
longer operating. No systematic investigation has been made hiito the
 
causes of this failure.
 
CDF funds have also been used to try to revitalize family 
planning programs at the village level. Community Committees in revera] 
ef the impact areas have sponsored lectures by well-known authorities 
a
. kl nnrv,+n1 ~ uI mmrnann waro md f' mnrA than a hundred 
CBIRD/South KoreaRi 
1977 who chose to have laparotemy tubectomies at pro­women in FY 
vincial hospitals. 
The Difficulties of Reaching the Poor 
Due to the relatively equitable distribution of land and the 
recent economic prosperity in the Korean cauntryside, the majorit7 
can be classified as self-!;upporting, middle levelof the population as wasfarmers enjoying a fair degree of economic security. And, 
 earn a

rlier, the skilled agricultural laborer can nowpointed out e But the poorestliving wage, even if he possesses no land of his own. 
20 percent or so of the rural population--often comprising the sick 
and 
physically or mentally handicapped, the widowed, the old and the very 
extremely difficult and vulnerable situation. Someyoung--remain in an 
meager welfare benefits are available through official channels and these 
But this sector of the population is genuinely deprivedare increasing. 
and without real hope of improving its situation in the rural context. 
It has proved extremely difficult for CDF to reach these people 
of a variety of structural constraints in the local environment."ecause 
The need to work with village elites in order to establish development
 
can evolve in the direction of autonomy
management institutions thai 
has meant that most of the CBIRD program has been focussed on the Efforts to help the poor are more prosperous sectors of rural societv. 
hampered by their lack of matching resources, low lhvels of competence, 
anc4 inferior standing in the community. Anyone whL falls to attend
 
the separate village meetings at which individual "incom1e increase"
 
either through lack of interest and confidenceprojects are discussed, loses his oppeitunity toin the program or because he lives far away, 

participate. Usually it is the poor who tend to live in the most
 
and they are the ones most likely toisolated and inconvenient areas, 

be cynical and discouraged, because they do not have enough money
 
or other resources to make a significant matching investment of their
 
own. 
areas rece.ve two kinds ofFarmers and fishermen in the impact 
loans under the CBIRD system. The CDF money allocated for 
income-increase proj6cts is first loaned at low interest rates; then,
 
when it is repaid, a revolving fund under the control of the
 
Community Committee is established as a source of iurther credit.
 
As village leaders learn te ranage these financial resources more
 
effivIently and rationally, the emphasis on raising productivity--on
 
good return on revolving fund loans--increases. The
obtaining a 
poor farmer is a bad risk, both because he needs the money for con­
sumptio,, and because his productive capacity is lower. The 
requirement that each borrower must have two guarantors willing to 
most of the poor from access to thesign his note effectively excludes 

revolving fAnd.
 
Coordinators have tried to get around the problem by Javeloping 
projects that are suitable for the poor. Korean cattle have been 
provided to some poor farmers in mountainous areas where forage is 
varkus kinds of fishing equipment haveavailable to ab. Similarly, 
Efforts have also beenbeen furnished on a small scale in the islands. 
81 The Social Welfare Record 
made to provide more loans to poor people by encouraging the forma­
tion of larger financial institutions, i.e., through merging the village 
banks established under Saemaul auspices. CDF project funds have 
In somebeen used in some instances to back these higher risk loans. 
and in the longcases scholarships have been given to poor children, 

run these may have the greatest effect. But overwhelmingly the main
 
thrust of the program has been to increase the earning power of middle
 
and well-to-do farmers and fishermen.
 
It is hard to imagine how a community development system could 
function otherwise, with most really poor families today suffering 
fiom various kinds of social/pathological problems that prevent them 
from taking effective advantage of whatever opportunities exist. 
Where genuine community spirit can be developed along with a widely 
shared sanse of social responsibility, Community Committees may elect 
to do more for the poor. It should be recognized, how dver, that for 
the most part such efforts will amount to charity, and thero is no 
areaspecial reason to expect prosperous farmers in a Korean CBIRD 
to be more charitable than people anywhere else. Thus, help for the 
poor remains a minor and relatively ineffective part of the overall 
program, despite the high importance attached to this objective by 
SCF/CDF and its Western financial supporters. 
CHAPTER 7
 
THE EDUCATION
 
AND TRAINING RECORD
 
For over 1,000 years Koreans have valued learning above most 
other activities, and during the past 500 years or so education has 
been the main path to upward mobility and high social status. These 
traditions are very much alive today, as they are in all countries that 
derive their higher culture from the Confucian tradition. Under 
Japanese colonial rule most farmers in Korea had no schooling, but 
after 1945 large investments were made in education; by 1960 nearly 
everyone was attending primary school for six years. Today, with 
relative rural prosperity, over 80 percent of rural primary school 
graduates go on to middle school, and of this group 40-50 percent 
continue their education in high school. 
During the modern period, and especially since the Korean 
War, educational aspirations have increasingly shifted from classical 
and humanistic studies to science and technology. The ability and. 
eagerness of large numbers of stivdents to absorb Western scientific 
and technical knowledge has been one of the most important con­
tributing factors to Korea's economic "miracle." Thus, not only Is 
the prestige of study both as an activity and as an end in itself 
still very high, but more specifically, the acquisition of practical 
technical skills for development is regarded as one of the most useful 
and worthy activities that one can engage in. 
These generalities also apply to the rural scene with ciLain 
qualifications. In the past only a few village youths attended middle 
and high school, and most of these moved to the towns and cities 
after graduation. Those few who returned to their villages were 
automatically regarded, upon reaching maturity, as being the best 
qualified among the local population for leadership roles, regardless 
of the nature of their education or their personal competence, simply 
because of the social and ethical prestige inherent in education. One 
problem in the past has been that not infrequently the high school 
graduate who assumed such a role possessed neither leadership 
qualities nor a dedication to public service, with disastrous results 
for village development programs. Fortunately in recent years 
much higher percentages of the rural school age population have 
been going on to middle and high schools, so that In each village 
there are many more persons in the 35 to 45 year-old group (the 
usual age of active leadership) with some capacity to read technical 
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articles and administrative directives, keep financial records, and
 
write reports. Such skills are increasingly necessary for village
 
heads to enable them to cope with larger amounts of papgr work and
 
deal with officials and other townspsople without being humiliated. 
CDF leadership and management training has been primarily directed 
at this group. 
While the rest of the rural adult population with only a primary 
school education or less may be only barely literate or illiterate, 
they are usually also eager to participate in whatever training 
possibilities are offered, even though nonformal education provides 
less prestige than the academic variety. In addition to the need 
for new skills there are important rewards in terms of self-confidence 
and standing in the community that derive from having completed 
any course of instruction. 
CDF has taken full advantage of this extremely favorable
 
situation to develop a large number of specialized training programs
 
for the CBIRD ereas. Some sort of nonformal and informal training
 
accompanies virtually every specific project. The flexibility of the
 
CBIRD program enables the Coordinator in consultation with the
 
Commuity Committee to tailor educational programs to local require­
ments. The Korean field staff has also recognizod that even non­
formal education has its formal aspects. --that the special aura of
 
prestige and confidence bestowed by even a short course in
 
leadership may be as important for subsequent performare as the
 
contents of the instruction. Consequently such formalities as
 
introductory oratory, group photographs, and closing exhortations
 
are all utilized to reinforce the educational process.
 
CDF classifies its training programs according to three
 
categories: 1) Community Basic Skills Training; 2) Intermediate
 
Training; and 3) Advanced Management Training.
 
During FY 1978, a total of 8,520 persons participated in basic
 
skills training at the community level, of whom 3,530 were women.
 
Some 193 different courses were offered, lasting from one to three
 
days. Basic skills training accounts for the vast majority of all
 
hours of instruction, total numbers of participants and numbers of
 
courses. A descriptive breakdown for all six impact ar6, is shown
 
in Table 10.
 
CDF has placed particular emphasis on the training of women, 
both in order to improve their standing in the community and to 
utilize their energy and abilities for development. In all, 3,530 
women participated in some form of basic skills training during FY 
1978. Another 34 women leaders attended leadership courses 
conducted in Seoul, while 76 women received special training in 
development planning in the island areas. If educational policy were 
determined solely on the basis of local initiative or Korean Government 
programs, there would be far fewer women enrolled in training courseE 
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Summary of CBIRD Training Activities, 

Type of Training 
Agriculture 
Animal Husbandry 
Community Development 
and Planning 
Cottage and Off-farm 
Industry 
Child Care 
Credit and Finance 
Family Planning 
Nutrition 
Para-medical . 
'Water Resource 
Development 
TOTALS 
No. of 
Participants 
1,241 
216 

1,825 
59 

61. 

935 

789 

679 

2,227 
488 

8,250 
Males 
1,047 

147 

1,408 
2 

815 

128 

1,013 
430 

4,990 
All Areas, FY 1978
 
Females No. of
 
Courses
 
194 27
 
69 15
 
417 63
 
59 2
 
59 13
 
120 10
 
661 15
 
679 10
 
1,214 19
 
58 19
 
3,530 193
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There are many different kinds of rural training institutions 
in Korea, both public and private. Coordinators can arrange to 
have selected trainees from their impact areas enrolled in appropriate 
courses, with the necessary funds provided either directly by CDF 
or through their Community Committees. The Saemaul Movement, 
the Office of Rural Development, the Federation of Cooperatives,
 
the National Agricultural Technical Association and provincial
 
universities all organize various kinds of training programs in
 
which motion pictures, slides, charts, pamphlets and other kinds 
of visual aids are prominently used. The Korean concern--some
 
might say obsession--with education is increasingly penetrating to
 
rural areas, as funds have become available and organizational
 
linkages established between the villages and national institutions.
 
Where Coordinators perceive that a need exists for specialized 
instruction, they can either invite experts to the community or 
arrange for villagers to attend regularly established courses of 
instruction (see the examples !n Chapter V of pig raising on Yaksan 
and vinyl greenhouse construction in Chunsong). The Coordinators 
themselves, who usually have wide experience in teaching, conduct 
most of the leadership and management courses at the basic skills 
level. Some of them also have more specialized knowledge, for 
exdmple, regarding such matters as cooperative financial organiza­
tions or particular aspects of animal husbandry, and they provide 
instruction and guidance accordingly. 
In Sanbuk where the Committee has been particularly active 
in organizing training programs, an outside specialist is invited 
to come and instruct each time a new kind of project is adopted. 
For example, instructors in knitting as a cottage industry and in 
various kinds of food proessing techniques were hired with money 
from the revolving fund to teach groups of women in FY 1978. In 
addition, using its own funds, the Committee has organized numerous 
tours, so that project participants can travel to other areas in-order 
to 9bserve similar, succossfully functioning projects. 
With the exception of technical subjects requiring qualified
 
experts, most of the courses are taught by the Coordinator, local
 
officials, knowledgeable Community Committee members, or other
 
competent prsons living nrrby. In Chunsong, for example,
 
officials of the agricultural o.a tansion service, which has its office
 
in the Community Center, provide frequent instruction to farmers
 
on technical matters, both in formally organized sessions and on
 
an ad hoc, informal, individual basis.
 
In addition to carefully planned courses of instruction a good 
deal of informal training takes place. Frequently in the course of 
meetings or in casual conversations the Coordinator or members 
of the Clommunity Committee will attempt to "correct" deep rooted 
values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior that are seen as limiting 
the effectiveness of developmental efforts. For example, the lack 
of punctuality, both in meeting deadlinen for the submission of 
documents and with regard to attendance at meetings, is a persistent 
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Older farmers inirritant and obstacle to getting things done. 
who still own most of the land and therefore make manyparticular, 
tend to retain a more easy-going, pre-modern senseof the decisions, 
the failure to comply exactly withof time. Another problem is 
variety ofdetailed instructions as, for example, when raising a new 

pig or planting vegetables in vinyl greenhouses. A particular
 
innovation involving precise quantitative measures that are in fact
 
crucial, may appear to farmers to be relatively trivial, so that they
 
easier to retain their old ways or fail to follow instructions
find it 
does not live up to expectations,exactly. Then, when the project 

there is likely to be general discouragement and a reluctance to
 
recognize the real problem. 
Another persistent cultural trait that sometimes interferes with 
the effective operation of CBIRD institutions is the belief by certain 
informal approach tofarmers--often influential ones--that a direct, 
the Committee Chairman, the Coordinator or local officials is the best 
way to obtain special personal advantages from a given situation or 
opportunity. Sometimes the Coordinator does, in fact, find it 
useful to treat an important person with special coasideration in
 
But as a rule
order to ensure his whole-hearted cooperation. 
asCoordinators are likely to emphasize during training sessions 
well as in informal conversations that the Community Committee must 
operate with objectivity and fairness, putting the general welfare 
ahead of personal interests in order to acquire and retain the 
general respect of the community. In other words, the Coordinator 
difficult role of trying to inculcate universalistichas the extremely 
a highly particularistic socialprinciples of thinking and acting in 

environment.
 
In spite of its emphasis on training the "consumer" of develop­
mental efforts, CDF has encountered soma obstinate problems in 
mobilizing continuing enthusiastic participation in CBIRD activities. 
no. betterOften attendance at Commurity Committee meetings is 
than 60 percent. The reluctance of women to violate traditional
 
an active role outside the home
norms of respectability by playing 
has proved to be very hard to overcome. Significant progress is 
being made in both these areas, however, partly through the 
but also becausecumulative influence of repeated training courses, 

of the more general effects of modernization--including the changing
 
values and patterns of behavior that characterize younger generations.
 
CDF organizes more elaborate programs of instruction at its 
Seoul office for local leaders (usually Community Committee members) 
to broaden their understanding of CBIRD principles and to develop 
both leadership and management skills. The training periods vary 
from two to ten days and often include field trips to the various 
impact areas, so that participante may learn from each other's 
CDF staff, including the Coordinators,practical experiences. 
outside experts,lecturers from universities or technical institutes, 

or other officials, provide the instruction, which
and Saemaul 
deals with such subjects as the planning process, financial manage­
ment, working with other local agencies, relations with the Saemaul 
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Movement, record keeping and reports. There are also more in­
spirational sessions designed to increase motivation and the intensity 
of participation in CBIRD activities. 
A more complete breakdown for the 1977-81 planning period 
of the contents of this kind of relatively highly organized and 
centralized training follows: 1) specialized management training 
for the Committee secretary/treasurer from each impact area; 
2) further motivation and development training for all Committee 
members (approximately 20 from each area); 3) special development 
training for women (about 25 from each area); 4) special develop­
ment training for youth (about 20 from each area); 5) specialized 
technical training of various kinds (numerous groups with from 
8 to 32 persons from each area); 6) training in agricultural tech­
niques for Agricultural Improvement Club members (6-10 from each 
area); 7) family life improvement for day care center mothers (10 
from each area); 8) leadership training for youth (10 from each 
area); 9) development training for local officials (3 from each area); 
10) development training for community leaders (24 from each 
area); 11) training for joint planning with local officials (1 or 2 
from each area); 12) intensive training (three months) for new 
Coordinators before they begin work in their impact areas. 
Most of the trainees are selected at Community Committee 
meetings, taking into consideration the interests, qualifications, 
and place of residence of those who volunteer. Village heads and 
other Committee members make recommendations, and in general 
the Committee tries to select about the same numbor of trainees 
from each village. The local institutional machinery for selecting 
trainees appears to operate in a reasonably effective and democratic 
manner, but inevitably the best qualified candidates tend to come 
from middle level and well-to-do farm families. 
Occasionally there will be joint training sessions organized 
by local officials in cooperation with the Coordinator or Committee 
Chairman, at which matters of concern to both CDF and the govern­
ment are discussed. There have been occasions in the past when 
officials used these meetings so blatantly for propaganda purposes 
that the popular reaction was highly unfavorable. In this kind of 
situation, when dealing with over-zealous local officials, great 
diplomatic skill on the part of the Coordinator is necessary in 
order to straighten things out. 
Under the Saemaul Movement the acquisition of techniques 
for the planning and management of development projects by. vil­
lageleaders has usually been a long and difficult process that 
has slowed down community development in many ways. The CBIRD 
approach of directly attacking this problem with well organized 
training programs designed to give local leaders the ability to 
operate their own institutions effectively represents an important 
innovative advance. 
The CDF principle that sustained, long run benefits depend 
more on local mastery of the proceeses of development than on 
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is supported by significant achievementsimmediate project success 
in all the impact areas, but most particularly at Sanbuk. There, 
intensely involved in utilizing the CBIRD institu­local leaders are 
tions to promote development. They take their responsibilities
 
long hours to the practical nuts and bolts
seriously and dedicate 
One result has been that localaspects of getting things done. 
in terms of both labor and resource investment hasparticipation, 
been consistently high, with a corresponding degree of success 
commun­in achieving project goals. Concurrently, participation in has also been widespreadity-wide cultural and recreational activities 
while not generally as out­and enthusiastic. Chunsong leaders, 
desire and ability to takestanding as those from Sanbuk in their 
for running the CBIRD program, have neverthe­over responsibility 
aless also acquired valuable experience and training in variety of
 
are still at the stage where
management skills. The island areas 
aand other important persons exertCoordinators, local officials, 
and fishermen.disproportionate influence relative to farmers 
Another CDF innovation has been the organization of special 
training courses for officials concerned with development in the 
impact areas. The job of the Coordinators and Committee Chairmen 
is greatly simplified if the local myon and gun administration has a 
and methodology.sympathetic understanding of the CBIRD objectives 
to someThe willingness of county and sub-county chiefs send of 
areastheir suboidinates for CDF training has enabled the impact 

and improve working relationships with the local
to develop 
bureaucracy.
 
In addition this kind of training has provided CDF with a 
means of getting its ideas on integrated community development 
across to working levels of the Korean administration. Although 
there is no evidence yet that CBIRD principles have been adopted 
it is certain that they are being consideredon a national scale, 
for further develop­in governmental circles as possible models 
that those aspects ofmental initiatives. And it can be expected 

the CDF approach that are particularly successful will probably
 
be incorporated in some form in the Saemaul Movement. In any
 
event Korean Government policy for rural development appears to 
be gradually converging with CDF ideas in two respects. There 
is now somewhat greater emphasis on regional as. opposed to village 
projects, and slightly greater attention is being paid to rural 
social wlfare. 
In all the impact areas Community Committees, usually 
working through an educational sub-committee, have used CDF 
funds to improve the educational facilities provided by local 
primary and middle schools. Various CBIRD projects have financed 
classroom furniture, teaching aids, library books, and such ameni­
ties as school drinking fountains. In Chunsong, where collaboration 
between the Community Committee and the Kasan primary school has 
been particularly productive, CDF funds have been used, in 
addition to the kinds of projects listed above, to support a 
school newspaper and ior the repair of a small educational green­
1978 the Chunsong Community Committee Chairmanhouse. In 
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recef ed a letter of commendation from the Minister o:" Education in 
recognition of the Committee's role in raising the sclool's academic 
performance. Where extensive day care programs have been under­
way for some years (Chunsong and Sanbuk), the beneficial effects 
of pre-school experience in raising learning ability are now becoming 
apparent, and the establishment of day care programs on a national 
scale is under discussion by government officials. 
In addition to the educational projects mentioned above, small 
scholarship funds have been made available in all the impact areas 
to help poor and worthy students. 
There is another way in which collaboration between Coord­
inators and the primary schools helps to further CBIRD objectives. 
Each school usually serves several villges, so that school activities 
involving parents tend to promote inter,-village contacts and to 
some degree, cooperation. Where Commurzity Committees actively 
support and assist schools on such occasions as Children's Day, 
athletic contests, the exhibit of agricultural products grown or 
raised by students, and outings with parents, they are contribu­
ting to the creation of a larger community beyond single village 
boundaries. Tha school, therefore, can serve as another focus 
of multi-village activities in addition to the Community Center, 
provided the Coordinator is able to establish appropriate relations 
with local educational authorities. School teachers throughout 
Korea have been commanded by the Saemaul authorities to contri­
bute to development by helping raise the scientific and national 
consciousness of the rural population, but often because of the 
teachers' lack of practical knowledge, farmers and flchermen do not 
take their efforts seriously. Nevertheless, Ruhool teachers are in 
a position to contribute to leadership and management training 
as well as the inculcation of a broader regional sense of community. 
The fact that primary school teachers are somewhat overworked and 
underpaid limits the extent of their participation in CBIRD activities, 
however.
 
CHAPTER 8 
SOME INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS
 
The CBIRD experience in Korea 	throws penetrating light on 
generic to innovative ruralseveral deep-rooted problems that are 
development undertakings in many countries and therefore need to 
be understood by all who seek to bring about social and economic 
improvement in rural areas. 
It is hoped that the discussion of these problems below will not 
be misconstrued as minimizing in any way CDF's impressive achieve­
ments in Korea, which are considerable. These achievements have 
and indeedbeen described and documented in the foregoing chapters, 
one wonders how it would have been possible to accomplish more with 
The CBIRD program has been both innovativethe available resources. 

and flexible. Lessons learned in other parts of the world and through
 
long experience in Korea have been incorporated in it, and the Korean
 
Field Office director and staff have shown extraordinary dedication
 
and ingenuity in pursuing both the basic goals and detailed practical
 
procedures.
 
In spite of these positive factors, however, one lesson drawn 
from this study must be that, even under relatively ideal conditions, 
community and rural development is an extraordinarily difficult and 
complex undertaking, mid we still have a great deal to learn about 
the best ways to carry it out. 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES
 
OF DIFFICULT'Y
 
Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that so much of the commun­
ity development literature--even including practical guides t.or use in 
the field--is tinged with missionary zeal born of Westei, humanitarian 
are high and there is so much at stake; upgradingideals. Expectations 

the livss of unfortunate people is seen as a virtuous undertaking of
 
such pressing importance that ordinary objections and constraints
 
must not be allowed to stand in the way. But certain intractae
 
constraints nevertheless do stand in the way, not least of all the
 
traditional village social structures and patterns of behaviour that
 
stoutly resist change in the face of outside blandishments and efforts.
 
And to compound the difficulty, the proclaimed basic goals of the
 
innovative model, reflecting the assumptions and value system of a­
distant "donor" society, may be quite incongruent with the current
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priority concerns, traditional value system and basic realities of the 
In this
"recipient" society in which the n3w model is to be applied. 
event a sizeable gap inevitably develops between the stated goals and 
the actual accomplishments, and a distorted picture of the reality 
tends to emerge. 
A further part of the difficulty is that once the new program
 
gets underway, pressures mount steadily to produce quick, visible
 
a naturaland measurable results. This pressure comes in part from 
eagerness on the part of the project managers to prove to the local 
people and the host government that the particular innovative develop­
ment model is indeed viable and capable of yielding sizeable benefits. 
But the pressure also derives from the need of the external sponsor­
ing organization to demonstrate to its own ronstituency and major 
funding sources that their honey is producing good results, consistent 
with the originally proclaimed priority goals. If a major funding 
source happens, as in this case, to be an official bilateral aid agency 
use nf theaccotutable to its national legislature for the effective 
taxpayers' money in a manner consistent with the policy o,.ectives 
set forth in its legislative mandate, then the pressure for c;emonstrable 
results becomes even more acute. Moreover, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, the bilateral agency's own evaluation staff, distant 
from the scene of action and unfamiliar with the surrounding realities, 
may exert a decisive influence on the project's built-in evaluation 
provisions and on the kinds of performance data that get periodically 
reported. 
The inevitable net effect of these various constraints, incon­
gruities, pressures and statistical reports is to build up a somewhat
 
distorted picture of the internal realities of the project and its actual
 
accomplishments, making them appear to fit the originally stated
 
objectives more closely than the actual facts may warrant.
 
The point to be emphasized Is that socio-economic change in any 
society has Its own Inner dynamic, patterns, and processes, and these 
often resist or even run counter to attempts ,ygovernments, 
voluntary -rganizations and local change agents to carry out programs 
of social engineering in accordance with predetermined ideas about 
where rural commurAt'js uhould be going. To a considerable extent 
the belief that one car, transR o-m local institutions, attitudes, relation­
ships, and behavior isboWd to be frustrated. For example, the 
whole complex of ideas, Ideals, and rhetoric surrounding the concept 
of "community," which lies at the core of the CBIRD concept, appears 
on close examination to be fuzzy and somewhat unrealistic in the light 
of social reality (a point we will return to later). Or, to take an 
example at a different level, although the periodic CBIRD field 
reports have generally provided the types of statistics called for, 
they have devoted little attention to the analysis of problems; thus 
the failure of health insurance schemes, for instance, and of projects 
Jasigned to promote small or cottage industry, have not been examined 
in a thorough, analytic fashion in order to determine what went wrong, 
and whether further efforts might be worthwhile. It is almost as if 
there were a general, informal agreement to the effect that there must 
be no dwelling on failures or concerns with problems that might 
Interrupt the positive, optimistic momentum of the parent organization. 
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Anyone familiar with the financial and operational exigencies of 
voluntary organizations based in developed countries but stieking to 
assist developing countries will appreciate that the problems sketched 
unique to SCF/CDF in relation to CBIRD; thr-­above are by no means 
are the common fare of virtually all such organizations, and they arf 
well known also to official bilateral and multilateral agencies. 
DILEMMAS IN THE SELECTION
 
OF PILOT AREAS
 
The first problem faced by any organization, public or private, 
that sets out to test a new rural development model is to establish 
then to select aappropriate criteria for selecting the pilot areas, CBIRD's experiencemanageable nrmber of areas that fit the criteria. 
to pose some difficultsuggests that this selection process iE likely 
dilemmas. 
arsasIn CDF publications two criteria for choosing the impact 

are stressed: 1) poverty and inaccessibility and 2) high potential
 
to the first, it is observed that "all
for development. With regard 
areas qualify as being among the most economically dis­six project 
with substandard conditions ofadvantaged areas [in the country] 
" And, in fact, CDF base line statisticseconomic and social needs. 
do show that income levels were somewhat below the national average
 
at the time the areas were chosen.
 
available, however,Direct observation and further evidence now 

indicate that the levels of productivity and income in the selected
 
actually not greatly below the national average (inimpact areas are 

a period of rapid rural development), and that topographical con­
areas arestraints are not particularly severe. Although the mainland 

characterized as "mountainous," this simply means that they are
 The state­located in valleys with mountains rising up around them. 
ment that "83%of the Sanbuk area is mountainous" should be compared 
68%of the entire country is too mountainous forwith the fact that 
Sanbuk is only three hours by bus from the capital cityagriculture. 
of Seoul. The Chunsong area is very near a large provincial city with 
In both regions the arable land per householdfrequent bus service. 

is not significantly less than the national average.
 
In the island areas, there are a number of distinctly poor and
 
relatively isolated villages, but the sharply rising prices for seaweed
 
and fish in recent years and improving produtctivity have given many 
of the villages on Yaksan and Wido higher average incomes than nearby 
mainland communities. Nor is isolation such a severe problem any more, 
at least for most villages in the group. On Yaksan there are regular 
dialy ferries connecting several different island villages with each 
other, with the mainland, and with other islands. On Wido there is 
one large (100 ton) ferry making a daily connection with the mainland. 
Thus the image of backward, isolated communities as the setting 
for CBIRD projects is somewhat exaggerated. Most of these villages 
are very much in the main stream of current Korean rural development, 
with the transition from a subsistence to a market-oriented economy 
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either well under way or virtually completed. Of course, CDF efforts 
have helped speed the transition and cecrease the degree of isolation, 
but in the main it is rapid national ecenomic growth, tlhe Saemaul 
Undong, and other governmental actions th'it are transforming Korean 
rural society in this regard. 
The other criterion for village selection was developmentrl 
potential. CDF has reported that "cohesive areas" were chosen 
"where linkages exist to market and growth centers," where there is 
a "potential for investment," a "demnnstrated wfllngness to learn," 
and the "potential for the development of leadersidp." Given this favor­
able constellation of attributes, it is almost inconceivable that in 
contemporary Korea fairly rapid development would r~ot take place 
in any event. The CBIRD inilative, however, ensures that a few 
clusters of villages will have an advantage, moving ahead faster 
than others, with a more secure basis for managing their own affairs 
and more effective procedures for linking their efforts with outside 
resources, both private and official. 
A number of q'iestions can be raised about these prcc3dures for 
choosing impact areas. To what extent is it justifiable to "stack the 
deck," as it were, in choosing villages that already have most of the 
ingredients for successful deielopment? Is there an element of dis­
crimination against the "hard cases"--the really mountainous villa ge",) 
or the really isolated islands--where outside help Is much more 
desperately needed? And how long should a voluntary agency assist) 
a carefully chosen community before seeking to extend its initiatives 
to other less favored areas? 
The dilemma here, of course, is that trying out a sophisticated 
and complicated new approach such as CBIRD,. even in relatively 
favorable situations, is bound to entail unforeseen difficuties and 
risks of failure. But to select the "hardest" cases will greatly 
compound the difficulties and risks of failure, and even at best visible 
results will come more slowly. Therefore prudence suggests the 
initial selection of areas that Lie somewhe:e between the wst and 
least promising situations, where the new approach will stand a 
reasonable chance of success. But the further one moves in this 
direction, the more one must stretch the criterion of "poverty and 
inaccessibility," and the less relevant the experience may be to 
truly disadvantaged and poverty-stricken areas, whether in Korea 
or in lower income developing countries. 
A further dilemma arises once an impact area is chosen and 
actions get underway. Understandably, there is a compulsion to do 
everything possible to promote Ats success, regardless of comparative 
needs elsewhere. The success of that particular Initiative becomes 
almost an end in itself. Attention and resources are concentrated on 
it without too much concern for whether similarly intensive assistance 
is possible on a much larger scale. The Coordinator's personal sense 
of mission and identity as wel as his career reputation are linked to 
sucessful project completion in one particular context. And to some 
extent this phenorenon Is reinforced at higher echelons, since the 
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succes-SCF/CDF Korea field office is naturally anxious to report the headquarters and itssful achievement of its planned goals to the U.S. 

principal financial supporters.
 
These are difficult issues. CDF is confronted with the problem 
Unless there is fairly rapid, tangibleof proving its case in Korea. 
neither the local population nor theprogress in the CBIRD areas, 

Korean Government is going to becoma enthusiastically involved in
 
furthering CDP objectives. Obviously results are necessary in order
 
to others that CDF innovativeto make an initial impact, demonstrating 
But the basic problem remaina. If one avoidspractices are effective. 
the "hard cases" not only in other parts of Korea but even the hard 
villages within the designated CBIRD impact areas, how relevant and 
useful will the lessons be to other countries where incomes and 
and the rural economy is relativelyresources are much lower, 
stagnant? 
as noted earlier, is anFor example, the Yaksan impact area, 
island with 21 villages, some 12 of which on the East and North sides 
the Westernare quite prosperous, while the other 9 villages on 
both in terms of amounts ofand Sothern coasts are relatively poor, 
access to marine resou.ces. When questioned as toarable land and 
why so many of the CBIRD projects were clustered in the better-off 
communities, the Coordinator pointed out, quite rationally, that 
wereprojects involving complex agricultural and fishery innovations 
unlikely to succeed unless the farmers nr fishermen in question are 
fairly well off, with resources of their own to invest and a reputation 
for competence. When it was suggested that some of the current
 
projects in the more prosperous areas might be phased out to permit
 
a greater concentration of effort in the poorer villages, there was
 
immediate objection on the grounds that confidence in the credibility 
of CDF initiatives could only be established through continuing 
support of projects over a period of several years. Little could be 
without this kind of follow-through.accomplished, it was asserted, 

And without doubt the Coordinator was rightl
 
Tle dilemmas are apparent. Conscientious, dedicated staff, 
both in the field and at higher levels, are committed to making certain 
But this processdevelopment strategies work in the selected areas. 
entails unforeseen consequences: there is a built-in tendency to 
favor places, projects, and persons where the risk of failure can be 
minimized. And the voluntary organization as a whole comes to identify 
its mission and accomplishments primarily with the ongoing progress 
of a few carefully nurtured impact areas. The more fundamental
 
goals of 1) improving the situation of the "low income rural popula­
tion" and 2) testing a "development management model" for eventual
 
use in areas where development initiatives have been less successful
 
Inevitably are relegated to a lower priority.
 
SOCIAL STRUCTUREEOBSTACLES TO CHANGING 
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
Throughout the international development community today
 
there is a new emphasis on the humanitarian goal of improving the lot
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of the rural poor. What this actually requires, of course, is
 
altering the social structures, the human relationships, and the
 
pattern of income distribution within rural communities. Again the
 
CBIRD experience demonstrates how difficult this can be, even in 
an uiusually dynamic milieu. 
Despite the fact that Korean rural society is undergoing a pro­
cess of extraordinarily rapid change and development, there is also 
a great deal of social, political, and moral continuity. Contemporary 
rural society is firmly rooted in traditional institutions, both the 
cohesive natural community, which for more than 1,000 years has 
supported itself by cooperative rice culture, and the belirfs and 
patterns of behavior that are regulated in accordance with Confucian 
whether Korean or foreign,doctrine. Thus the outside change agent, 
who goes into a Korean village with a little capital and technical 
advice, expecting to bring about planned "reforms" in the structure 
has little chance of success. Both the inexorableof social relations, 
changes associated with long term modernization and the deep-rooted 
traditions are usually impervious to hie efforts. But in Korea, at 
least, development along economic lines does not require a thorough­
going transformation. Fatalism, dependency, and lack of confidence 
are being overcome within the context of a traditional social 
environment that still emphasizes hierarchy, paternalism and 
the subordination of individual goals and desires to the interests 
of family, lineage, and community. 
Historically, Korean villages have been left pretty much alone 
by the central bureaucratic authority, and accordingly there is a 
long tradition of self-government and self-reliance. Today the transi­
tion has been made nearly everywhere from leadership by an older 
elite concerned mainly with survival and preservation of the status 
quo, to leadership by younger activists determined to promotn change 
But in other respects the traditional system is pretty much intact. 
This system of authority and decision-making at the village 
level can best be descrlbed as "consensus politics." There is exten­
sive discussion among all those who are interested in any given issue, 
and everyone's voice is heard. But it is the village elite--comprising 
formal leaders, wealthy farmers and other influential men--who 
actually determine (often informally) what decisions are reached and 
how they will be implemented. It is their responsibility to make sure 
that decisions are fair and equitable, and social censure is usually 
effective in insuring a reasonable degree of conformity with the 
ideal. Others are expected to go along once agreement has been 
reached. Every man's voice does not have equal weight, and no 
one, least of all the poor, expects that it should. Persons of educa­
tion, wealth, high status, experience, and good reputation are 
"naturally" regarded as more qualified to make decisions. 
Land ownership Is one essential attribute of status, respect, 
and authority in traditionpl peasant societies. The landless poor are 
dependent on the good will and charity of their neighbors (usually 
relatives), and their influence on decision-making in village affairs 
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is slight. They are clients and go along with their patrons' wishes. 
Twenty years ago 35 to 50 percent of Korean aural households
 
could be classified as very poor--either landless or with so little
 
land as to make them dependent on laboring for others. Today the
 
combination of land reform, rural development, and very large scale
 
rural/urban migration has probably lowered this figure to around 20
 
Another 20-39 percent might also be consideredpercent or even less. 

poor in the sense that they are barely able to make ends meet. But
 
each year the "ends" in the sense of acceptable minimum standards
 
for food, clothing, education, material goods, medicine, and so 
forth, become u little more ample. 
Although wages and living standards of agricultural laborers 
have improved considerably (with the shortage of agricultural labor), 
the prospects for structurally altering the status of the rural poor 
are not particularly good. Land prices are well out of their reach, 
and without land they are unable to take advantage of most of the
 
development projects that have been designed to raise productivity
 
and increase income. An occasional competent, diligent, healthy,
 
lucky, and austere individual will in fact succeed in breaking out of
 
the category of the landless poor, but he is the exception. The 
hard core of the very poor are old, or young, or sick, or widowed,
 
or lazy and incompetent; and the amount of self-help of which they
 
are capable Is limited. Except for the opportunity provided by
 
migration and entry into the industrial labor force, the able-bodied
 
rural poor are pretty well stuck with their role of agricultural
 
labor, dependent for their well being on the trickle-down effect
 
of increasing prosperity among their land-owning fellow villagers.
 
In the traditional village, kinship ties and a sense of communal 
responsibility provided a kind of primitive welfare system for the 
poor and unfortunate. With the exception of a few landowners, 
everyone's living standard was low, and the difference between the 
poor (ordinary farmers) and the very poor was as much oue of status 
as of consumption levels. But as part of the modernization process 
there has been a weakening of kinship ties and communal responsi­
bility during the past 30 years or so, with a corresponrling 
development of individual initiative. Today, the attitude of middle­
level and well-off farmers towards the village poor is not much 
different from that of Americans: they ere necessary in order to 
perform manual labor, but their wages are regarded as outrageously 
high. Where personal ties exist, there are numerous individual 
acts of generosity. But moat farmers still consider their own finan­
cial situation to be precarious, and they are primarily concerned 
with waye to take advantage of expanding markets and new tech­
nology in order to increase their own earnings. Any utopian notion 
on the part of change agents that such people are going to redistri­
bute income In order to promote economic egalitarianism or operate 
a thoroughgoing commumal welfare system must be rejected as utterly 
unrealistic. 
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LIMITATIONS ON REACHING THE POOR 
It is within this context of traditional patterns of village 
leadership and decision-making and in terms of the intractable 
problems confronting the rural poor that one must consider CBIRD 
objectives and accomplishments. 
The Coordinator is obliged to work with local elites. Most (in 
some cases all) membels of the Community Committee are village chiefs, 
while the C,,:mittee Chairman and Vice-Chairman are likely to have an 
even more exalted status. The "felt needs" expressed as a result of 
the Committee's deliberations are those of middle-level and well-to-do 
farmers with capital resources in land worth from about $20,000 to 
$50,000 or more (in 1976) and annual incomes ranging from $2,300 
(average farm household income in 1976) to over $6,000 (on the 
average, for that 5 percent of the farm population who owned more 
than 2 hectares of land in 1976). These figures are, of course, much 
higher today. To the extent that there is grass roots representation 
in the planning and implementation process, these, then, are the 
graes roots. The "bottom" in "bottom-up" planning comprises for the 
most part agricultural or fishing entrepreneurs with considerable 
capital, who are keenly cognizant of and participate in regional, 
national, and overseas markets for their products, and who have 
had rapidly rising incomes for the past ten years or more. The 
rural poor, on the other hand, have neither the confidence, the 
education, the status, nor the opportunity to participate, except 
passively, in the planning or implementation of village self-help 
projects. 
Any program to redistribute land or provide long term low 
interest loans for land purchases would require a major policy 
decision on the part of the Korean Government (many such ideas 
have been discussed) and an enormous capital investment. A 
massive pro gram along these lines is unlikely, however, bcause 
from the economist's perspective--and economist /bureaucrats are 
now the most influential technocrats in the Korean technocracy-­
contiulng economic development requires that more and moze of 
the rural population leave the land and join the industrial labor 
fozce. Korean farms are too small to be really efficient, it Ln argued, 
and to some extent current rural prosperity Is indeed dependent on 
artificially high (government subsidized) grain pricas. It can be 
expected, therefore, that in the future government policy will pro­
mote the increased mechanization of larger individual farms rather 
than efforts to assist the lowe3t income groups to acquire land in 
rural areas. 
Such detailed background information regarding the rural 
economy may seem irrelevant to an evaluation of CDF's highly 
practical and effective initiatives in the six Impact areas. But the 
Issue we are considering here is not whether the CBIRD system is 
helping farmers and fishermen increase their productivity, incomes, 
and q'amlity of life, or whether it is helping them learn to manage 
their own village affairs. It isdoing this and doing it well. The 
present issue is, to what extent is CBIRD reaching the rural poor? 
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It is our conclusion that, given the stage of development in Korea,
 
the nature of village social structure and politics, and the direction
 
the capacity of self-help projects to improveof government policy, 

the situation of the landless poor to any marked degree (except
 
through charity) is quite limited.
 
it isIf we examine the actual results in the impact areas, 
evident that most of the assistance and benefits are going to middle 
level and well-off farmers. Even the loan programs and most of the 
social welfar6 projects are relatively inacceasstble to the poor. Loans 
from the village revolving fund require two guarantors. As a 
result the poor can borrow only very minor amounts. The fees of 
day care centers or health insuzance schemes are too great for most 
as we have 	shown earlier, except for a relativelypoor families. And 
most of thefew projects such as the raising of Korean cows, 

efforts designed to raise icome have not been directed towards the
 
poor.
 
In short, in the rural Korea of today there appears to be an 
inherent cortradiction betwebn the aim of improving the relative 
position of the poor and the aim of fostering a solidly-based, ener­
getic program of development through self-heir,. CBRD productivity 
prujects are mostly geared to the requirements of independent cash­to 
crop farmers or fishermen with some resources of their own 
i3conomic base and supporting the author­invest. By building up the 
CBIRD is in effect ensuring that theity of these village elites, 

socio-economic structure of rural society will not be radically dis­
it is an important, albeit discouraging findingturbed. If 	this is so, 
and should help tn make the enunciation of future development goals
 
and programs more realistic.
 
ACHIEVING A BALANCED "PROJECT MIX" 
In the circumstances just described, achieving the "right" mix 
area between social welfare c.nd produc­or balance in each CBIRD 
tivity projects becomes very difficult. The fact that the direction
 
of Community Committees is firmly in the hands of village elites
 
means that there Is a predilection for investment in projects that
 
will increase incomes. The opinions or desires of women, children,
 
or the old are not forcefully presented, yet one gets the
the sick, 
village opinion would not differImpression 	that even if they were, 
For the most part Koreansdrastically 	from that of their leaders. 
today seem 	to be strongly imbued with a capitalist, free enterprise
 
They want to earn more money, and then from a position
mentality. 

of relative economic independence decide themselves how to spend It.
 
On the other hand, there is in most places also a strong sense 
of communal responsibility and a tradition of cooperative effort. 
There is often great pride in successful cooperative undertakings 
and an improvement in morale as a result that goes far beyond actual 
economic benefits. Th-a tension between traditional rural communalism 
on the one hand ani the exuberant new individualist activism on the 
other is another factor contributing to the enormous complexity of 
cor temporary Korean society. 
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In any case, among the projects requiring joint effort there 
seems to be more enthusiasm for building roads, dikes, bridges, and 
water supply systems than for day care centers or health clinics. 
And even when such sociFl projects are carried through to completion, 
it is primarily the actual building that Is the focus of popular atten­
tion and effort rather than the activity that is supposed to take place 
inside. All over Korea farmer3 ha';e built village meeting halls at the 
urging of Saemaul officials, and there is often a good deal of local 
pride in the finished product as a monument to village cooperation and 
progressive spirit. But In many places the halls are seldom used for 
meetings, serving instead for storage or living quarters. The build­
ing itself is a tangible sign of development effort, but the activity, 
particularly where it Is unfamiliar and not specifically addressed to
 
urgent, locally felt needs, remains outside the villagers' immediate
 
concern, even though they may regard it as desirable.
 
Through numerous and repeated training sessions CDF has-­
with considerable success--stressed the Importance of conducting 
frequent regular meetings at the community center to discuss develop­
ment programs, ss well as the maintenance of a permanent office where 
management of development matters can take place on a continuing 
Probablybasis. These are an integral part of the CBIRD concept. 
a similar concerted educational effort is necessary in order to create 
a local demand for, and a sense of personal involvement in, more 
intensive health, welfare and cultural activities. 
Actually the problem is quite complex. There are different 
voices within the CDF organization itself urging greater emphasis on 
one or the other kind of project. Different Coordinators have dif­
ferent points of view and, off course, the extent to which they 
influence the Community Committee's decisions varies in each area. 
Villages and impact areas are at different stagee of development, and 
sothe psychological environment also varies from place to place, 
that it is extremely difficult for any outsider to judge what combina­
tion of projects is best suited and most feasible in a given situation. 
In general things are left up to the Coordinator's judgement. 
He must balance the Committee's expressed wishes against his own 
conception of integrated and balanced development, or what he 
believes is necessary in order to comply with CDF's goals or its 
obligations to funding sources. For example, on Yaksan one of the 
Coordinator's greatest problems has been the gap between the kinds 
of projects desired and expected locally (large scale public works) 
and the varied small scale assistance programs that are regarded as 
approprIate by CDF. In Sanbuk, where commimity solidarity in 
support of CBIRD goals is highest, a medical insurance scheme was 
organized at the urging of the Coordinator, but it has broken down 
through lack of popular interest. 
Probably the current, somewhat amorphous situation, in which 
there is a formal delegation of authority to ths Committee combined 
with continuing informal pressure exercised by the Coordinator ir cis 
effective as any other system might be in reronciling these opposing 
points of view. But the compromise solutio-is are bound to fall 
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short of the ideal, both for tha local proponents of concentrating on 
income-raising projects and fur the CDF proponents of giving greater 
attention to health, nutrition, child care and the status of women. 
THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF "COMMUNITY"
 
While the main focus of interest on the part of CDF and of the 
villagers themselves is development--the actual accomplishment of 
projects that will improve incomes and the quality of life--it is Impor­
tant also to consider holintically the kind of residential entity, i.e., 
environment, within whichthe social-economic-psychological-spatia
On the oale hand there is the pro­development can best take place. 
ce:s itself--the dynamic activity that produces desired developmental 
the other, there is the social context--a particular setresults. And on 
of relationships among local people, their Institutions, values and 
patterns of behavior--that provides a favorable setting for that 
not between economicprocess. The conceptual difference here is 
projects and social wulfare projects. Rather it is between concrete 
developmental activity of all kinds and the small society where it take 
place. In other words, it is useful to make a distinction between 
community and what the community can accomplish. The CBIRD 
program represents an innovative approach to both aspects of the 
problem. 
Let us considgr first the Issue of the mini-regional (or multi­
village) impact area as a community. * To what extent has CBIRD 
been able to expand the psychological and behavioral boundaries of 
residents in the hamlets and clusters of hamlets that make up its 
Impact areas? In Sanbuk it seems evident that there Is a broader 
sense of community beyond village boundaries. It is not, of course, 
the same closed, exclusive, "we/they" type of solidarity that 
characterizes most small natural villages where there are tightly 
grouped clusters of houses; and certainly everyone in the Sanbuk 
area is not included. Nevertheless, a large measure of cooperative, 
not only in the mobiliza­constructive effort takes place in Sanbuk, 
tion of labor for carrying out projects but in their planning and 
direction as well. The management of and participation in other 
local institutions of a social, administrative, recreational, financial 
and educational nature also reflects the fact that the social field, 
i.e., the territorial environment within which farmers are accustomed 
to share their ideas, work, and visits, and within which they feel 
comfortable In pursuing their goals, is in fact larger than the single 
village. 
But Sanbuk is exceptional, not only among the CBIRD creas but 
in Korea as a whole. "Commumity" is essentially an ideology for 
those who partcipate in it. The community's members must not 
only share common beliefs and goals; they must derive psychological 
Community is used here in the sense of a group of frequently 
inter-acting people who share similar Ideals and work together 
effectively for achieving common goals. 
101 Some IntractableProblems 
satisfactions from joint participation in work, play, and ceremony. 
There must be a common sense of belonging that is stronger than 
the rivalry, jealousy, and competition that exists among individuals, 
kinship groups, or natural hamlets. 
Creating such a working social ideology where it does not 
alreudy exist is not easy. Perhaps it is not even possible in the 
short run. It is all very well to use such names as Community 
Committee and Community Center, or to refer to groups of villages 
in the impact areas as a community. * And it is certainly a worth­
while objective to try to foster a sense of community and cooperation 
for the achievement of desired goals. But this whole operation--at 
least the English-speaking part of it--sometimes seems to involve a 
certain amount of self deception. One has the impression that 
becaue the term "community" is used so much, the rhetoric has 
taken on a life of its own, convincing the promoters of change that 
the desired result is being more fully achieved than may actually 
be the case. One can argue, however, that in Korean rural villages 
today, partic!.darly those that are developing most rapidly, there is, 
in fact, an increase in individual ambition and the pursuit of private 
goals compared to the past. Genuine community is being gradually 
eclipsed by modernization, just as it has been throughout much of 
the industrialized world. Thus, the basis for cooperation is increas­
ingly self-interest, and the basis for effective leadership is 
increasingly expertise and demonstrated performance. At the level 
of the impact areas Coordinators are fully aware of these social 
realities, and the programs are being designed accordingly. Thus, 
training, the efficient operation of organizational structures, and 
administrative linkages among organizations are crucial. Closely 
knit bonds of community, except for such efforts as mobilizing the 
labor of a single village, are, although always desirable, less and 
less likely to be an integral factor in regional development. 
Another essential characteristic of the successful mini-regional 
area as exemplified by Sanbuk is that most local residents, whether 
they play a leading role or not in the management proc6as, have a 
sense of proprietorship--a feeling that the Community Committee, 
the Credit Union, the Community Center, and the revolving fund 
all are in some degree their own institutions rather than just the 
instruments (however welcome) of an outside agency. As a result 
there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative upgrading of their
 
participation in such organizations.
 
There is a good deal less evidence of community in the Chun­
song area, where the program has been gcng on for the same length 
of time. And in the Islands where CBIRD was first initiated in 
1977, the extension of villagers' sense of mutual responsibility, 
territorial loyalty, and focus of cooperative endeavor Is still in its 
initial stages. 
*Actually, the word for community in Korean is an esoteric, 
technical term used mainly by rural sociologists. It is unknown to 
farmers. The Korean for "Community Committee" and "Community 
Center" stresses development and welfare rather than community. 
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It is evidently impossible to pin down the causes of such an 
The best thatelusive psychological trait as community solidarity. 

can be done is to suggest a set of variables that are related; each
 
community must then be considered in terms of its unique mix of
 
these variables.
 
Important among these variables, of course, are the given
 
characteristics of any particular place--the structural factors that
 Distribu­affect cohesiveness and its expression in group activity. 

tion of land ownership, the composition of kbiship groups, settlement
 
and the quality of local leadershippatterns, ease of transportation, 

are all significant elements. In both tha Chunsong and Wido impact
 
those villages where there is a particularly uneven distributionareas 
as well as less desireof wealth deinonstrate less internal solidarity 
to cooperate in projects with other communities. In the genuine 
mountain villages that are outside of but adjoin the Chunsong impact 
area, most houses are widely dispersed because of the shortage of 
arable land and steep terrain. In such places cooperation even with­
in a single village is difficult to organize, because few projects can 
b6 devised that benefit everyone more or less equally. It is also 
more difficult to obtain a village consensus, particularly with regard 
to such projects as electrification or water supply, where the costs 
of supplying outlying households are much greater than for a single 
tightly clustered group of dwellings. Topography has an effect 
also on communication and ease of access, complicating the task of 
anyone trying to organize cooperative work or participation in
 
these kinds of problems are
other activities. As indicated earlier, 

particularly severe in the island areas.
 
One of the most crucial variables is the Coordinator's skill 
It is' not only what he does but what kind of person heand style. 
is--from the villagers' perspective--that makes all the difference. 
He must be respected, but he must also be liked. One essential 
ingredient of community is egalitarianism; if the social gap is too 
great there can be no community. In Korea there are two traditional 
dimensions or models for personal relationships, the collective or 
communal and the hierarchical. The Coordinator usually comes to 
an area with considerable authority, an urban manner, wealth (he 
controls substantial funds), and education. His relations with high 
local officials are cordial. The farmer, even the influential farmer, 
initially accords such a person high status and relates to him in a 
Villagersdeferential, subordinate, and somewhat formal manner. 

fit naturally into a hierarchical relationship (that of the inferior)
 
in dealing with powerful outsiders; but this is also a way of keeping
 
them outside, of asserting local exclusiveness.
 
The problem for the Ccc-rdinator is to break through the 
formality and status barriei:, so that he can interact on the basis of 
mutual respect with the local elites. The Coordinator must be popular 
as a human being, able to relate easily to all kinds of people without 
being patronizing or paternalistic. 
As part of his efforts to instill in influential members of the 
local population a sense of proprietorship in operating their own 
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local institutions, the Coordinator should stay in the background,
 
boosting the importance and active participation of local leaders.
 
But he must also keep some kind of control over the direction of
 
local initiatives, opposing or somehow mobilizing opposition to im­
practical schemes. In other words, he must be strong enough to
 
stand up to local interests when the occasion demands it. The
 
ability to keep everything on the right track without antagonizing
 
influential local citizens requires great political skill.
 
There are some situations, of course, where no amount of skill 
or good will on the part of the Coordinator can overcome local 
distrust, at least in the short run. For each impact area there are 
stories of the jealousies, resentments and hostility engendered during 
initial stages of the program. It is not yet clear whether some of the 
problems encountered in the island areas are due to particular states 
of mind characteristic of isolated communities, to lack of social and 
political skill on the part of the Coordinator, or simply to the fact 
that the programs have only been in effect a short time. 
No matter how effectively the Coordinator plays his role, or how 
successfully development projects are carried out, other factors can 
impede the growth of community feeling beyond village boundaries. 
Unless there are close social or kin ties linking the villages, or 
strong common economic interests, it Is extremely hard to create 
a larger sense of community. In the last analysis it also depends 
on the predominant values and the mood or morale of the local villages 
making up the impact area. Where many of the influential and wealthy 
farmers are primarily concerned with furthering their own interests, 
there is a tendency for them to disengage from close involvement in 
community affairs and develop independent ties with outside persons 
and institutions. Or they may try to co-opt the CBIRD structure tc 
further their own ambitions. In such a situation efforts to mobilize 
support for educational improvement, health care, or recreational 
events are much more difficult, and the goal of enlarging the 
community may become unattainable. It seems axiomatic that only 
where key individuals become personally in-tolved in furthering 
collective goals is there much chance for success. 
CBIRD'S SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION 
If we shift our attention away from such lofty themes as
 
abolishing rural poverty, creating harmonious communities, or
 
inculcating participatory democracy in villages and uonsider instead
 
the CBIRD strategy in terms of its immediate practical goals, we
 
begin to get a cletrer Idea of Its actual accomplishments.
 
First of all it is widening the social field of farmers and pro­
viding the skills and experience they will need in order to survive 
and prosper in the complex world of commercialized, high technology 
agriculture. In this connection it is worth noting that in Korea 
rural development Is no longer a matter of Jolting farmers out of 
traditional apathy or conservative agricultural practices. The ques­
tion Is simply how far and how fast rural development will be pushed 
relative to other sectors of society. A wide variety of services to 
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the farmer such as agricultural extension, credit, storage, distribu­
tion, and marketing advice is becoming increasingly available through
 
official channels.
 
The Saemaul Undong, while centrally planned and administered 
with the continuing personal backing of the President, has also
 
strongly emphasized the important role of local village leadership in
 
planning and implementing self-help projects. The announced goal
 
has been to transform the consciousness of farmers so that they will 
recognize the potential benefits of working together for collective 
community goals. It is not a contradiction to state that strong "top 
down" bureaucratic pressures have been used to promote enthusiastic 
to certain mass mobilization
"bottom-up" participation. A resemblance 
strategies in socialist countries, particularly the principle of "demo­
is probably morecratic centralism" ti the People's Republic of China, 
the other hand, the national economic systemthan coincidental. on 
tightly Integratedwith which Korean farmers are being more and more 
is one of free enterprise and competition. As a result, the rewards
 
for efficient agricultural production involving advanced technology
 
are increasing, while inconpetent or overly conservative farmers
 
are being driven off the land. And not surprisingly, for the
 
given earlier, the rate of progress in different villagesreasons 

has been quite uneven.
 
It is in the areas of leadership, the acquisition of relatively 
sophisticated management skills, and the exploration and utilization
 
of better ties with institutions outside the villages that the CBIRD
 
program is making a particularly useful and important contribution.
 
weakest,It supplements the Saemaul Undong In the areas where it is 
by providing training in those techniques of integrated rural develop­
ment that can be practiced by the villagezs themselves: systematic 
long and short range planning, the management of local development 
organizations, the creation of financial institutions designed to re­
cycle increased income back into the "community" economy, and
 
techniques for obtaining various kinds of outside help from both
 
public and private sources.
 
To the extent that CBIRD is successful in promoting effective 
cooperative efforts at the multi-village level, it will enable the 
traditional cohesive solidarity and mutual interdependence of the 
village to survive on a larger, more viable scale. In the small, 
closed, Korean natural community there has always been a great 
deal of economic and social mutuality. Correspondingly, there has 
also been an easy intimacy as well as a security and harmony of 
personal relationships that is expressed constantly in the sharing 
of work and material goods, generous (often extravagant) hospitality, 
and frequent informal gatherings. But today a considerable degree 
of atomization is taking place, as time honored valucis and customs
 
clustered around such concepts as mutual help,, cooperation, and
 
the amicable settlement of disputes give way to the hard driving
 
individualism of the cash crop farmer. As individuals expand and
 
strengthen their connections with outside institutions, ties with
 
their neighbors are weakened. Everywhere there is Increased
 
dependence on sources of leadership, capital, know-how, and
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with the drive formanufactured goods beyond village boundaries, 

higher living standards taking precedence over most other
 
considerations.
 
The CBIRD strategy, best exemplified by the Sanbuk area, 
helps the rural population deal with both of these challenges, the 
pressing need to expand links with the world outside the village 
and the threat of commercialized individualism to cooperation. Where 
successful the CBIRD model can point the way to another alternative 
direction for rural society: the formation of larger, economically 
prosperous cooperating social units within which the most 
important humanistic aspects of traditional rural society can perhaps 
be preserved against the enormously powerful influences of 
consumption-oriented materialism and economic individualism. 
Although the goal of creating genuine multi-village communities may 
prove somewhat illusory in many instances, the CBIRD approach 
offers many advantages by enlarging the scale and therefore the 
effectiveness of self-help and self-management. This permits the 
Community Committee to undertake more ambitious projects to deal 
more effectively with local administration, to tap other outside 
sources of technology and capital, and to train its own leaders In 
relatively sophisticated management skills. 
CHAPTER 9
 
SOME LESSONS
 
AND OPEN QUESTIONS
 
In examining the operational record of CBIRD in search of 
useful lessons, this report has stressed certain special character­
istics of the Korean setting that provide a generally favorable context 
for rural development, as well as certain other characteristics that 
place practical limits on the CBIRD approach. Both sets of factors-­
positive and negative--need to be kept in view in considering the 
future potentialities of CBIRD in South Korea and the feasibility of 
replicating some or all of its special features. 
This final chapter recapitulates some of the special contribu­
tions the CBIRD program has made in the Korean context and suggests 
some considerations that will determine its applicability in other 
countries. It also addresses two outstanding questions of importance 
to many couatries, and a third concerning the survival and future 
influence of CBIRD in South Korea. 
Since 1971 the pace of change in virtually all of South Korea's 
36,000 villages has picked up dramatically, as village economies have 
become more and more tightly integrated with that of the nation as a 
whole, and as bureaucratic influences on almost every aspect of farm 
life have deepened. From this standpoint the CDF program must be 
seen as an effort to fine-tune and accelerate the process in a few 
carefully selected areas. The rural populations of the CBIRD impact 
areas are particularly fortunate in that the kinds of benefits, train­
ing, and experience they are receiving will have long lasting effects, 
enabling them to compete more effectively in the materialistic sweep­
stakes that are now going on in South Korea. 
Korean rural dovelopment in recent years has taken place 
under the influence of the Saemaul Movement with its emphasis on 
paternalistic guidance Lnd material support from above combined with 
the mobilization of popular cooperative effort under local leadership. 
CBIRD has supported the Saemaul efforts but has gone beyond them, 
enabling farmers, fishermen and others in its impact areas to exer­
cise a greater degree of control over the development process. While 
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geaeral effect of both Saemaul and CBIRD initiatives has probablyone 
been to reinforce a realization by these local producers of their 
dependence on outside institutions and the linkage of their livelihood 
with the national economy, the CBIRD approach has clearly demon­
strated better ways to plan, finance, and direct further progress 
In accordance w'ith villagers' own goals and needs. It has furnished 
the multi-village area with a set of institutions and a methodology 
that enables the local population to make the most of their available 
resources. Most importantly it provides them with a workable means 
of acquiring those essential factors of production that are everywierc 
in short supply: capital, technical know-how, and management skills. 
So far, particularly in the mainland impact areas, the CBIRD 
initiatives have produced impressive results in increased productivity, 
incomes, and local living standards. On the islands there have been 
some initial problems and delays, but a wide variety of projects is now 
being implemented, and given the fact that some of the island programs 
represent much smaller per capita investment by CDF, the benefits 
already achieved are significant. 
APPLICABILITY OF CBIRD EXPERIENCE
 
TO POORER COUNTRIES
 
In a report such as this it is not possible to reach any firm
 
conclusions regarding the extent to which successful CDF programs
 
in Korea are replicable elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems useful to 
ask some leading questions that might help to establish a comparative 
basis for exploring the possibilities. 
1) 	 How important is the relatively egalitarian distribution 
of land ownership in determining the outcome of the 
CBIRD experiment in Korea? 
2) 	 Has the strong demand for agricultural and fishery 
products from prosperous urban centers been a necessary 
condition for raising farm income? 
3) 	 To what extent does the success of CBIRD's non-formal 
educational program depend on popular attitudes towards 
learning? 
4) 	 How much has CBIRD depended on the effective operation 
of le.al administrative agencies and Korean government 
inputs in order to achieve its planned goals? 
5) 	 To what extent does CDF's concentration on areas with a 
."good potential for development" account for the program's 
impressive achievements? Or, conversely, would the 
CBIRD experience be more relevant for less developed 
countries if there were greater emphasis on "hard cases"? 
There ,an be no doubt that the first four factors listed above-­
the relatively equitable distribution of land holdings, the profitable 
and expanding markets for agricultural and fishery products, the 
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high value traditionally placed on education and learning in the 
Korean culture, and the aggressive promotion of rural development 
by the government--have all contributed importantly to the effec-
It would seem to follow, therefore,tiveness of the CBIRD program. 
that the absence of any one or combination of these positive factors 
in another country setting--especially a very low income country 
with a low economic growth rate--would constitute if not an outright 
barrier at least a serious impediment to replicating the successful 
CBIRD experience in South Korea. 
As to the fifth question concerning CDF's concentration on
 
areas 
with a "good potential for development," we can give only a
 
speculative answer. CDF was undoubtedly well advised to choose
 
such promising areas as Sanbuk and Chiusong in which to
 
required testing out a complicatedlaunch its experiment because it 
and untried approach that would inevitably present sizeable problems 
and risks even under relatively favorable circumstances. To have 
could well have doomed the experimentstarted with the hardest cases 

to failure from the outset. In moving on from these initial areas
 
to the island areas of Wido and Yaksan, CDF did indeed take on
 
good
some relatively "harder cases." Yet even these areas had a 
deal going for them, especially in terms of prospering markets and 
rising prices for marine products, and the availability of substantial 
local savings--albeit concentrated in relatively few hands--for 
reinvestment in development. 
There are, however, some much "harder cases" in Korea,
 
particularly isolated mountain villages with only poor to moderate
 
development potential and still lying outside the mainstream of
 
the dynamically growing Korean economy. It is reasonable to sup­
pose that if the CBIRD app;oach were now to be tried out on some
 
of these truly "hard cases" it would encounter much greater diffi­
culties and would probably have to be modified substantially in
 
certain respects in order to achieve significant results. But the
 
experience thus gained would undoubtedly 
offer much poorer 
countries to the south a wider range of useful lessons--both positive 
and negative--than the present CBIRD experience. 
This observation is not intended to imply, however, that the 
CBIRD approacji and the lessons of its experience in South Korea 
have no relevance to less I :osperous countries. On the contrary, 
It may well be that certain features of CBIRD's strategy and
 
methodologies--for example, its way of dovetailing local planning
 
and implementation with broader nationwide planning and develop­
ment efforts, its technique of recycling outside grants into local
 
revolving loan funds, and its successful efforts to link rural 
communities with outside sources of know-how and technical 
support--may well have considerable applicability to other countries, 
provided, of course, that they are properly adapted to the quite 
different circumstances of these countries. Indeed, no one can 
really know until it %as actually been tried. 
What is very clear, however, is that CBIRD's unusually favor­
able environment in South Korea, especially the extraordinary 
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economic dynamism, cannot readily be replicated elsewhere. There­
fore, the expectations of what a modified CBIRD approach might 
achieve under much less favorable economic circumstances should be 
appropriately modest and realistic. In other-words, inflated rhetoric 
and false hopes should be studiously avoided. 
THREE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS 
The discrepancies noted earlier between CBIRD's more intan­
gible goals--particularly concorning social change and welfare--and 
the actual program accomplishments pose a few important unresolved 
questions that merit brief review, especially since they apply to 
many countries. 
1. Can the Poor Really be Helped? 
It has been pointed out in previous sections that most of the 
benefits from CDF investment accrue to middle level and well-off 
farmers, and that relatively little can apparently be done to change 
this pattern despite the best intentions and efforts on the part of 
the CDF staff and Coordinators. In the Korean case It seems evident 
that except for outright charity, attempts to help the jp3orest sector 
of the rural population must depend mainly on the trickle-down effect 
of generally increased village prosperity. The goals of restructuring 
society so as to change the distribution of wealth, mid of establishing 
a new welfare-oriented mentality among local elites, are simply beyond 
the capacities of the CBIRD program--or any other program for that 
matter, short of a thoroughgoing political revolution or an ideological 
revitalization movement. 
The question then inevitably arises; despite the widespread 
international consensus on the need to Improve the lot of the rural 
poor, to what extent is this goal really practicable? Perhaps there 
is something wrong with our perceptions of the problems. Have we 
taken adequate account of the very solid and durable social/ 
structural obstacles to the kinds of change that are so widely 
regarded as desirable? Or, to put the matter in terms of practical 
strategies, Is It possible to redistribute wealth or focus efforts 
mainly on aiding the poor, while at the same time promoting self­
sustaining rural development? We raust conclude here that, In Korea 
at least, the answer seems to be no. Further, our assessment of 
the CBIRD programs suggests that, regardlbss of its statements 
of basic principles and objectives, SCF /CDF--at the level of actual 
operating procedures--has implicitly reached the same conclusion. 
Unless a rural society is In a state of chaotic demoralization or 
upheaval, which has not been the case in South Korea, an effective 
integrated development program must be based on existing traditions, 
values, and institutions. It may be possible to modify their operation 
in gradual and subtle ways, but if the change agent's commitment 
compels him to confront and try to do something all at once about 
such intractable problems as the role of women, child-rearing 
practices, village authority structures or hierarchies of wealth and 
status--all in addition to technical agricultural innovation--then 
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truly his program's failure is assured. In Korea, at any rate, effec­
tive self-help efforts depend on strengthening and Improving village
 
accordance with generally recognized,
institutions and leadership in 
or radically transformingtraditional standards--not on undermining 

afford to lose sight of the
them. The community worker can never 

social mechanisms through which penple interact and organize their
 
group efforts, no matter how dedicated he may be to certain over­
riding objectives.
 
Hard questions must be asked: is the ideal of integrated 
economic an! social development always valid as a working strategy?
 
The CRIRD experience in Korea suggests that this issue should be
 
with the major pushapproached through carefully planned stages, 
social welfare projects coming after effective improvement in thein 
sector and after extensive indoctrination through non­economic 
Such an approach reflects two particular charactor­formal education. grosslyistics of the Korean context. First, while rural health care is 
inadequate by W3stern standards, health problems are not so severe 
as to impair either vilage morale or work output. Second, the Korean 
fisherman gives highest priority tcj economic devdiopment.farmer or 
CDF Coordinators and Community Committees have arrived at 
reasonably successful compromises on this issue in the actual working 
out of a viable mix of projects in the impact areas. The social welfare 
effort has been concentrated mainly or women's training, day care 
centers, and actions to reinvigorate and supplement existing family 
planning programs. Except for the day care centers, however, the 
amounts investod have been minor compared to other kinds of projects. 
even with these kinds ofAnd, as has been pointed out before, 
the better educated, more confident, and more aggres­projects it is 

sive women from economically secure households who receive most
 
of the benefits.
 
that if "bottom up" participationAnother lesson here, then, is 
It is that under the CBIRDand decision-making has any meaning, 
approach local leaders will determine the direction that development 
(and the local administration's)takes in accordance with their own 

ordering of priorities. The Coordinator has considerable influence
 
on the Committee's deliberations, but any serious effort to alter
 
local priorities would be self-defeating, which is to say that any
 
major and direct effort to improve the lot of the landless and help­
less poor will have to wait. 
2. Will Villages Work Together? 
Another major objective of the CBIRD system has been the 
as the focus for developmentformation of multi-village communities 

a distinction between a true
efforts. Here it is useful to make 
soaiological community and a set of villages that are able to plan 
and work together under unified leadership for mutually agreed upon 
goals. The distinction can ba illustrated by differences In the 
degree of solidarity and the manner in which CBIRD institutions are 
operated in the different impact areas. Only in Sanbuk does there 
appear to be a strong and broader sense of community in which 
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feelings of mutuality and social responsibility--a conuern for the
 
common welfare--go beyond village boundaries to encompass the
 
whole impact area. The impressior, is inescapable in Sanbuk that
 
farmers not only participate energetically, they also take pride in
 
operating the CBIRD machinery for their own purposes. This same 
sense of proprietorship is popularly reflected in the frequent, 
everyday use of the Community Center, where, for example, a 
steady stream of people conduct their business with the credit union. 
In the other CBIRD areas the same general formula is being
 
followed, and there is widespread and grateful recognition of the
 
benefits derived from it. But for most people the activities remain
 
something that is being done for them by outsiders in accordance
 
with externally imposed rules and procedures. In terms of their
 
associations, loyalties and economic goals people continue to identify 
themselves with a particular village or kinship group. Or, where 
such ties are weakened, they are likely to migrate to tlhe city. In 
other words, the CBIRD spirit has not yet become an integral, deeply 
rooted part of the local sub-culture and social system. The lesson 
here would seem to be that while the advantages of larger scale, inter­
village cooperation are self evident, the erosion of village solidarity 
and the formation of an expanded rural community is likely to be a 
very slow process. 
CDF's goal of establishing multi-village development units on a 
larger scale is impeded by other factors as well. The ide%of the 
natural village community as the focus of social life and (now) of 
developmental aspirations is cL-eply ingrained in Korean mentality. 
Intimate, long term personal association is regarded as the proper 
and natural basis for both rural leadership and cooperative effort. 
Accordingly the Saemaul organizers (reportedly including President 
Pjark), while recognizing the Importance of planning and coordinated 
effort on a regional basis, have continued to emphasize the individual 
village, both as the local decision-making unit and as the basis of 
labor mobilization. Coordination of larger projects beyond the village 
level is regarded as the function of local administration. 
Is it likely that the demonstrated effectiveness of the CBIRD 
methodology will change official thinking on this issue? On the basis 
of the present study it seems highly problematical. The emotional 
associations of the village as Fi social and political unit have been 
mentioned above. In addition there are powerful bureaucratic and 
political forces influencing the direction of development of rural 
institutions. The Korean administration's approach is eminently 
pragmatic: 1) any concessions and adaptations to foreign organiza­
tions that are necessary in the short run in order to ensure the 
continued flow of outside assistance are readily made; 2) there is 
a genuine eagerness to learn new techniques and technologies, which 
if useful will probably be incorporated somehow in future practices. 
In the longer run, however, the prestige, authority, ar d ubiquity 
of Korean governmental agencies will determine the form and manner 
of operation of all local institutions. 
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3. What are CBIRD's Long Term Prospects? 
areToday the social and economic horizons of Korean farmers 
and CBIRD projects are accelerating the process.rapidly expanding,
Local leaders are actively participating in guiding the development of 
But the Korean Government depends on the dociletheir communities. 
support of the rural population. It does not look kindly on the form­
ation of any independent, private associations at the local level that 
might be in a position to challenge the authority of official agencies 
a rallying point for demands for greater local autonomy.or serve as 
as some have done, thatIt would be highly misleading to assume, 
for economic developmentthe organization of local decision-making 
represents a significant trend in the direction of grass roots political 
democracy. Korean tradition, current governmental practice, and 
a ten­the geo-political situation in Northeast Asia all oppose such 

the immediate foreseeable future.
dency, at least in 
Thus it seems unrealistic to expect that a set of model or 
Korean rural sojiety can eventuallypilot communities iunplanted in 

accordance with a particular
transform that society by example in 
is the other way around. As CDF phasesideal vision. Rather it 
the model will inevitably be transformed by theout its operation, 
area and by theparticular conditions and popular attitudes of each 
ubiquitous and growing influence of the bureaucracy. 
But even if the present CBIRD model seems unlikely to spread 
will it survive in thespontaneously throughout South Korea, 

after CDF withdraws? Without occasional
present impact areas 
capital inputs and at least periodic encouragement and supervision 
program sustain itself in anythingfrom the outside, can the CBIRI) 
will depend heavilylike its present form? The answer, in our view, 
on whether by then the CBIRD system has achieved a sufficiently
 
high degree of integration in the sense of being supported and
 
addition to achieving thesanctioned by local values nd customs, in 
Given these conditions,sense of proprietorship referred to earlier. 
the survival prospects seem promising, but lacking this, there seems 
little likelihood that it will be perpetuated after the Coordinator and 
his capital are withdrawn. 
One promising possibility that merits consideration, even if 
it may seem remote at the moment, is that the myon level coopera­
tives might take over the local CBIRD role of promoting and coordin­
ating integrated rural development. But before this can be 
there will have to be some drasticregarded as a serious alternative, 
changes in the structural organization and operating style of the 
and in the attitudes of its officials. Localcooperative system, 
branches of the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation in 
The parent organization is aKorea are cooperatives in name only. 
with a strong "top-down"centralized government bureaucracy 

with great resources and
orientation. It is extremely powerful, 
the fields of ::ural credit, farm Input supplies, and inauthority in 

the collection, storage and distribution of agricultural products.
 
There have been many changes for the better in its operations as
 
..a result of the Saemaul Movement, but no one believes that it
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represents the farmers' views or interests. 
At the time of this case study discussions were reportedly
 
going on at high levels in the Korean Government with a view to
 
restructuring the cooperative system to achieve a greater degree
 
of active lOcal participation and greater responsiveness to local
 
needs. Were this to occur, the national organization would then
 
play more of an advisory and facilitating role than, as at present,
 
a strong-handed directive role as executor of government policy.
 
In such a climate, the seeds of local planning, management and
 
self-help that CBIRD has planted and nurtured would have a real
 
chance to thriva. Whether such a vision Is utopian or not, it
 
appears to us that the local cooperative is in fact the logical focus
 
of integration and the most promising successor to CBIRD.
 
In any event, there can be little doubt that in the long run
 
the CBIRD innovations will leave some useful and enduring impacts
 
on the Korean rural scene. But just what form they will take and
 
how extensive they will be, only time can tell.
 
